Town of Mount Dora v. Green
Decision Date | 11 September 1934 |
Citation | 158 So. 131,117 Fla. 385 |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Parties | TOWN OF MOUNT DORA v. GREEN. |
Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 1934.
En Banc.
Suit by Luther C. Green against the Town of Mount Dora. Decree for complainant, and respondent appeals.
Reversed with directions. Appeal from Circuit Court Lake County; J. C. B. Koonce, judge.
Shackleford Ivy, Farrior & Shannon and Robert W. Shackleford, all of Tampa, and Thomas H. Cooley, of Mt. Dora, for appellant.
Macfarlane Pettingill, Macfarlane & Fowler, of Tampa, for appellee on rehearing.
Luther C. Green filed a bill of complaint, the purpose of which was to enjoin the municipality of Mount Dora, Fla., from setting up or pleading the statute of limitations as contained in the charter of the town as a defense in an action at law brought by the said Green to recover damages for injuries received by reason of the alleged negligence of such municipality.
The particular section of the charter, the benefits of which this suit was instituted to prevent the municipality from deriving the advantage of, was section 15 of the Charter Act, which was chapter 10866 of the Special Acts of 1925, to wit:
'That suits on all causes of action of whatsoever kind or nature, accruing against the Town of Mount Dora, shall be instituted within twelve months after the cause of action accrues.'
It was alleged in the bill of complaint that action at law was not filed within twelve months after the cause of action accrued, but it was alleged that the suit was not filed within the twelve months because of certain negotiations and representations which were carried on between plaintiff in that suit and one Lamoreux, who was a local agent of New Amsterdam Casualty Company, which company was bound by the terms of a policy of insurance issued by it to the town of Mount Dora to indemnify the town of Mount Dora against any liability it might sustain by reason of inflicting personal injuries by negligence, and that in connection with this incident the said Lamoreux acted as the agent and representative of the town of Mount Dora. The theory of the suit was, and is, that the town of Mount Dora was estopped from setting up the statute of limitations contained in its charter as a defense against this cause of action because of the representations and negotiations made and entered into by and between the injured person and Lamoreux, the agent of the municipality.
Much appears in the record and in the brief filed by the appellant concerning what Lamoreux did, or did not do, and concerning the extent of his authority as agent for the municipality or as to whether or not he was an agent of the municipality.
A number of questions of law are presented for our determination, but we think there is one controlling question presented, and that it is not necessary to discuss any others attempted to be presented.
The controlling question presented here is whether or not an agent of a municipality, without being thereunto authorized by a statute, may by express agreement or by conduct waive the right of the municipality to interpose its defense of statutory limitation against the enforcement of a cause of action, or, in other words, whether or not a municipality may be estopped from pleading the statute of limitations by reason of the conduct or express agreement of an agent of limited authority whose action in that connection is not specifically authorized by statute.
There is serious doubt in our minds as to whether or not the statutory governing authority of a municipality may by official action in that regard waive the right to plead the statute of limitations set up in the charter where the right is only permissive, unless the right to so waive the statute of limitation be authorized by statute. However, that question is not presented here and we do not determine it.
It is clear to us, however, that no conduct of any person or persons possessing less authority than the governing power of the municipality may by express agreement or by conduct, unless thereunto specifically authorized by statute, waive the duty of the municipality to plead the statute of limitations where the statute is mandatory.
It may be observed that the charter of a municipality is to the municipality what the Constitution is to the state. In a legislative charter the state both grants and withholds powers to and from the municipality and by its provisions protects and safeguards the rights of the public as well as of the individuals who may be affected.
In the charter provision here under consideration, the Legislature prescribed a mandatory condition to be observed by those who might seek to enforce claims by suits against the municipality. One purpose was to protect the public as represented by citizens and taxpayers of the municipality from the expense incident to the defense of stale claims.
This mandatory provision may not be respected or ignored at the will of the municipal officers and agents. It may not be set aside to favor some and invoked to hinder others but it is the controlling law and it is the duty of the municipality to invoke it in all cases. That duty cannot be waived or its performance estopped by the conduct of an officer or agent without legislative authority.
A mandatory statute of limitations and a mandatory requirement of presentation of notice as a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action stand on much the same ground.
McQuillin, in his treatise on Municipal Corporations, vol. 6, par. 2889, referring to requirements that notice be given as a condition precedent to the right to maintain the action, says:
In Trowbridge v. Schmidt, reported in 82 Miss. 475, 34 So. 84, the Supreme Court of Mississippi said:
'We have a statute (Code 1892, § 2755) as follows: We find the following in Dillon on Municipal Corporations, vol. 1 (4th Ed.) § 504 (412): The italics are those of the text. It is indisputable that a municipal board cannot lawfully give away public money. It is certain, also, that a former liability extinguished by the bar of the statute of limitations is no debt. It follows that paying it is giving away public money, and this is ultra vires, and the treasurer may refuse to pay it. Files v. McWilliams, 49 Miss. 578; Klein v. Board, 51 Miss. 878.
In Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah, 608, 201 P. 173, 178, the Supreme Court of Utah said:
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Rice v. Granite School Dist., 11443
...an ordinary statute of limitations. It cannot be waived by an insurance adjuster. 1 A case in point is that of Town of Mount Dora v. Green, 117 Fla. 385, 158 So. 131 (1934). There Green brought an action in equity to enjoin the town of Mount Dora from setting up the statute of limitations a......
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Pacific Indemnity Company v. Broward County, 71-2646.
...Dade County, 151 So.2d 69 (Fla.App.1963). 4 However a contrary rule did prevail in earlier cases, e. g., Town of Mount Dora v. Green, 117 Fla. 385, 158 So. 131, 132 (1934). 5 any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conferenc......
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