Town of Ocean Ridge, Palm Beach County v. Certain Lands Upon Which Taxes Due Town of Ocean Ridge Are Delinquent

• Decision Date: 19 December 1947
• Parties: TOWN OF OCEAN RIDGE (formerly BOYNTON BEACH), PALM BEACH COUNTY, v. CERTAIN LANDS UPON WHICH TAXES DUE TOWN OF OCEAN RIDGE (formerly BOYNTON BEACH) ARE DELINQUENT.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

33 So.2d 596

159 Fla. 880

TOWN OF OCEAN RIDGE (formerly BOYNTON BEACH), PALM BEACH COUNTY, v. CERTAIN LANDS UPON WHICH TAXES DUE TOWN OF OCEAN RIDGE (formerly BOYNTON BEACH) ARE DELINQUENT.

Florida Supreme Court

December 19, 1947

Rehearing Denied Feb. 12, 1948.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Palm Beach County; C. E Chillingworth, judge.

W. F Finch, Bert Winters, William H. Cook, and Robert D. Tylander all of West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Raymond R Richardson, beacham & Gaulden, John R. Beacham, George W. Coleman, and Farish & Farish, all of West Palm Beach, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The decree appealed from should be affirmed on the authority of State ex rel. Davis v City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335, 64 A.L.R. 1307; State v. City of Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409; State v. Town of Boynton Beach, 129 Fla. 528, 177 So. 327; City of Sarasota v. Skillin, 130 Fla. 724, 178 So. 837; Richmond v. Town of Largo, 155 Fla. 226, 19 So.2d 791; and related cases wherein are laid down the basic principles with reference to taxation of private lands by a municipality and the right of the property owner to have relief therefrom if the lands are not susceptible to municipal benefits.

It is so ordered.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, and BUFORD, CHAPMAN, and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

ADAMS and BARNS JJ., dissent.

BARNS, Justice (dissenting).

Appellant brought bill to foreclose tax certificates against land of appellees. Appellees answered and counterclaimed and on final hearing the chancellor entered a final decree denying plaintiff-appellant relief, granted relief on the counterclaim and enjoined all taxation of the property by the appellant, whereupon it appealed.

State ex rel. v. City of Largo, 1933, 110 Fla. 21, 149 So. 420, 421 (per Judge Koonce), in quo warranto, held that there was no estoppel against relator, granted ouster, and, in respect to legislative power under the provisions of Section 8 of Article VIII, held:

'But in exercising such authority it should at all times be kept in mind that the objects and purposes of such establishment or extension is to provide for an aggregation or community of people, and not simply an indiscriminate location of territory without regard for the requirements of the inhabitants. A sparsely settled area, chiefly used for groves, farms or gardens, or which is wild, unimproved and vacant lands and not needed for habitation or municipal purposes is not ordinarily within the meaning or purpose of the Constitution. A most enlightening and interesting history and analysis of this subject is given in the opinion of Justice Whitfield in the case of State ex rel. v. Avon Park, 149 So. 409, delivered at the present term of this court. While under the facts in the Avon Park case it was held that quo warranto was not the proper remedy under that writ unless further amended, the case now under consideration is somewhat different.

'In this case a major portion of the lands annexed to the Town of Largo by the Acts of 1925 are wholly unsuited and unnecessary for municipal purposes, the area is thinly settled, most of the lands are either vacant, wild and unimproved or are farms, groves, or gardens and by reason of distance incapable of receiving any benefit by being included within the city boundaries, and by far the greatest portion does not appear to have the remotest prospect of ever being benefited thereby. * * * It may be that a portion of the land annexed might receive some benefit by being within the corporate limits and might be suitable for municipal purposes, but the legislative act includes such a large portion which is not so suited or benefited and so unwarranted as to render the entire act void as violative of section 12 of the Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida.'

State ex rel. v. City of Pompano, 1933, 113 Fla. 246, 151 So. 485 (per Judge Buford), in quo warranto, approved State ex rel. v. City of Largo, supra, and State ex rel. v. Town of Lake Placid, 109 Fla. 419, 147 So. 468, and reiterated the first paragraphs of the Largo case, quoted above, and granted ouster of the lands annexed in 1927.

City of Winter Park v. State, 1935, 119 Fla. 343, 161 So. 386 (Per Curiam), granted ouster of urban and rural lands annexed in 1925 upon authority of the circumstances recited in the Largo and Avon Park cases, citing them with approval.

