Tompkins v. Quaker Oats Co.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1921
• Citation: 239 Mass. 147,131 N.E. 456
• Parties: TOMPKINS v. QUAKER OATS CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

239 Mass. 147

131 N.E. 456

TOMPKINS

v.QUAKER OATS CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

June 2, 1921.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Richard W. Irwin, Judge.

Action by Lester Tompkins against the Quaker Oats Company. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions. Exceptions sustained.

The action was against a manufacturer of poultry feed for negligence in its manufacture, causing the death of plaintiff's hens. Plaintiff purchased the feed from a third person, and not from defendant.

Shelley D. Vincent, of Milford, and Hugh D. McLellan, of Boston, for plaintiff.

Warner, Stackpole & Bradlee, of Boston (J. G. Palfrey and R. J. Cotter, both of Boston, and Marvin C. Taylor, of Worcester, of counsel), for defendant.

DE COURCY, J.

This is an action to recover damages for the death of a large number of hens, alleged to have been killed by salt in Schumacher feed, manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff bought the particular bags of feed alleged to have caused the loss from the Whitney Coal & Grain Company of Concord, which was a purchaser from and not a selling agent of the defendant. The declaration alleged that the death of the poultry ‘was caused by the negligence and improper mixing and compounding of the said ‘Schumacher feed’ by the said defendant,' in consequence whereof the feed which he purchased ‘contained dangerous and deleterious substances.’ With the exception of certain phrases in his charge, which will be referred to later, the presiding judge submitted the case to the jury as one based on negligence. For instance he said:

‘The same rules of law apply to this as in all the cases that you have tried, negligence of the defendant and due care of the plaintiff.’

Again:

‘Unless and until you are satisfied that there was negligence on the part of the defendant you will go no further, you stop, and your verdict would be for the defendant.’

And:

‘The plaintiff asserts here that the negligence upon which he bases his case was caused by the defendant at its place of manufacture.’

As was said by Bowen, L. J., in Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 625, 694:

‘The ideas of negligence and duty are strictly correlative, and there is no such thing as negligence in the abstract; negligence is simply neglect of some care which we are bound by law to exercise towards somebody.’

It is a long-established general rule that the manufacturer of an article is not liable to those who have no contractual relations with him for injuries resulting from negligence in its manufacture. This has been based on the various grounds of the absence of a legal duty to the plaintiff to use care in making the article, the break in the chain of legal causation, and the multiplicity of suits thought likely to result if the action were allowed. Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N. E. 482;Windram Manuf. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 237 Mass. --, 131 N. E. 454, and cases cited; Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109; Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865, 57 C. C. A. 237, 61 L. R. A. 303. This general rule is subject to certain well-settled qualifications or exceptions. One, which recognizes the liability to third persons on grounds of negligence in the preparation of food for human consumption, is not applicable here, and need not be discussed. Wilson v. Ferguson Co., 214 Mass. 265, 101 N. E. 381,48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 219, note. Another established exception recognizes the existence of a duty of care in favor of strangers to the contract, where the product is inherently or commonly recognized as dangerous to human life or health; such as poisonous drugs and explosives. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455;Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567, 96 Am. Dec. 682;Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64;Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 220 Mass. 593, 108 N. E. 474. And there is a tendency in certain courts to extend this doctrine to cases where an article not inherently dangerous becomes so by reason of negligentpreparation. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, L. R. A. 1916F, 696, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 440;Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co. (C. C. A.) 261 Fed. 878, 8 A. L. R. 1023.

In the present case there was no evidence that Schumacher feed, in its ordinary state, was harmful to poultry. The testimony was all to the contrary, including that of the plaintiff, who had used it for two or three years before his loss early in 1918.

The complaint against the feed then bought by him is that salt, although commonly used as a desirable ingredient in commercial poultry feeds, was present in too large quantity; that this excess quantity was due to negligence in the process of mixing, and that it was responsible for the death of the poultry.

In instructing the jury as to the law applicable the presiding judge adopted the following requests submitted by the defendant:

‘(2) Upon all the evidence there is no evidence that the device used by the defendant in the preparation of the product used by the plaintiff was not reasonably adapted to the safe and proper and careful preparation of the same.’

‘(3) Upon all the evidence there is no evidence that the methods of manufacture used by the defendant in the preparation of the product used by the plaintiff were not reasonably adapted to the safe and proper and careful preparation of the same.’

‘(13) A manufacturer of an article of food for poultry which is not inherently dangerous to poultry is not liable in an action of tort for negligence, for injuries due to negligence in manufacture.’

‘(16) A manufacturer of feed for poultry is not bound at his peril to know that particular lots of his product are not dangerous to animals and poultry if fed to them.’

‘(52) If you find...