Touchton v. Woodside Credit, LLC
Decision Date | 07 April 2021 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2D19-3499 |
Citation | 316 So.3d 392 |
Parties | Rhonda TOUCHTON, Appellant, v. WOODSIDE CREDIT, LLC, a Foreign Limited Liability Company, Exotic Motor Cars, Judson Lilly, Wassim Nasr, and Nasr's Auto Sales Inc., Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Susanne M. Suiter of Caglianone & Miller, P.A., Brooksville, for Appellant.
No appearance by Appellees.
Rhonda Touchton appeals an order granting the motion to dismiss filed by Woodside Credit, LLC. We conclude that the order is a final order. Because the complaint stated a legally sufficient cause of action for a declaratory judgment, the lower court erred by granting the motion to dismiss. We therefore reverse.
Rhonda Touchton purchased a vehicle from Exotic Motorcars Dealership on July 22, 2018, by trading in another vehicle and paying the dealership cash for the balance of the purchase price. She left the dealership with the vehicle, which she registered with the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles. She subsequently learned that there was a lien on the vehicle held by Woodside Credit, LLC, and that the prior owner, Judson Lilly, had given the dealership possession of the vehicle on consignment.
Touchton sued Nasr's Auto Sales, Exotic Motorcars, and Wassim Nasr for negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. The last claim of her complaint was directed at Woodside and Lilly; she requested a declaratory judgment regarding the title to the vehicle. Lilly filed a letter with the court in which he contested her demand for clear title. Woodside filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action "[b]ased upon Florida Statutes 319.27 and the fact that Woodside Credit LLC is the lien holder on a valid Florida Title."1 Woodside attached to its motion to dismiss a Lien and Title Information Report reflecting that Woodside had a lien on the vehicle with the same vehicle identification number as the one listed in Touchton's complaint.
The trial court entered an order granting the motion. The order states, in pertinent part, the following:
Where an order merely grants a motion to dismiss, it is not a final order. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Madison Cty. v. Grice, 438 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 1983) (); Hayward & Assocs. v. Hoffman, 793 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (); GMI, LLC v. Asociacion del Futbol Argentino, 174 So. 3d 500, 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) ( . The order on appeal provides that "Defendant WOODSIDE CREDIT'S Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is hereby granted with PREJUDICE." This language lacks finality.
However, the order on appeal also orders and adjudges that "Defendant, WOODSIDE CREDIT LLC, has and had a Valid Lien on the Vehicle VIN # 137ZA843XYE185974." "The traditional test for finality is whether the decree disposes of the cause on its merits leaving no questions open for judicial determination except for execution and enforcement of the decree if necessary." Hoffman v. Hall, 817 So. 2d 1057, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). "While an order must contain 'unequivocal language of finality,' an order or judgment of a court does not need to contain any particular or 'magic' words to make it final." Holland v. Holland, 140 So. 3d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting Hoffman, 817 So. 2d at 1058 ). For example, it is unnecessary for the order to "include traditional words of finality like 'go hence without day' or 'let execution lie.' " Timmons v. Lake City Golf, LLC, 293 So. 3d 596, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) ; see also Cardillo v. Qualsure Ins. Corp., 974 So. 2d 1174, 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
Here, the order disposed of the issue for which Touchton sought a declaration—to declare the title-holder and lienholder of the vehicle at issue. The trial court essentially nestled a declaratory judgment within an order granting a motion to dismiss. As such, this court has jurisdiction over a final, appealable order. Cf. Ribaya v. Bd. of Trs. of City Pension Fund for Firefighters & Police Officers in City of Tampa, 162 So. 3d 348, 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ( ); Cardillo, 974 So. 2d at 1175 ( ); Legion Ins. Co. v. Moore, 846 So. 2d 1183, 1185, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ( ).
The trial court's granting of declaratory relief in the guise of a dismissal is also why we must reverse. "A motion to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment is not a motion on the merits." Royal Selections, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 687 So. 2d 893, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). "Rather, it is a motion only to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of its rights, not to whether it is entitled to a declaration in its favor." Id. (citing Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury, 56 So. 2d 445, 448 (Fla. 1952) ). And when ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action a trial court must limit its review to the allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint and "accept the material allegations as true." Murphy v. Bay Colony Prop. Owners Ass'n, 12 So. 3d 924, 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ; see also Meadows Cmty. Ass'n v. Russell-Tutty, 928 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) .
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...open for judicial determination except for execution and enforcement of the decree if necessary." See Touchton v. Woodside Credit , LLC , 316 So. 3d 392, 394 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). Norris identifies one way a trial court can dispose of a case and conclude judicial labor—by issuing an order ado......
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