Torres v. Commissioner of Correction

• Decision Date: 05 June 1998
• Citation: 695 N.E.2d 200,427 Mass. 611
• Parties: Victor TORRES & others 1 v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 200

695 N.E.2d 200

427 Mass. 611

Victor TORRES & others ¹ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued May 7, 1998.

Decided June 5, 1998.

Scott P. Lewis, Boston (John Reinstein, with him), for plaintiffs.

Thomas O. Bean, Special Assistant Attorney General, for defendants.

Before ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY, FRIED, MARSHALL and IRELAND, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The plaintiffs, prisoners presently or formerly confined in a subunit of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction known as the department disciplinary unit (DDU), challenge their conditions of confinement. Their complaint contains thirteen counts alleging various constitutional and statutory violations. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment on eight of the thirteen counts. After a timely appeal we granted the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review. The plaintiffs assert that the judge erred in finding that (1) the conditions present in the DDU do not offend the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; (2) the DDU is not an "isolation unit" and thus, not subject to the requirements of G.L. c. 127, § 40; (3) the procedures governing DDU confinement do not deprive inmates of procedural due process rights, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 26; and (4) the conditions present in the DDU do not violate G.L. c. 127, §§ 32, 39. For the reasons set forth below, we reject the plaintiffs' claims and accordingly, affirm the allowance of summary judgment.

Facts. The judge found the following facts. In April, 1992, the Department of Correction (department) opened the DDU at MCI-Cedar Junction to house inmates who have committed major disciplinary violations while incarcerated. Inmates who, after a hearing before a department special hearing officer, have been found guilty of committing a violation calling for a major sanction may be sentenced to up to ten years in the DDU. ³ 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 430.25(3)(d) (1993). The DDU is a modern secure facility which can hold up to 124 male inmates in individual cells. The DDU inmates are allowed five hours of outdoor exercise weekly, weather permitting, and they also are allowed to leave their cells to shower and to shave three times weekly.

At all other times, DDU inmates remain in their cells. Each inmate's cell is approximately seven by twelve feet, and contains a toilet, sink, bed, desk with attached seat, and one window. The cell's steel door also has a window, two slots through which items can be passed, and several small holes to facilitate communication through the door. While there, DDU inmates receive hourly visits from correction officers, and daily visits from the director and captain of the DDU. The correctional program officer also makes rounds two or three times weekly. In addition, medical personnel visit the inmates four times each day, while religious and mental health staff make rounds once each week. Inmates may communicate with any of their visitors through their cell doors or by passing a note through one of the door's slots. Inmates may also speak with each other while in the exercise yard or in their cells. While in their cells, DDU inmates have access to the resources of the prison law library and the other reading material. Finally, inmates who have not committed further disciplinary violations while in DDU may eventually have a radio and television in their cells, make four thirty-minute telephone calls monthly, and have four one-hour, noncontact visits per month.

1. Rights under the Eighth Amendment and art. 26. The plaintiffs first claim that the judge erred in ruling on summary judgment that DDU confinement does not subject inmates to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and cruel or unusual punishment in violation of art. 26. ⁴ To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff-inmate must demonstrate that (1) a prison's conditions of confinement present "a substantial risk of serious harm"; and (2) prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to inmate health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2482, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993). To survive a motion for summary judgment, a nonmoving plaintiff must "designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 714, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991), quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In support of their claim that a factual dispute exists the plaintiffs cite the affidavit of Dr. Stuart Grassin, who opined that DDU's conditions of confinement can cause "severe psychiatric harm." The plaintiffs therefore contend that a genuine issue exists as to whether DDU's conditions pose "a substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer v. Brennan, supra at 834, 114 S.Ct. at 1977. However, other courts have concluded, and we agree that, whether prison conditions are sufficiently harmful to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, is a purely legal determination for the court to make. See Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir.1993), citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998-999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146, 1246 (N.D.Cal.1995). Therefore, expert opinion regarding what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is entitled to little weight. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 n. 13, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 n. 13, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (expert opinions "may be helpful and relevant with respect to some questions, but 'they simply do not establish the constitutional minima' "). ⁵ Here, there is no factual dispute over the conditions endured by DDU inmates. Rather, the only arguable dispute concerned the extent to which these conditions generally caused inmates' psychological problems. In these circumstances the judge properly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed. See Curtis v. School Comm. of Falmouth, 420 Mass. 749, 754, 652 N.E.2d 580 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067, 116 S.Ct. 753, 133 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (deeming summary judgment proper where the "issues before the judge were issues of law, i.e., whether the condom-availability program, the provisions of which are not in dispute, infringes on the rights of the plaintiffs").

Absent a factual dispute, the judge properly allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment. As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has observed, "federal appellate decisions during the past decade which have focused on the factor of segregated confinement and lack of inmate contact reveals to us a widely shared disinclination to declare even very lengthy periods of segregated confinement beyond the pale of minimally civilized conduct on the part of prison authorities." Jackson v. Meachum, 699 F.2d 578, 583 (1st Cir.1983). See Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974, 104 S.Ct. 2352, 80 L.Ed.2d 825 (1984) ("courts that have examined the confinement of adults in prison isolation cells have been reluctant to find them unconstitutional, based either on the length of confinement or on the possibility that isolation might cause psychiatric deterioration"). Similarly, in Libby v. Commissioner of Correction, 385 Mass. 421, 431, 432 N.E.2d 486 (1982), we held that a prison isolation unit whose conditions were more restrictive than those in DDU did not offend the Eighth Amendment because its inmates were provided adequate food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and communication with others. Id. at 431-432, 432 N.E.2d 486. ⁶ "The 'isolation' and 'loneliness' of which the plaintiffs complain," we concluded, "is not in and of itself unconstitutional." Id. at 432, 432 N.E.2d 486. If conditions of confinement harsher than those posed by DDU did not offend the Eighth Amendment, it follows that DDU's confinement is likewise constitutional. Consequently, the judge acted properly in allowing the defendants' motion for summary judgment. ⁷

For identical reasons, we reject the plaintiffs' contention that summary judgment was improperly granted to the defendants on the art. 26 claim. While the rights guaranteed under art. 26 "are at least equally as broad as those guaranteed under the Eighth Amendment," Michaud v. Sheriff of Essex County, 390 Mass. 523, 534, 458 N.E.2d 702 (1983), a prisoner seeking relief under this provision of the Massachusetts Constitution must point to both (1) a condition or situation "which poses a substantial risk of serious harm"; and (2) facts establishing that a prison official "has knowledge of the situation and ignores it." Good v. Commissioner of Correction, 417 Mass. 329, 336, 629 N.E.2d 1321 (1994). See Abdullah v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 387, 395, 677 N.E.2d 689 (1997). As previously discussed, the plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the first requirement. The evidence instead described conditions of confinement more favorable to inmates than those of an isolation unit we have previously deemed adequate under art. 26. Libby v. Commissioner of Correction, supra at 435, 432 N.E.2d 486. Consequently, the judge properly allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim. ⁸

2. General Laws c. 127, § 40. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that DDU's conditions of confinement violated G.L. c. 127, § 40, which limits confinement in an "isolation unit" to fifteen consecutive days. ⁹ In allowing the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the judge concluded that DDU is not an "isolation unit" and therefore, is exempt from the fifteen-day limit imposed by § 40. The plaintiffs claim this was...