Town of Burnsville v. City of Bloomington

• Decision Date: 02 November 1962
• Docket Number: No. 38665,38665
• Citation: 264 Minn. 133,117 N.W.2d 746
• Parties: TOWN OF BURNSVILLE, Dakota County, et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF BLOOMINGTON et al., Defendants, City of Bloomington, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 746

117 N.W.2d 746

264 Minn. 133

TOWN OF BURNSVILLE, Dakota County, et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF BLOOMINGTON et al., Defendants, City of Bloomington Appellant.

No. 38665.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 2, 1962.

Syllabus by the Court

1. An organized town from which it is proposed to detach territory has such a special interest in the matter as to enable it to challenge the validity of the annexation proceeding.

2. Where a proper proceeding is commenced by a town from which property is to be detached by an annexation proceeding, residents and taxpayers of the town may join with the town in challenging the validity of the annexation proceeding.

3. Where an action for a declaratory judgment will lie, the trial court may grant injunctive relief to maintain the status quo pending a determination of the main action if the facts and circumstances of the case warrant it.

4. An action for a declaratory judgment is a direct, not a collateral, attack on an annexation proceeding.

5. Where there are fact issues to be tried, it is preferable to commence an action in the district court rather than the supreme court.

6. An action for a declaratory judgment brought by a municipal corporation from which it is proposed to detach territory is a proper proceeding to test the validity of an annexation proceeding.

7. Where an action for a declaratory judgment is brought to test the validity of an annexation proceeding by the town from which it is proposed to detach territory, the determination of the rights of the parties is res judicata on all the residents and taxpayers of the governmental units involved.

8. Abolition of the writ of quo warranto and an information in the nature of quo warranto by amendment of Rule 81.01 of Rules of Civil Procedure did not abolish the relief formerly available under such procedures.

Briggs & Morgan, Richard E. Kyle, Frank N. Graham, David C. Forsberg, St. Paul, for amicus curiae.

John G. Pidgeon, Bloomington, for appellant.

David L. Grannis, Jr., and Vance B. Grannis, Jr., Grannis & Grannis, South St. Paul, for respondents.

Donald E. Nelson, Armin M. Johnson, Gordon G. Busdicker, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Amicus Curiae.

KNUTSON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court granting a temporary injunction in proceedings challenging an annexation.

Plaintiffs are the town of Burnsville, a duly organized township; the members of the town board; and an individual resident of the town who owns property in the city of Bloomington, one of the defendants.

The defendants are the city of Bloomington; the major of the city; and the auditor, treasurer, assessor, and commissioners of Dakota County, in which the town of Burnsville is located. The city of Bloomington is located in Hennepin County.

Northern States Power Company is the owner of certain land in the town of Burnsville, the description of which is not material here, on which is located a power plant known as the 'Black Dog Plant.'

The Minnesota River runs between the city of Bloomington and the town of Burnsville.

On August 22, 1961, Northern States Power Company filed a petition with the city of Bloomington pursuant to Minn.St. 414.03, subd. 2, requesting that its property located in the town of Burnsville be annexed by the city of Bloomington. On the same day the city adopted an ordinance purporting to annex the property described in the petition.

Plaintiffs promptly commenced an action for a declaratory judgment, seeking a determination that the annexation was void for a number of reason and, as a part of the action, sought injunctive relief to restrain defendants from doing any further act to carry out the annexation ordinance. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order on September 6, 1961, and on September 15 heard a motion for a temporary injunction. On December 26 the court granted this motion and denied defendants' motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order theretofore issued and to dismiss the action. This appeal is from such order. In Town of Burnsville v. City of Bloomington, 262 Minn. 455, 115 N.W.2d 923, we held that the part of the court's order denying the motion to dismiss the action was not appealable but that the part of the order granting the motion for a temporary injunction was, and we dismissed the appeal from that part of the order which was not appealable. It follows that the case is here as an appeal from the order granting a temporary injunction.

We are not concerned with the merits of the controversy in this appeal. The questions raised are procedural only. It is the contention of defendants (1) that the validity of the annexation cannot be tested in a suit for an injunction, and (2) that plaintiffs, as private persons, may not attack a de facto annexation. Basically, it is the claim of defendants that a quo warranto proceeding, brought by the state, is the exclusive method for challenging the validity of an annexation proceeding.

