Town of Clayton v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 21 July 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 325.,325. |
Citation | 82 ALR 417,51 F.2d 977 |
Parties | TOWN OF CLAYTON v. COLORADO & S. RY. CO. et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Myles P. Tallmadge, of Denver, Colo., and Hugh B. Woodward, of Albuquerque, N. M. (Frank O. Blue, of Clayton, N. M., and Pershing, Nye, Tallmadge, Bosworth & Dick, of Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellant.
J. L. Rice, of Denver, Colo. (O. P. Easterwood, of Clayton, N. M., J. Q. Dier and A. C. Scott, both of Denver, Colo., and J. C. James, of Chicago, Ill., on the brief), for appellees.
Before LEWIS, PHILLIPS, and McDERMOTT, Circuit Judges.
The Town of Clayton brought this suit against the railway company and the two trust companies to foreclose a street improvement lien against the property of the railway company abutting on the street improved. The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss the bill, and the town has appealed.
The town initiated a street improvement proceeding under the so-called Provisional Order Street Improvement statute of New Mexico, chapter 42, N. M. Laws 1903 (sections 3665 to 3671, N. M. St. Ann. 1915 Code), chapter 152, N. M. Laws 1919, and chapter 16, N. M. Laws 1927. Among the streets improved was Front Street between the northerly line of its intersection with Chestnut Street and the southerly line of its intersection with Maple Street. The right-of-way of the railway company abuts the western boundary of such portion of Front Street. Such abutting portion of the right-of-way is 300 feet in width and on it are located the main line and sidetracks of the railway company, and grain elevators, warehouses, coal-yards, and other industrial structures and plants of lessees of the railway company.
The town adopted Ordinance No. 172 on August 27, 1928, which assessed against such abutting portion of the right-of-way east of the center median line thereof as abutting property $6,590.39 as its proportionate share of the cost of such improvement, under the provisions of section 3669, supra, chapter 152, § 3, supra. This section, before its amendment in 1919, read as follows:
"After the making of such contract, said city council or board of trustees shall determine what portion of such work shall be paid by such abutting property, and the owners thereof, and shall assess to each lot or parcel of land abutting upon such street or alley or part thereof so to be improved its proportionate share of such total amount."
The amendment added the following language:
Counsel for defendants contend that the effect of this amendment was to limit the assessment of railway company property for a street improvement to the cost of the improvement between or under the rails and tracks of such railway company and for two feet on each side thereof, situated within the boundaries of such improvement, and to exempt it from all other assessments for such improvement.
The primary rule in the construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislative body. Stevens v. Nave-McCord Merc. Co. (C. C. A. 8) 150 F. 71, 75; Balanced Rock S. A. v. Manitou (C. C. A. 10) 38 F.(2d) 28, 30; Moffat Tunnel Imp. Dist. v. Denver & S. L. R. Co. (C. C. A. 10) 45 F. (2d) 715, 723. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, resort must not be had, ordinarily, to rules of construction, but the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. United States v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 278 U. S. 269, 277, 49 S. Ct. 133, 73 L. Ed. 322; Duke Power Co. v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 4) 44 F. (2d) 543; Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Iowa Loan & T. Co. (C. C. A. 8) 38 F. (2d) 608, 610. Where, however, the language is of doubtful meaning, or where adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice or absurdity, or result in contradictory provisions, it devolves upon the court to ascertain the true meaning. United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 357, 46 S. Ct. 513, 70 L. Ed. 986; In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 667, 17 S. Ct. 677, 41 L. Ed. 1154; United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486, 487, 19 L. Ed. 278. The general design and purpose of a statute should be kept in mind and its provisions should be given a fair and reasonable construction with a view to effecting its purpose and object. Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460, 475, 32 S. Ct. 734, 56 L. Ed. 1165; Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178, 194, 43 S. Ct. 65, 67 L. Ed. 199; Feitler v. United States (C. C. A. 3) 34 F. (2d) 30, 33.
