Town of North Kingstown v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd.
| Decision Date | 07 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | C.A. 97-0679 |
| Parties | TOWN OF NORTH KINGSTOWN, Appellant v. RHODE ISLAND STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, et al., Appellees |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
Before this Court is an appeal by the Town of North Kingston (Town) from a "Decision and Direction of Election" (Decision) of the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board (Board). Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15.
On July 2, 1993, the National Education Association of Rhode Island (Union) filed a "Petition by Employees for Investigation and Certification of Representatives" (Petition) with the Board, seeking to represent the following employees of the Town: Public Works Director, Town Engineer, Finance Director, Planning and Development Director, Town Clerk, Tax Assessor, Director of Water Supply, Recreation Director Building Official, Senior Services Director, Controller Deputy Town Clerk, Director of Welfare, Superintendent of Golf Course Operations, Highway Superintendent, Engineering Inspector, Recreation Program Director, Golf Course Operations Manager, Principal Planner, Principal Planner/Environmental Coordinator, Executive Secretary Community Development Director, and the Library Assistant Directors.
After several hearings, which spanned the course of over two years the Board issued its Decision on August 19, 1997. In the Decision, the Board directed an election among the following positions: Town Engineer, Engineering Inspector, Director of Planning and Development, Principal Planner, Principal Planner/Environmental Coordinator, Director of Welfare, Building Official, Director of Senior Services, Assistant Library Director, Operations Manager, Golf Course Superintendent, Deputy Town Clerk, and Director of Community Development. The Board excluded the Executive Secretary, Director of Public Works, Highway Superintendent, Finance Director, Controller, Tax Assessor, Recreation Director, Town Clerk, and the Director of Water Supply from the election.
On November 6, 1997, the election was held. By a six to five vote, the Union was chosen to represent the employees. On November 12, 1997, the Board certified the Union for those employees. On December 11, 1997, the Town appealed the decision of the Board, praying this Court reverse the Board's decision, vacate the direction of election, and vacate the certification of representatives.
The review of a decision of the Board by this Court is controlled by G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g), which provides for review of a contested agency decision:
When reviewing a decision of an agency, a justice of the Superior Court may not substitute his or her judgment for that of the agency board on issues of fact or as to the credibility of testifying witnesses, Mercantum Farm Corp. v. Dutra, 572 A.2d 286, 288 (R.I. 1990) (citing Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Lillibridge, 120 R.I. 283, 291, 387 A.2d 1034, 1038 (1978)); Center for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I. 1998), where substantial evidence exists on the record to support the board's findings. Baker v. Department of Employment and Training Board of Review, 637 A.2d 360, 366 (R.I. 1994) (citing DePetrillo v. Department of Employment Security, 623 A.2d 31, 34 (R.I. 1993); Whitelaw v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 95 R.I. 154, 156, 185 A.2d 104, 105 (1962)). Findings of fact by an agency board "are, in the absence of fraud, conclusive upon this court if in the record there is any competent legal evidence from which those findings could properly be made." Mercantum Farm, 572 A.2d at 288 (citing Leviton, 120 R.I. at 287, 387 A.2d at 1036-37). Legally competent evidence is "marked 'by the presence of 'some' or 'any' evidence supporting the agency's findings.'" State v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 694 A.2d 24, 28 (R.I. 1997) (citing Environmental Scientific Corp. v. Durfee, 621 A.2d 200, 208 (R.I. 1993)).
The Municipal Employees' Arbitration Act, G.L. 1956 § 28-9.4-1 et seq. (Act), grants municipal employees the right to bargain collectively with municipal employers. A municipal employee is defined in the Act as "any employee of a municipal employer, whether or not in the classified service of the municipal employer[.]" § 28-9.4-2(b). Excluded from that definition are "elected officials and administrative officials," and "confidential and supervisory employees." §28-9.4-2(b)(1)&(4). Furthermore, our Supreme Court has held that so-called managerial employees are excluded from the definition of municipal employees. See Fraternal Order of Police v. Town of Westerly, 659 A.2d 1104 (R.I. 1995). Because these categories of employees are excluded from the protections of the Act, they may not be included in collective bargaining units.
The Town argues that the Board erred in permitting the eleven positions to be included in a bargaining unit, because the positions were either supervisory or managerial, or they were administrative officials, or some combination of the three categories, thus excluded from the Act's protections.
In Board of Trustees, Robert H. Champlin Memorial Library v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 694 A.2d 1185, 1189-90 (R.I. 1997), our Supreme Court adopted the federal labor law definition of a supervisor, which is set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) as:
"any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment."
An employee may be a supervisor without meeting all the criteria set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 152(11), and may in fact be considered a supervisor even if only one criterion is met. See Butler-Johnson Corp. V. NLRB, 608 F.2d 1303, 1306 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979) () However, any power listed in 29 U.S.C. 152(11) "must involve the exercise of independent judgment in order to brand the holder of the power as a supervisor," as is stated in the statute. Telemundo de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 270, 274 (1st. Cir. 1997). And the legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act makes clear that only those employees "vested with such genuine management prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective recommendations with respect to such actions" are to be considered supervisors. Patrick Hardin, The Developing Labor Law, Third Edition Vol. 2, page 1610 (1992) (quoting NLRB v. Security Guard Service, 384 F.2d 143, 147 (5th Cir. 1967)). Thus, the fact that an employee's position does contain one of the enumerated powers in the definition of a supervisor does not automatically deem that employee a supervisor. The Board, utilizing its discretion, may look at the "collective force of [the] factors" to determine whether a position meets supervisory status. See Telemundo de Puerto Rico, 113 F.3d at 275.
Although managerial employees are not specifically listed as an excluded class of employees in the Act, our Supreme Court has held that they are, as a matter of public policy and legislative intent, excluded from collective bargaining. See e.g., Town of Westerly, 659 A.2d at 1108. In Town of Westerly, the court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of "managerial employees" as "those who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employers." 659 A.2d at 1108 (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980)). The court went on to hold that "such employees must exercise discretion within, or even independently of, established employer policy and must be aligned with management" to be considered managerial, and they "may be excluded as managerial only if [they] represent management interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy." Id. (citation omitted).
Section 28-9.4-2(b)(1) excludes "elected officials and administrative officials" from the protections of the Act. The parties at bar urge very different definitions of the term "administrative official." The Town argues that this Court should adopt the definition of "administrative employees" used by the U.S Department of Labor. The Department of Labor defines the term because the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1), excludes "administrative employees" from its protections. Administrative employees are those:
To continue reading
Request your trial