Torres-Santiago v. Alcaraz-Emmanuelli

• Decision Date: 15 January 2008
• Docket Number: Civil No. 06-1349 (FAB).
• Parties: Adaline TORRES-SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. Gabriel ALCARAZ-EMMANUELLI, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

553 F.Supp.2d 75

Adaline TORRES-SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. Gabriel ALCARAZ-EMMANUELLI, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 06-1349 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

January 15, 2008.

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Ralph Jr. Vallone-Jr., Ralph Vallone, Jr. Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Jose J. Gueits-Ortiz, Department of Justice of Puerto Rico, Beatriz Annexy-Guevara, Reichard & Escalera, Claribel Ortiz-Rodriguez, Sanchez Betances Sifre Munoz Noya & Rivera Law Offices, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

On June 22, 2006, plaintiff Adaline Torres-Santiago ("Torres-Santiago") filed an amended complaint against Gabriel Alcaraz-Emmanuelli ("Alcaraz-Emmanuelli"), in his personal and official capacity as Secretary of Puerto Rico's Department of Transportation and Public Works ("DTOP," as the department is known locally), the conjugal partnership Alcaraz-Doe, Fernando Vargas-Arroyo ("Vargas-Arroyo"), in his personal and official capacity as Executive Director of the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority, the conjugal partnership Vargas-Roe, and Evan Gonzalez-Baker ("Gonzalez-Baker") in his official capacity as President and General Manager of the Metropolitan Bus Authority ("AMA," as the authority is known locally) (Docket No. 25). On August 7, 2006, defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 30). On August 28, 2006, plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss (Docket No. 36). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part defendants' motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Torres-Santiago worked as the President and General Manager of AMA from mid-January 2005 to February 5, 2006. Although she tendered her own resignation, she claims that she was constructively forced to resign by defendants, who discriminated against her based upon her age and gender, creating an intolerable environment in which to work. In addition to allegedly creating an atmosphere in which plaintiffs co-workers referred to her as "the old woman" or "the witch" (Docket No. 25, ¶ 34 ("la vieja" o "la bruja")), plaintiff cites a number of instances in which defendant Alcaraz-Emmanuelli directly addressed her in a discriminatory fashion.

The first such instance took place in late January 2005. At a meeting, Alcaraz-Emmanuelli told Torres-Santiago that she was very serious and that he wanted to make her laugh. Torres-Santiago responded that she was a serious person. Alcaraz-Emmanuelli then responded that "the most important factor to his understanding was youth" and he asked plaintiff "don't you feel old among so many young people?" (Docket No. 25, ¶ 23.)

Then at another meeting in early February 2005, Alcaraz-Emmanuelli asked Torres-Santiago what she would do now that "the breast she had to suck milk from had gone." (Id., ¶ 25 ("que se le habia ido la teta que le daba de mamar").) Torres-Santiago then asked Alcaraz-Emmanuelli what he meant by his comment and he allegedly responded "Fagundo [the former Secretary of Transportation] was not there anymore," and then asked plaintiff "how will you manage?" (Id.) In that same meeting Torres-Santiago asked to be considered for the position of Director of "Alternativa de Transporte Integrado," to which Alcaraz-Emmanuelli replied that he was considering a man for that position and that he had it all decided. (Id.)

On a third occasion in March 2005, Torres-Santiago met again with Alcaraz-Emmanuelli and unnamed others to discuss a report. In that meeting Alcaraz-Emmanuelli pointedly asked Torres-Santiago her age. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Thereafter, Alcaraz-Emmanuelli told Torres-Santiago that her position at AMA was "made for men and not for women" because transportation was a "man's business." (Id. at ¶ 27.)

On a fourth occasion, at an unnamed date and time, Torres-Santiago, Vargas-Arroyo and Alcaraz-Emmanuelli met to listen to what appears from the amended complaint to have been recorded voices, in order to choose the voice that would be used to announce stops on the AMA bus routes. (Id. at ¶ 29.) After hearing one voice, Alcaraz-Emmanuelli told Torres-Santiago "that voice sounds as old as you." (Id.)