1. At the outset it must be noted that one of the plaintiffs is the town from which the land to be annexed by the city is to be taken. In State ex rel. Town of Stuntz v. City of Chisholm, 196 Minn. 285, 264 N.W. 798, 266 N.W 689, 20 Minn.L.Rev. 832, we held that a town from which it was proposed to detach land by annexation to a city has such a special interest in the proceeding as to enable it to challenge the annexation. We there said (196 Minn. 289, 264 N.W. 800):

'We pass the question whether the present relator, an organized town, may properly be called a private relator. It is such if 'any relator other than the attorney general' is a private relator, and such may be the correct legal view. Assuming it to be so, yet relator plainly has a very substantial and special interest when of its territory there is sought to be taken away such a substantial portion, in area and value, as that which has been included within the new Chisholm limits. * * * That a town has a very direct, special, and vital interest in retaining so much of area and assessed value is not and will not be denied by anybody.

Relator is clearly within the rule declared in State ex rel. Young v. Village of Kent (96 Minn. 255, 104 N.W. 948, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 826, 6 Ann.Cas. 905) and State ex rel. Wah-we-yea-cumin v. Olson (107 Minn. 136, 119 N.W. 799, 21 L.R.S.(N.S.) 685) supra.'

That decision controls here in so far as the right of the town to challenge the validity of the annexation is concerned.

2. We also held in that case that, once the town has commenced a proper proceeding, taxpayers and residents of the town could be permitted to intervene. In that respect we said (196 Minn. 295, 266 N.W. 689):

'Several taxpayers and residents of the town of Balkan and some mining companies, which own property in the affected area, also filed petitions for leave to intervene. It appears that these petitioners may have 'special rights' that will be affected by the final determination of the case. We are of opinion that no harm can result by permitting them to intervene, and their petitions to do so are granted. That does not mean that we would have permitted them to come in as the original and only relators. Compare State ex rel. Wah-we-yea-cumin v. Olson, 107 Minn. 136, 119 N.W. 799, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 685.'

In State ex rel. Wah-we-yea-cumin v. Olson, 107 Minn. 136, 138, 119 N.W. 799, 800, 21 L.R.A.,N.S., 685, 688, we said:

'* * * The question ought at this time to be definitely settled and put at rest, and to that end we hold, in harmony with what seems the trend of judicial opinion, that leave to conduct quo warranto proceedings to test the legality of the organization of municipal or quasi municipal corporations will not be granted at the instance of private relators having no interest in the subject-matter distinct from the public. The Dahl case should be limited to facts like those there before the court.'

If taxpayers and residents may be permitted to intervene after a proper proceeding is commenced by the town, there is no good reason why they cannot be permitted to join the town in the first instance. As in the Stuntz case, we need not determine here whether they would be permitted to maintain the action if they were the original and only plaintiffs. We do hold that, once a proper proceeding is commenced by the town from this territory is to be detached by an annexation proceeding, it is not improper for residents and taxpayers of the town to join as parties with the town in challenging the annexation. Whether taxpayers and residents have such a special interest aside from the public in general as to permit them to challenge the annexation individually we do not here determine.

3. The crucial question then is whether the validity of a de facto annexation may be tested by an action brought for a declaratory judgment by the town from which territory is to be detached. While defendants urge that the question is whether the validity of such annexation may be tested by a suit for an injunction, the injunctive relief granted here is only incidental to the action for a declaratory judgment in maintaining the status quo until the main action can be determined.

Authorities from other jurisdictions are not at all in harmony on whether quo warranto is the exclusive remedy; whether a suit for an injunction constitutes a direct or collateral attack; or whether an action for a declaratory judgment may be used to test the validity of proceedings of this kind. The number of authorities on the latter question are few, but on the whole subject, see Annotations, 13 A.L.R.(2d) 1279 and 18 A.L.R.(2d) 1255; 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, § 1.19; 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3 ed.) § 7.41. Due to the difference in the history of the development of case law or enactment of statutes in the various states, decisions are frequently inapplicable.

It must be conceded that there are authorities holding that a suit for injunctive relief alone is not a...