Tony Alamo Christian Ministries v. Selig

• Decision Date: 11 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–1424.,10–1424.
• Citation: 664 F.3d 1245
• Parties: TONY ALAMO CHRISTIAN MINISTRIES, A Division of Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, Inc., Plaintiff–Appellant,Albert Ralph Krantz; Gregory Scott Seago, Plaintiffs, v. John M. SELIG, Director of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, in his Individual and Official Capacity; Steve Mason, Administrator of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, Texarcana, Miller County, Arkansas Division, in his Individual and Official Capacity; and Gwen Lovelace, Administrator of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, Fort Smith, Arkansas Division, in her Individual and Official Capacity, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

664 F.3d 1245

TONY ALAMO CHRISTIAN MINISTRIES, A Division of Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, Inc., Plaintiff–Appellant,Albert Ralph Krantz; Gregory Scott Seago, Plaintiffs,

v.John M. SELIG, Director of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, in his Individual and Official Capacity; Steve Mason, Administrator of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, Texarcana, Miller County, Arkansas Division, in his Individual and Official Capacity; and Gwen Lovelace, Administrator of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, Fort Smith, Arkansas Division, in her Individual and Official Capacity, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 10–1424.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 16, 2011.Filed: Jan. 11, 2012.

John Wesley Hall, Jr., argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellant.

Richard Neil Rosen, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.

Before LOKEN and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and NELSON,^* District Judge.NELSON, District Judge.

In this appeal from the district court's ¹ dismissal of a Section 1983 action on grounds of standing and Younger v. Harris abstention, Plaintiff–Appellant Tony Alamo Christian Ministries (“TACM” or “the church”) argues that it has standing to assert various constitutional claims and that the district court also erred in abstaining in deference to the pending state-court actions regarding whether the minor children of the members of the church were neglected or abused. Defendants–Appellees John Selig, the Director of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, and Steve Mason and Gwen Lovelace, two other officials of that state agency, contend that the district court relied on abstention only with respect to the individual Plaintiffs, Albert Ralph Krantz and Gregory Scott Seago—two members of the church who have not appealed the dismissal—and that TACM does not have standing to assert claims alleging a deprivation of its own federal rights much less those of its individual members.

We agree that the district court applied abstention only with respect to the individual Plaintiffs, and that it dismissed TACM solely for lack of standing. Without reaching the question of standing at the pleading stage, however, we affirm because the court's analysis of Younger abstention with respect to the two individual Plaintiffs is equally applicable to TACM.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 2008, federal and state officials, including the Arkansas Department of Human Services, took custody of numerous minor children of members of TACM who lived on TACM's property in order to protect them from abuse. After the officials removed the children from TACM property, the Arkansas state courts adjudicated many, if not all, of the seized children to be dependent-neglected. State court proceedings also resulted in the termination of the parental rights of many of the church's members.

On April 9, 2009, Plaintiffs filed this Section 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They also simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants, after having filed their Answer, moved for judgment on the pleadings.

Plaintiffs generally allege that Defendants violated their constitutional rights, including those under the First and Fourth Amendments—and did so in bad faith—by seizing the minor children of Seago, Krantz and numerous other members of TACM and imposing certain conditions on the parents in order to regain custody of their children. In particular, TACM alleges that it has suffered, both directly and in a representational capacity, various injuries as a result of (1) the seizures of the children, (2) the alleged policies underlying those seizures, (3) the conditions imposed for the parents to regain custody of their children, and (4) the ensuing fallout from these events. The Complaint alleges that TACM “asserts its own rights, the rights of its faculty and staff, and the rights of its students, members, ministers and their families.” (App. at 13 (Compl. ¶ 19).) It also alleges that the church has standing

to assert these rights and claims because the members, ministers, students and staff would have standing to assert these rights in their own right. The Church is seeking to protect interests that are germane to its purpose; and neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members, ministers, students, staff or their families in this lawsuit.

( Id. at 13–14 (Compl. ¶ 22).) Thus, TACM alleges not only standing in terms of its own injuries (“associational standing”), but also “representational standing” to assert the rights of its members, ministers, students and staff. “[A]n association may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (referring to such as “associational standing”), and “[e]ven in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members,” id.

In February 2010, the district court granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that (1) Younger abstention barred at least the individual Plaintiffs' claims, and (2) TACM lacked standing. With respect to the two individual Plaintiffs, the district court ruled that granting the relief they requested in federal court would interfere with the ongoing state proceedings, that protecting children from abuse and neglect are important state interests and that the individual Plaintiffs do not contend that they will be unable to raise their constitutional claims in state court.

With respect to TACM, the district court ruled that it

does not allege any deprivation of a legally protected interest. TACM does not have a legally protected interest in its membership numbers, any charitable donations it receives, or the amount of people it serves through its outreach ministries. Because TACM has no legitimate expectation of entitlement to the aforementioned things, there is no injury to a protected constitutional interest when any of these things are diminished. Moreover, TACM cannot show that any alleged injury it has suffered is “fairly traceable” to the actions of Defendants. Because TACM cannot prove an injury in fact to a legally protected interest and cannot show a causal connect[ion] between the alleged injury and the conduct complained of, TACM lacks standing to bring its claims in this action.

(App. at 226.) Thus, it appears that the district court addressed standing only in terms of TACM's own injuries to it as an entity.

Only TACM has appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a dismissal for lack of standing under a de novo standard. E.g., St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 439 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir.2006). Likewise, we also review a “grant of judgment on the pleadings de novo.” Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir.2008). We apply the same standard used by the district court: generally, we view the facts as alleged in the non-movants' Complaint as true and make all reasonable inferences in their favor. Id.

We need not resolve any issues of standing because, even if TACM would have standing, the district court should have dismissed not only the individual Plaintiffs, but also TACM, based on Younger abstention. We may affirm based on any grounds supported by the record. Jones v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 401 F.3d 950, 951 (8th Cir.2005). And we may affirm on abstention grounds without first resolving the standing issues. Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (“Nor must a federal court decide whether the parties present an Article III case or controversy before abstaining under Younger v. Harris.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) (noting that district courts do not err when they “abstain under Younger v. Harris ... without deciding whether the parties present a case or controversy”); see Steel Co. v. Citizens For A Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 100 n. 3, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (treating Younger abstention “as jurisdictional”).

Under current Younger v. Harris doctrine, federal courts should abstain from exercising their jurisdiction if (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding, (2) that implicates important state interests, and (3) that provides an adequate opportunity to raise any relevant federal questions. Plouffe v. Ligon, 606 F.3d 890, 894–95 (8th Cir.2010) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982)). In such circumstances, principles of comity and federalism preclude federal actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 & n. 2, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) (noting companion case of Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971), regarding declaratory relief).

Regarding the second component for Younger abstention, there is no doubt that state-court proceedings regarding the welfare of children reflect an important state interest that is plainly within the scope of the doctrine. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423–24, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (holding that district court should have abstained where there were ongoing state-court proceedings regarding welfare of abused children). And the fact that TACM is a religious entity does not, of course, preclude application of Younger abstention. “Even religious schools cannot claim to be wholly free from some state regulation.” Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (holding that district court should have abstained from action brought by religious school where it could raise its constitutional claims in state administrative proceedings).

Nor is there any doubt, with respect to the third component of Yo...