Torrington Company v. METAL PRODUCTS WKRS. U. LOCAL 1645

• Decision Date: 20 January 1965
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 10697.
• Citation: 237 F. Supp. 139
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: In the Matter of the TORRINGTON COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff, v. METAL PRODUCTS WORKERS UNION LOCAL 1645, UAW-AFL-CIO and International Union, UAW-AFL-CIO, Defendants.

237 F. Supp. 139

In the Matter of the TORRINGTON COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff, v. METAL PRODUCTS WORKERS UNION LOCAL 1645, UAW-AFL-CIO and International Union, UAW-AFL-CIO, Defendants.

Civ. No. 10697.

United States District Court D. Connecticut.

January 20, 1965.

William J. Larkin, II, Waterbury, Conn., J. S. Siegel, Hartford, Conn., for plaintiff.

Jerome S. Rubenstein, New York City, for defendants.

ZAMPANO, District Judge.

In this action plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment holding three industrial grievances not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement between it and the defendant Union Local 1645. Jurisdiction of the Court is predicated upon Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

Defendants now move for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and for an order to compel arbitration of the disputes.

On January 18, 1964 the parties, after an extended strike, executed a new collective bargaining agreement which contained a multi-step grievance procedure to resolve disputes between the company and the union "in regard to wages, hours, and working conditions, or in regard to the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this agreement." Three steps are established for negotiation of a dispute and, if the matter is not adjusted, the grievance may be presented for arbitration.¹

In February and June, 1964 the union filed three grievances, pursuant to the provisions of the agreement, on behalf of employees Lassiter, Kuehl and Latina.

The Lassiter and Kuehl grievances were processed through the three negotiation steps without being resolved and, in accord with the contractual procedure, the disputes were referred to arbitration. To this point of the proceedings the issues were joined on the merits of the complaints as to whether the company had violated the "seniority clauses" of the contract in failing to recall Lassiter "back to work first" and in failing to place Mrs. Kuehl in a job held by an employee with less seniority than she. The Latina dispute was pressed through two steps of the grievance procedure, and, as in the Lassiter and Kuehl grievances, the company contested the claim on the merits. Only after the Lassiter and Kuehl grievances were referred to arbitration and the Latina grievance had been through two steps of the grievance procedure did the company assert its claim of non-arbitrability by filing this declaratory judgment action.

While the aforementioned grievances were being processed through the contractual procedures, the company and the union were arbitrating the grievance of one Michael Chiarito concerning his right to return to work after the strike. On July 26, 1964, the company's position that the issue was not arbitrable was sustained by the arbitrator. Its success in the Chiarito case prompted the company to raise the defense of non-arbitrability in the Lassiter, Kuehl and Latina matters. There is now pending before Chief Judge Timbers the union's petition to vacate the arbitrator's award in the Chiarito case, Metal Products Workers Union Local 1645 UAW-CIO v. The Torrington Company, Civil Action No. 10624, D. Conn.

In the instant case the union contends the grievances concern the "seniority clauses" of the agreement, not the method for recall from strike, and, even assuming recall is at issue, arbitration should be compelled. In opposition the company alleges an independent oral agreement between the parties, entered into after the collective bargaining agreement was executed on January 18, 1964, governs the return to work of employees after the strike. This collateral agreement, argues the company, did not provide for arbitration and, since it superseded the written agreement, controls the grievances presented here. The pleadings and affidavits raise factual questions as to the existence, scope and effect of such an oral agreement.

Ordinarily, summary judgment is barred if there is a material question of fact affecting the merits of a case. Doehler Metal Furniture Company v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2 Cir. 1945). Here, however, assuming factual issues exist, the question posed is whether this Court should resolve the factual claims of the parties by taking further evidence or refer the entire controversy to arbitration for determination.

Initially we note the Supreme Court has cautioned, in the absence of an express provision in the collective bargaining agreement excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, "only the most forceful evidence" of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-585, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1409 (1960). See also, United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568, 80 S. Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v....