Toledo City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ. of Ohio
| Citation | 56 N.E.3d 950,146 Ohio St.3d 356 |
| Decision Date | 04 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014–1769.,2014–1769. |
| Parties | TOLEDO CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION of Ohio et al., Appellants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Nicholas A. Pittner, James J. Hughes III, Susan B. Greenberger, and Jennifer A. Flint, Columbus, for appellees Toledo City School District Board of Education, Dayton City School District Board of Education, and Cleveland Metropolitan School District Board of Education.
Marshall & Marshall, L.L.C., and Amy M. Natyshak, Toledo, for appellee Toledo City School District Board of Education.
Jyllian R. Guerriero, for appellee Dayton City School District Board of Education.
Wayne J. Belock, for appellee Cleveland Metropolitan School District Board of Education.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, Hannah C. Wilson, Deputy Solicitor, and Todd R. Marti, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants.
Scott, Scriven & Wahoff, L.L.P., Patrick J. Schmitz, and Derek L. Towster, Columbus, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio School Boards Association, Buckeye Association of School Administrators, Ohio Association of School Business Officials, Ohio Education Association, and Ohio Federation of Teachers.
Peck, Shaffer & Williams, Thomas A. Luebbers, and Michael T. Dean, Cincinnati, urging affirmance for amicus curiae County Commissioners Association of Ohio.
, J.
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, we consider whether the General Assembly has the constitutional authority to retroactively reduce the amount of state funding allocated to local school districts and to immunize appellant State Board of Education of Ohio (“the department”) against legal claims by school districts seeking reimbursement for retroactive reductions in school-foundation funding. The department advances the following proposition of law: “The General Assembly has constitutional authority to adjust local school funding retrospectively.” We agree.
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Retroactivity Clause, Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution
, does not protect political subdivisions like appellees Toledo City School District Board of Education, Dayton City School District Board of Education, and Cleveland Metropolitan School District Board of Education (“the boards”) that are created by the state to carry out the state's governmental functions. Therefore, we hold that the General Assembly has constitutional authority to adjust local school funding retrospectively. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
{¶ 3} A school district's revenue is derived primarily from state and local funds, with federal funds playing a lesser role. State funding is determined and distributed through the School Foundation Program, R.C. Chapter 3317, which is administered by the department. R.C. 3317.01
. One component used in the formula for calculating a school district's funding is the district's average daily membership (“formula ADM”).
{¶ 4} For fiscal year 2005, a school district's formula ADM consisted of the total number of students actually receiving the district's educational services plus the total number of students who were entitled to attend school in the district but who received educational services elsewhere, including at community schools. Former R.C. 3317.03(A)(1) and (2), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 106 (“H.B. 106”) 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4254–4255. Each school district certified its formula ADM to the department based on a one-time student count conducted in early October (the “October count”). Id. at 4254.
{¶ 5} Enrollment changes that occurred outside of the October count did not increase or decrease a school district's funding, with one exception: students who attended community schools but who were not included in their district's October count were added to the formula ADM. H.B. 106, Id. at 4262.
{¶ 6} While community-school students were included in school districts' October counts under H.B. 106, Id. at 4255, the community schools' funding was not determined based upon those counts. Instead, that funding was based on the number of students in attendance at the community schools, which was submitted monthly to the department in an enrollment report known as the Community School Average Daily Membership (“CSADM”). Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn., 176 Ohio App.3d 157, 2008-Ohio-1434, 891 N.E.2d 352, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.)
. Based upon the CSADM report, the funds attributable to a student enrolled at a community school were deducted from the student's school district's school-foundation funds and paid to the community school that reported the student in its CSADM. Former R.C. 3314.08(C), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 95, 150 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1117–1118.
{¶ 7} During fiscal year 2005, the department noticed that the number of community-school students reported in some districts' October counts was greater than the number reported in the CSADMs. Believing the CSADMs to be more accurate, the department recalculated those school districts' school-foundation funding for that fiscal year. The boards respectively allege that the department determined the October counts were too high by the following numbers of students: Toledo, 561 students; Dayton, 688 students; and Cleveland, 575 students.
{¶ 8} This recalculation resulted in the department's determination that the boards had been overpaid for fiscal year 2005. The department recouped the overpayment by deducting the overpaid amounts from the boards' school-foundation funding during fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007. The boards allege that the department reduced funding during these years by the following amounts: Toledo, $3,576,948; Dayton, $2,548,120; and Cleveland, $1,857,311.
{¶ 9} In 2007, the Cincinnati School District sued the department over its fiscal–year–2005 adjustment of Cincinnati's school-foundation funding. Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 176 Ohio App.3d 157, 2008-Ohio-1434, 891 N.E.2d 352
. The trial court determined that Ohio law mandated that the formula ADM from the October count be used to calculate school-foundation funding—not the monthly CSADM data from the community schools. Id. at ¶ 2. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
{¶ 10} The department appealed to this court and we accepted review. 119 Ohio St.3d 1443, 2008-Ohio-4487, 893 N.E.2d 515
. The action, however, was dismissed before briefing because the parties reached a settlement. 119 Ohio St.3d 1498, 2008-Ohio-5500, 895 N.E.2d 562.
{¶ 11} During the pendency of the Cincinnati litigation, the General Assembly amended R.C. 3317.03
to authorize the department to adjust the formula ADM if an error was discovered. Former R.C. 3317.03(K), 2007 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 119. Additionally, in the 2009 biennial budget bill, the General Assembly immunized the department from liability for any legal claim for reimbursement brought by a school district for the reduction of school-foundation funding for fiscal years 2005, 2006, or 2007 (“budget provision”). See 2009 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, Section 265.60.70.
{¶ 12} In 2011, four years after the last reduction in funding resulting from the 2005 adjustment of their formula ADMs, the boards filed complaints seeking an order that the department had to pay their respective funds for fiscal years 2005 through 2007 using only the formula ADMs from the October counts and not from the CSADMs. The boards also sought equitable restitution for funds they claimed that the department had wrongfully withheld. Parents of some children in the school districts joined the suits but did not allege separate claims. The three cases were transferred to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and consolidated.
{¶ 13} The department moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing in part that the budget provision barred the boards' claims and insulated the department from liability. The trial court held that the budget provision's elimination of potential state liability was unconstitutionally retroactive. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed. 2014-Ohio-3741, 18 N.E.3d 505
. It held that the budget provision was unconstitutionally retroactive because it impaired the boards' “substantive right to School Foundation funds that accrued under the statutory law in place for FY 2005 through FY 2007.” Id. at ¶ 42.
{¶ 14} The department argues that the Retroactivity Clause protects private parties, not arms of the state, and that therefore, the boards' claims that the budget provisions are unconstitutionally retroactive fails. The department sets forth numerous bases for its position. First, when the 1851 Constitution was adopted, the settled meaning of “retroactive laws” did not reach laws affecting government entities, and debate during the 1850–1851 constitutional convention reveals the intention to incorporate the settled meaning into the Constitution. Second, the Ohio Constitution's structure reinforces the conclusion that the phrase “retroactive laws” does not apply to laws affecting the state's political arms. Third, decisions of this court after the Constitution's ratification hold that the Retroactivity Clause does not prohibit retroactive laws negatively affecting state subdivisions. Lastly, the department argues that the Tenth District relied upon cases that did not squarely address this issue.
{¶ 15} In response, the boards argue that the Retroactivity Clause is absolute in its prohibition and, as such, there is no...
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