On a fifth occasion, also at an unnamed date and time, Alcaraz-Emmanuelli told Torres-Santiago that he did not want a jacket that AMA was planning to give him because Torres-Santiago and Alcaraz-Emmanuelli could not fit in the jacket together. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Alcaraz-Emmanuelli then told Torres-Santiago "you are alone, nobody is going to be jealous." (Id.) Torres-Santiago purports to have acted "seriously" thereby prompting Alcaraz-Emmanuelli to say to her "that's the problem when you work with women." (Id.) At the end of this meeting, Torres-Santiago told Alcaraz-Emmanuelli that they needed to travel to a site to make an inspection together and Alcaraz-Emmanuelli responded that he would not travel with "an old hen." (Id.)

Torres-Santiago also alleges that she was harassed on December 28, 2005 by Guillermo Mena ("Mena"), a press official. Mena allegedly called plaintiff on her cell phone, which she answered during her mother's prayer service. (Id. at ¶ 42.) During this call Mena told Torres-Santiago that he was with defendant Vargas-Arroyo and that they were calling plaintiff upon the instruction of Alcaraz-Emmanuelli. (Id.) Torres-Santiago avers that she found this call offensive and humiliating, although she does not allege that any gender or age related comments were made during the call. Torres-Santiago resigned on February 5, 2006 (id. at ¶ 43), allegedly because of the "intolerable" and "hostile" work environment she experienced as a result of the gender and age based harassment she endured from defendants.

DISCUSSION

A. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to relief." Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). To avoid dismissal, the complaint must contain factual allegations that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level," or in other words, plaintiffs must "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible."¹ Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1974.

The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. See Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990). The Court need not credit, however, "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like" when evaluating the complaint's allegations. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). When opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a plaintiff cannot expect a trial court to do his homework for him." McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.1991). Plaintiffs are responsible for putting their best foot forward in an effort to present a legal theory that will support their claim. Id. at 23 (citing Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52). Plaintiffs must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988).

B. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution renders Alcaraz-Emmanuelli and Gonzalez-Baker immune to suit in their official capacity as officers of the DTOP and the AMA. Plaintiff disagrees.²

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court for money damages against states unless one of four exceptions apply.³ Metcalf & Eddy v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Authority, 991 F.2d 935, 938 (1st Cir.1993). This protection from suit extends to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.⁴ Immunity from suit also extends from the state itself to its instrumentalities, also known as "alter egos" of the state. Ainsworth Aristocrat Int'l Pty. Ltd. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 818 F.2d 1034, 1036 (1st Cir.1987); see Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. Of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Immunity even extends to state officials "when the state is the real, substantial party in interest," such as when a suit is brought against a state official in his official capacity. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 89-91, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Bernier-Aponte v. Izquierdo-Encarnacion, 196 F.Supp.2d 93, 98-99 (D.P.R.2002).

i. ARM OF THE STATE ANALYSIS

For Alcaraz-Emmanuelli and Gonzalez-Baker to be immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court must first find that the DTOP and the AMA qualify as arms of the state. The First Circuit utilizes a two-part test to determine if an entity is an arm of the state. Pastranar-Torres v. Corporation De Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publico, 460 F.3d 124, 126 (1st Cir.2006); Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. Puerto Rico & the Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2003). The first step is to analyze whether the state structured the entity in a way to allow the entity to share the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Pastrana-Torres, 460 F.3d at 126; Fresenius, 322 F.3d at 68. If the relevant structural factors do not conclusively show that the entity is protected by the Eleventh Amendment, then the Court focuses upon step two of the test, which involves a weighing of the risk that damages will be paid from the state treasury if the entity is found liable. Pastrana-Torres, 460 F.3d at 126. This second step focuses upon whether the state is "legally or practically" obligated itself to pay the entity's debts. Id. at 126; Fresenius, 322 F.3d at 68. If so, the entity...