Tompkins v. State, SC01-1619.
Decision Date | 09 October 2003 |
Docket Number | No. SC01-1619.,SC01-1619. |
Citation | 872 So.2d 230 |
Parties | Wayne TOMPKINS, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Todd G. Scher, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, Martin McClain, Special Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel and Suzanne Myers, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Robert J. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Wayne Tompkins, a prisoner under sentence of death and an active death warrant, appeals an order of the circuit court denying in part his successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The State cross-appeals the circuit court's order granting Tompkins a new penalty phase based on evidence that the trial court directed the State to prepare the sentencing order in an ex parte communication after the trial court imposed the death penalty.1 We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the portion of the trial court's order denying Tompkins' motion for postconviction relief and reverse the portion of the trial court's order granting a new penalty phase.
In 1985, Tompkins was convicted of the first-degree murder of Lisa Decarr and sentenced to death on the recommendation of a unanimous jury. See Tompkins v. State, 502 So.2d 415 (Fla.1986)
. This Court's opinion on direct appeal sets forth the following facts:
The jury recommended death by a vote of twelve to zero. After finding three aggravating circumstances2 and one mitigating circumstance,3 the trial court imposed a sentence of death.
Tompkins raised ten issues on appeal, four related to the guilt phase4 and six related to the penalty phase.5 See id. at 419. This Court found no reversible error and affirmed both the conviction and death sentence. See id. at 421.
Tompkins' first motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 included nineteen claims. See Tompkins v. Dugger, 549 So.2d 1370, 1372 (Fla.1989)
.6 After an evidentiary hearing at which Tompkins presented evidence primarily related to his Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the trial court denied relief. See id. This Court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief on appeal. See id. With respect to Tompkins' Brady claims, we stated:
As to Tompkins' claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, this Court concluded that counsel was not ineffective during the guilt phase but was deficient in failing to investigate and present evidence of mitigation in the penalty phase. See id. at 1373. However, we agreed with the trial court that this mitigating evidence would not "have affected the penalty in light of the crime and the nature of the aggravating circumstances." Id.
Tompkins also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, raising nine claims. See id. at 1371.7 We denied relief on all of Tompkins' claims. See id.
Subsequently, Tompkins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. See Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir.1999)
. The federal district court denied relief and Tompkins appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed without discussing several of the issues addressed by the district court.8
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Tompkins' argument that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for failing to introduce several pieces of evidence, including witness Wendy Chancey's testimony that she had seen Lisa alive after the date the murder was alleged to have occurred. See id. at 1334-35 & n. 3. With respect to Tompkins' claims of counsel's ineffectiveness during the penalty phase, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the "weight of [the] aggravating circumstances overwhelm[ed] the mitigating circumstance evidence that was and could have been presented." Id. at 1339. Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit addressed Tompkins' argument that the State knowingly presented false testimony of Stevens, Turco, and the medical examiner in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972).9 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the claims as to Stevens and Turco outright, agreeing with the district court that Tompkins' "contentions are palpably without merit." Id. at 1342 n. 14.
With respect to Tompkins' Giglio claim regarding the medical examiner's testimony that dental records identified the skeleton as that of Lisa DeCarr, the Eleventh Circuit held that even if this had been false testimony and the State knew it was false, Tompkins' claim would still fail to meet the materiality element of the Giglio test. See id. at 1341. The Eleventh Circuit noted that there was "overwhelming" evidence that the skeletal remains belonged to Lisa and found Tompkins' argument that "`there was very little evidence of the identity of the deceased' ... preposterous." Id. at 1341-42.
On March 22, 2001, Governor Bush signed Tompkins' third death warrant,10 which resulted in Tompkins filing a second postconviction motion in state court. After a Huff hearing,11 the trial court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was required only on Tompkins' claim that the sentencing judge, Harry Lee Coe, erred in failing to (1) independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and (2) disclose that the State had prepared the sentencing order. After hearing several witnesses presented by Tompkins and argument from both Tompkins and the State, the trial court found that these errors entitled Tompkins to a new penalty phase.
The day after the evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Tompkins' motion for a stay of execution. In a subsequent order on Tompkins' postconviction motion, the trial court provided written findings supporting the denial of all of Tompkins' other claims and the granting of the new penalty phase. The trial court also denied Tompkins' motions for DNA testing and to compel the disclosure of public records.
Tompkins now appeals, raising four issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his Brady claims...
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