Toussaint v. Perreault
Decision Date | 26 July 1978 |
Parties | Roland TOUSSAINT and Amelda Toussaint v. Roland PERREAULT and Juliet Perreault. Roland PERREAULT and Juliet Perreault v. Roland TOUSSAINT and Amelda Toussaint. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Marshall, Raymond, Beliveau, Dionne & Bonneau by Paul R. Dionne, Lewiston (orally), for plaintiff.
Solman, Page & Hunter by Robert H. Page, Caribou (orally), for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.
This case is before us in the form of an interlocutory appeal by Roland and Juliet Perreault pursuant to Rule 72(c), M.R.Civ.P. 1
We discharge the report and remand the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings.
Roland and Emelda Toussaint (hereinafter Toussaints) initiated a civil action against Roland and Juliet Perreault (hereinafter the Perreaults), alleging various tortious acts, 2 including trespassing on the Toussaints' property in the Town of Eagle Lake. The Perreaults denied these acts, counterclaimed alleging trespass and acts of harassment by the Toussaints, and then filed a cross-complaint for the purpose of trying title to the land upon which the alleged trespass occurred. The Toussaints answered both the counterclaim and cross-action with a general denial.
The matter was heard before a single Justice of the Superior Court without a jury on October 16, 1975, who, on May 30, 1976, filed an "interlocutory finding as to boundaries only." Without repeating the details, this finding defined the disputed boundaries in such a manner as to be consistent with where the Toussaints claimed them to be. If the conclusion was legally correct, the end result would be to reduce the Perreaults' claimed 500' frontage on Eagle Lake by approximately one hundred feet.
The natural sequence of events thereafter would have been a further hearing to determine (1) where the boundary was on the face of the earth, (2) whether either the Toussaints or the Perreaults (or both) were guilty of trespass and/or any of the other alleged causes of action, and (3) the quantum of damages, if any. This hearing was never held and the case apparently remained dormant until August 5, 1977, 3 when the Perreaults filed a motion to report the case to the Law Court pursuant to Rule 72(c). In the interim the Justice who had conducted the initial hearing and had made the "interlocutory finding," died on July 16, 1977. The Rule 72(c) motion to report was of necessity presented by the Perreaults to another Justice of the Superior Court who signed an appropriate order on September 6, 1977, and the case in due course was argued before the Law Court.
A report under Rule 72(c) does not automatically require the Law Court to decide the issue reported. In Laverdiere v. Marden, Me., 333 A.2d 701, 702 (1975), we held:
Since Laverdiere this Court has again given consideration to the problem which arises when issues are reported which are not of that degree of legal importance prerequisite to the utilization of this appellate mechanism. In State v. Placzek, Me., 380 A.2d 1010 (1977), although we were then dealing with a report under Rule 37A, M.R.Crim.P., we adopted the rationale of two civil cases to determine the parameters which should guide us when called upon to exercise our discretion in accepting or rejecting a report. We utilized the language found in Hand v. Nickerson, 148 Me. 465, 469, 95 A.2d 813, 816 (1953), to point out that the question of law reported must be of sufficient importance and doubt to justify the report. It seems clear from the reasoning in Placzek that we deemed it inappropriate to report interlocutory rulings on which there was no serious dispute on the legal issue and which involved only the resolution of a factual dispute between litigants. If a case is thus postured, the decision of the Law Court would have minimal precedential value. See Huot v. Gendron, Me., 284 A.2d 899 (1971).
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...parties without making any decision therein. [¶ 14] We have discretion as to whether to accept or reject a report, see Toussaint v. Perreault, 388 A.2d 918, 920 (Me. 1978) ("A report under Rule 72(c)2 does not automatically require the Law Court to decide the issue reported."); Laverdiere v......
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...importance and doubt as to require review by this court before the action is allowed to proceed any further. Toussaint v. Perreault, 388 A.2d 918, 920 (Me.1978); 4 M.R.S.A. § 57. The Superior Court justice was convinced, and correctly so, that the interests of justice will be served by our ......
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