Torres v. Van Eepoel

• Decision Date: 18 September 1957
• Parties: Annice A. TORRES, Appellant, v. Edward F. VAN EEPOEL and Margaret Torres Van Eepoel et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 735

98 So.2d 735

Annice A. TORRES, Appellant, v. Edward F. VAN EEPOEL and Margaret Torres Van Eepoel et al., Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 18, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 19, 1957.

John P. Corcoran, Jr. (of Brown, Brown & Corcoran) and Tom J. Johnson, Jr., Tampa, for appellant.

Myron G. Gibbons (of Gibbons & Gibbons), Tampa, for appellees.

THORNAL, Justice.

Appellant, Annice A. Torres, now Annice A. Justice, seeks reversal of a final decree of adoption of her two minor children entered in favor of the appellees Van Eepoel, who were petitioners for adoption in the trial Court.

The determining question is whether the evidence in the light of the findings and conclusions of the Chancellor supports the entry of the decree of adoption.

Mrs. Justice is the natural mother of the two minors who were, respectively, eight and ten years of age when the adoption decree was entered in January, 1956. In 1950 her husband, the father of the children, was killed in an automobile wreck. The appellee, Margaret Torres Van Eepoel, is the sister of the deceased father, and the appellee, Edward F. Van Eepoel, is her husband.

After the death of the father the entire responsibility for the care, maintenance and rearing of the two children rested upon the mother. Within two months after his death she went to work in order to earn the money to take care of the children and herself. In December, 1954, when the mother was out of the city, having left the children in the care of a 'baby sitter,' they were delivered into the custody of another aunt (a second sister of the deceased father). Subsequently, on December 22, 1954, the temporary custody of the children was delivered to the appellees on order of the Juvenile Court of Hillsborough County. On February 3, 1955, the appellees petitioned the Circuit Court for the adoption of the two children. The appellant strenuously opposed the petition. Extensive testimony and other evidence was presented to the Chancellor by the contesting parties in support of their respective positions. After several postponements, the proceeding culminated in the decree of adoption now under attack.

We think it unnecessary to delineate in detail many of the unpleasant facts and allegations asserted by the parties.

The sum of the position of the appellees in support of their prayer for adoption of the children was that the appellant-mother had since the death of her husband neglected the children spiritually, physically and materially. It was their contention that the children were ill-kept and were denied the natural and normal love and affection of a mother. They further support their position with claims of immorality directed at the mother. We pretermit a catalog of the evidence for the reason that we find it unnecessary to summarize the testimony in view of the findings of the Chancellor which we hereafter mention. Suffice it at this point to record that in the ultimate the Chancellor decided that the decree favorable to the adoption should be entered. He supported his decree with certain findings which we feel lead to the conclusion which we hereafter announce.

To support her claim for a reversal, the appellant-mother insists that the record fails to show that she should be denied her natural right to the custody of her children because of the alleged mistreatment, abandonment or alleged immorality.

The appellees take the position that the record adequately sustains the decree of the Chancellor.

The ultimate judgment of the Chancellor was grounded on two basic findings derived from the evidence submitted. Quoting from his order for the adoption we find the following, towit:

'* * * This continued conduct of the respondent in absenting herself on pleasure visits with the knowledge that the children were not receiving the care that they rightfully should have received, exhibits a sense of irresponsibility and indifference to their welfare, though perhaps not of itself justifying the granting of the adoption, must however, be taken into consideration in the decision of the case.

'The remaining phase of the case, as made by the evidence, involved the respondent's immoral conduct during this same period, beginning not long after the death of her husband and continuing up to the final hearing of this cause. There is evidence of her intimate association with out or more men, beginning soon after her husband's death, indicating to some extent that her conduct was subject to criticism and perhaps suspicion of immorality.' (Emphasis added.)

After announcing these findings the trial Judge then makes reference to...