It frequently happens that the true intention of a legislative body is not expressed by the language employed in a statute, when literally construed. In such cases, the intent of such legislative body can only be effectuated by a departure from a literal interpretation of the language employed. Where such intention is plainly discernible from the provisions of the statute when considered as a whole, the real purpose and intent of the legislative body will prevail over the literal import of the words employed. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226; U. S. for use of Hill v. American Surety Co., 200 U. S. 197, 203, 26 S. Ct. 168, 50 L. Ed. 437; Jones v. Guaranty & I. Co., 101 U. S. 622, 626, 25 L. Ed. 1030; Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U. S. 85, 90, 45 S. Ct. 437, 69 L. Ed. 857; Fleischman Const. Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 349, 360, 46 S. Ct. 284, 70 L. Ed. 624; Baltzell v. Mitchell (C. C. A. 1) 3 F.(2d) 428, 430; London & L. I. Co. v. Smoot, 52 App. D. C. 378, 287 F. 952, 956.
The original act made express provision for assessing the cost of the improvement against abutting property. The phrase abutting property includes abutting railroad property without specific mention thereof. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U. S. 430, 25 S. Ct. 466, 49 L. Ed. 819; Heman Const. Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 206 Mo. 172, 104 S. W. 67, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112, 121 Am. St. Rep. 649, 12 Ann. Cas. 630; Marion B. & E. Traction Co. v. Simmons, 180 Ind. 289, 102 N. E. 132; C., M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Churdan, 196 Iowa, 1057, 195 N. W. 996; Figg v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 116 Ky. 135, 75 S. W. 269; Forest v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 159 N. C. 547, 75 S. E. 796; Kinston v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co., 183 N. C. 14, 110 S. E. 645; Mo., K. & T. R. Co. v. Tulsa, 45 Okl. 382, 145 P. 398; Okla. R. Co. v. Severns Paving Co., 67 Okl. 207, 170 P. 216, 10 A. L. R. 157.
Had the legislative body intended to exempt railway property from assessment as abutting property, the natural and ordinary method would have been to have added an exception to the general language of the original act. This it did not do. Instead it left undisturbed the original act which included abutting railway property and added thereto an amendment purporting to grant additional power to assess railway property.
The introductory language of the next to the last sentence of the amendment, "the governing body of any municipality shall have power to assess against the owner or owners of any railroad or street railroad occupying or abutting," is in the form of a grant of power rather than an exemption. Nevertheless, counsel for the railway company maintain that the word abutting was inserted therein to exempt abutting railway property from assessment.
In that portion of such sentence which reads, "the whole cost of the improvement between or under the rails and tracks of...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Crownover v. Crownover
...set forth in our many cases on that subject. Reese v. Dempsey, 1944, 48 N.M. 417, 152 P.2d 157; Town of Clayton v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 10 Cir., 1931, 51 F.2d 977, 82 A.L.R. 417; Fisherdick v. San Juan County Bd. of Ed., 1925, 30 N.M. 454, 236 P. 743; State v. Llewellyn, 1917, 23 N.M. 43,......
-
New York Cent. R. Co. v. Town of Glasgow
...R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 25 S.Ct. 466, 49 L.Ed. 819; 116 Ky. 856, 76 S.W. 1097; Town of Clayton v. Colorado & So. Ry. Co., 10 Cir., 51 F.2d 977, 82 A.L.R. 417; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. City of Minot, 51 N.D. 313, 199 N.W. 875, 37 A.L.R. 211; Chocta......
-
State for Benefit of Workmen's Compensation Fund v. E. W. Wylie Co., 7288
...and once truly ascertained, it should prevail, even against the strict letter of the law.' In Town of Clayton v. Colorado & Southern Railroad Co., 10 Cir., 51 F.2d 977, 979, 82 A.L.R. 417, the court 'Where, however, the language is of doubtful meaning, or where adherence to the strict lette......
-
Barrett v. Hunter, 3954
...2 Pulliam v. United States, 10 Cir., 178 F. 2d 777. 3 Martin v. Hiatt, 5 Cir., 174 F.2d 350, 352. 4 Town of Clayton v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 10 Cir., 51 F.2d 977, 979, 82 A.L.R. 417; Board of Education, etc., v. Woodmen of the World, 10 Cir., 77 F.2d 31, 34; Federal Deposit Ins. Corporatio......