Toth v. Bristol Tp.

• Decision Date: 13 August 2002
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 01-2832.
• Citation: 215 F.Supp.2d 595
• Parties: Donna TOTH, Plaintiff, v. BRISTOL TOWNSHIP, a/k/a The Township of Bristol, Bristol Township Police Department, and Police Officer Anthony DeSilva, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

215 F.Supp.2d 595

Donna TOTH, Plaintiff, v. BRISTOL TOWNSHIP, a/k/a The Township of Bristol, Bristol Township Police Department, and Police Officer Anthony DeSilva, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 01-2832.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

August 13, 2002.

John F.X. Fenerty, Jr., Law Offices of Baratta & Fenerty, Huntingdon Valley, PA, for plaintiff.

Ronald S. Collins, Jr., Wright & O'Donnell, P.C., Conshohocken, PA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOYNER, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants, Bristol Township, a/k/a the Township of Bristol (the "Township"), Bristol Township Police Department (the "Police Department"), and Police Officer Anthony DeSilva ("DeSilva"). Plaintiff, Donna Toth ("Plaintiff"), filed her initial complaint in this action on June 8, 2001. Plaintiff's complaint alleges the following claims: civil rights violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988, the Pennsylvania Constitution and state laws against DeSilva in his use of handcuffs on Plaintiff; civil rights violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988, the Pennsylvania Constitution and state laws against the Township and Police Department for their failure to properly instruct, supervise and train DeSilva and for creating a policy or custom of improper use of handcuffs; assault and battery against DeSilva; invasion of Plaintiff's privacy against all Defendants;¹ false imprisonment against DeSilva; and false arrest against DeSilva.

Defendants seeks to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against them. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's federal claims based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 are dismissed with prejudice, and Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

The facts, taken from Plaintiff's complaint and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows: on June 11, 1999, Plaintiff suffered a seizure at Wal-Mart in Bristol, Pennsylvania. A police officer, Anthony DeSilva, hearing the radio call for emergency medical services, responded to the store. DeSilva entered the store and found Plaintiff in an active seizure. As the emergency medical team was unable to treat Plaintiff due to her flailing limbs and her continuing seizure, DeSilva placed handcuffs on Plaintiff allegedly to prevent any harm to herself or others. DeSilva allegedly handcuffed Plaintiff without any legitimate legal enforcement reason to do so. The emergency medical team eventually placed Plaintiff on a stretcher and restrained her with soft materials, such as cravats and straps. At some later point, the handcuffs were removed. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of DeSilva's actions, she suffers from bilateral handcuff neuropathy, emotional distress, and loss of earnings.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion,² a court must view all facts, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 325 (3d Cir.2001). Dismissal is appropriate only "if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); see also Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir.1993). Notwithstanding these standards, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions." See In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir.1997) (internal quotations omitted).

II. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-1986

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims of civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-1986 for failure to state a claim.³ Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants acted on any class-based animus against Plaintiff. Additionally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not allege that Defendants conspired with others to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 27).

Plaintiff did not reply to this portion of the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, we dismiss Plaintiff's claim based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-1986 against all Defendants under Local Rules of Civil Procedure 7.1(c) as we assume Plaintiff does not contest this dismissal due to her lack of response.

However, even if the Court were to perform a cursory analysis of this portion of the Plaintiff's claim, Plaintiff failed to allege in either her Complaint or Reply to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the requisite elements of a § 1985 claim. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) creates a cause of action if two or more persons conspire to deprive an individual of their rights or privileges under the equal protection of the law. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (West 1994). "[A] cause of action properly brought under § 1985(3) must allege the existence of a class `racial or perhaps otherwise' and the existence of discriminatory animus or hostile motive triggering defendant's conduct." Jackson v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of Phila., 414 F.Supp. 315, 323 (E.D.Pa.1976) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a cause of action under § 1985 through lack of allegations of a discernible class or class-based animus). See also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) ("[S]ome racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action" must be alleged in a § 1985 claim.); Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 369 (3d Cir.2000) (affirming that mentally handicapped are a class for § 1985 purposes); Teti v. Towamencin Township, No. Civ.A.96-5402, 2001 WL 1168102, at *2 n. 2 (E.D.Pa. Aug.17, 2001) (outlining that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) protects members of a group or class defined by immutable characteristics); Stouch v. Williamson Hospitality Corp., 22 F.Supp.2d 431, 434 (E.D.Pa.1998) (dismissing claim for failure to allege conspiracy based on class-based discrimination). Plaintiff has not alleged any class-based animus.

In addition to lacking allegations of class membership and class-based discrimination, Plaintiff failed to allege any conspiracy between the Defendants, see Johnson v. Commw. of Pa. Dep't of Corrs., No. CIV. A.92-5149, 1993 WL 220611, at *5 (E.D.Pa. June 15, 1993), but rather repeatedly asserted that DeSilva acted "on his own volition". (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 2, 5; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 4). Thus, Plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 would be dismissed against Defendants under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if we had not already dismissed this claim under Local Rules of Civil Procedure 7.1(c).

Furthermore, without a properly pled claim under § 1985, a plaintiff cannot bring a § 1986 claim. See Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (3d Cir.1994) ("[T]ransgressions of § 1986 by definition depend on preexisting violation of § 1985".) (internal quotations omitted); Stouch, 22 F.Supp.2d at 433 (dismissing complaint for failure to allege sufficient conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1986); Messa v. Rubin, 897 F.Supp. 883, 886-87 (E.D.Pa.1995) ("Because Messa's § 1985 claims must fail, so must his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 which grants a cause of action against persons who know of an impending § 1985 violation and fail to prevent it.").

III. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Against Bristol Township Police Department

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the Bristol Township Police Department contending that the Police Department is a sub-unit, not a distinct entity, of Bristol Township, another named Defendant in this suit. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 28). As Plaintiff did not reply to this portion of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, we dismiss Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Police Department under Local Rules of Civil Procedure 7.1(c). Moreover, a police department cannot be sued under § 1983 in conjunction with a municipality as it is a local arm, not a separate entity, of the municipality. Zamichieli v. Stott, No. CIV.A.96-0254, 1999 WL 447311, at *3 (E.D.Pa. July 1, 1999); Irvin v. Borough of Darby, 937 F.Supp. 446, 450 (E.D.Pa.1996).

IV. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 Claim Against Defendants

Plaintiff brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against DeSilva, in his individual and official capacities, for placing handcuffs on her in an objectively unreasonable manner and with deliberate indifference to her medical condition, use of excessive force, and failure to exercise due care and against the Township for failure to properly train, instruct and supervise its employees, including DeSilva, and creation of a policy, practice and/or custom of placing handcuffs on an individual improperly and with deliberate indifference. Plaintiff bases her civil rights claim on the Fourth Amendment.⁴ (Pl's Compl. at 6-7). "In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force," since "§ 1983 `is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides `a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695 n. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)).

A. Plaintiff's Claim Against DeSilva

DeSilva moves to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claim as he did not handcuff Plaintiff to arrest or detain her for law enforcement purposes nor was he deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs.⁵ (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 29-30). Additionally, DeSilva claims qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claim as there is no clearly established statutory or constitutional right to be free from emergency medical treatment. (Defs...