Toohey v. Nitze, 23639.
Decision Date | 29 July 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 23639.,23639. |
Parties | John J. TOOHEY, Appellant, v. Paul H. NITZE, Secretary, U. S. Department of the Navy, et al., Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
John J. Toohey, in pro. per.
Ceil C. Poole, U. S. Atty., Jerry K. Cimmett, Brian B. Denton, Asst. U. S. Attys., San Francisco, Cal., for appellees.
Before MADDEN*, Judge, United States Court of Claims, MERRILL and TRASK, Circuit Judges.
John J. Toohey1 appeals in pro per from a summary judgment rendered against him in this action brought by him against the government for reinstatement, back pay, and damages for wrongful discharge and injury to his professional reputation.
Appellant is a registered professional engineer with impressive academic credentials. On March 20, 1967, he commenced employment as a mechanical engineer for the Department of the Navy at the San Francisco Bay Naval Shipyard. Before achieving permanent employment status, he was required to satisfactorily complete a one-year probationary period. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.801(a) (1)2; 315.802(a).3 Some three months later, on June 23, 1967, he was given notice of his proposed termination, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.803-804,4 on the ground that he failed to demonstrate that he possessed the necessary dependability, adaptability, cooperativeness and proper attitude for his employment. He was terminated on July 14. Toohey's appeal of his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission was denied on the ground that the Commission was "specifically precluded by regulation from making an investigation into, or a review of, the sufficiency of the reason for the action, unless it is alleged by affidavit that the action was taken for political reasons not required by law, or resulted from discrimination * * *" See 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(a), (b), (c).5 Toohey did not submit any information in support of his contention that his termination was effected for political reasons.
Appellant then initiated this action in the district court. On June 20, 1968, the court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Toohey had been accorded all of the administrative rights to which he was entitled, and there was substantial evidence to support his removal.
We believe that appellant has presented his case to us in utmost sincerity, but we must affirm the district court. Dismissal from federal employment is largely a matter of executive agency discretion. Particularly is this true during the probationary period. The scope of judicial review is narrow. Assuming that statutory procedures meet constitutional requirements, the court is limited to a determination of whether the agency substantially complied with its statutory and regulatory procedures, whether its factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence, and whether its action was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. See Burke v. Carpenter, 387 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U. S. 903, 88 S.Ct. 1651, 20 L.Ed.2d 417 (1968); Mancilla v. United States, 382 F.2d 269, 270 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 982, 88 S.Ct. 1104, 19 L. Ed.2d 1280 (1968); Taylor v. United States Civil Service Commission, 374 F. 2d 466 (9th Cir. 1967); Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969).
Upon a review of the record, we determine that the government complied with administrative procedure, and that appellant received the administrative review to which he was entitled. There is no evidence that appellant's dismissal was either political or discriminatory in nature. The relevant statute, 5 U.S.C. § 3301, and regulations promulgated there-under are not unconstitutional. The administrative action was supported by substantial evidence.6 It was not arbitrary or capricious and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
The judgment is affirmed.
* Honorable J. Warren Madden, Senior Judge, United States Court of Claims, sitting by designation.
1 Appellant Toohey has advised the court that he has changed his surname to Thomas.
2 315.801 Probationary period; when required.
3 315.802 Length of probationary period.
"(a) The probationary period required by § 315.801 is 1 year."
4 315.083 Agency action during probationary period (generally).
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