State v. Town of Boynton Beach, 1937, 129 Fla. 528, 177 So. 327, 329 (per Justice Terrell), in quo warranto, granted ouster of land placed within the City in 1929 by Ch. 8918, Sp.Acts 1921, and included in the division of the town by Ch. 15088, Sp.Acts 1931;

The trial judge denied ouster because of estoppel but found that the lands in question were not susceptible to receiving municipal benefits and stated 'the property is situated at such a distance that it is beyond any municipal benefits and receives no benefits at all.'

This Court, in granting ouster, stated, in reference to the legislative power that:

'* * * is nevertheless limited by the requirement that the elements which necessitate or make desirable the creation of a municipal corporation must be present. There must be a basis for additional governmental facilities; otherwise that provided by the state and county is ample.

'The elements essential to constitute a municipal corporation comprehend an area of contiguous territory sufficiently populated and industrialized to make it necessary or desirable that it be incorporated into a municipality in order that additional and better governmental services such as police protection, sanitary improvements, lights, water, electricity, sewerage disposal, paved streets, and other municipal conveniences be provided. Such services may be furnished by the municipality or by private parties under contract with the municipality.

'Until a proposed municipality has attained this status or some appreciable degree of it, there is no predicate for incorporating it as such. The area incorporated must be suited for municipal purposes and must bear a just proportion to the population included. The test of what lands should be embraced in the municipality is determined by the benefits that may be returned to it and when these are absent, there is no theory on which it can be included. State ex rel. Davis v. Town of Lake Placid, 109 Fla. 419, 147 So. 468; State ex rel. Davis v. City of Largo, 110 Fla. 21, 149 So. 420.

'To incorporate an area into a municipality that is not susceptible of development along the lines and for the purposes here outlined or to bring considerable areas of wild and unimproved lands into a municipality already created for revenue purpose already created for revenue purposes benefits in proportion to the tax imposed is but little short of criminal and cannot be sustained. Benefits are no always susceptible of admeasurement in dollors and cents. They may be present or remote, tangible or intangible, such as appeal only to the aesthetic sense, but they must be present.'

In denying rehearing, this Court stated:

'We find no bases whatever for applying the doctrine of estoppel or res adjudicata. As we said in our former opinion, municipal benefits is the only theory on which lands can be included in a municipality. If Miller submitted and paid his taxes for a period of years and then decides to withdraw because no benefits were in sight, the municipality has gained that much and Miller has been the loser. It would be the grossest kind of oppression and injustice to refuse the relief prayed for in this case. Section 4, Declaration of Rights.'

State ex rel. v. Town of Boca Raton, 1937, 129 Fla. 673, 177 So. 293 (per Justice Terrell), in quo warranto, this Court reaffirmed State v. Town of Boynton Beach, 129 Fla. 528, 177 So. 327, and construed this Court's holding concerning estoppel as contained in State v. City of Coral Gables, 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308, 101 A.L.R. 578, and held, in respect to estoppel and laches, that:

'This rule would also control in cases where delay had wrought changes in the circumstances of the parties in such a way that to grant the prayer of the writ would be inequitable, but mere delay without damage will generally not be considered as laches. The delay must operate to the datriment of someone who is a party to the cause.

'In cases where lands are illegally included in a municipality, that is to say, where they are so remote from any municipal betterment or facility that they can receive no benefit therefrom, the rule stated in State ex rel. Landis et al. v. City of Coral Gables, supra, does not control and the lapse of time raises no bar to the owner raising the question. * * * Neither do we know of any reason why the owner of such lands should not be permitted to question the validity of their inclusion within the municipality at any time.'

City of Coral Gables v. State, 1937, 129 Fla. 834, 177 So. 290 (per Justice Chapman), in quo warranto, reaffirmed the Stuart case, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335, 64 A.L.A. 1307; Avon Park case, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409; and Lake Placid case, 109 Fla. 419, 147 So. 468, as related to unrelated property being included in a municipality, and affirmed ouster.

City of Sarasota v. Skillen, 1938, 130 Fla. 724, 178 So. 837 (per Justice Terrell), was an appeal from a final decree enjoining the City from assessing and collecting taxes on plaintiff's lands. The lands were placed within the City by an Act of 1927, and the suit was filed in 1934.

The injunction was granted because the lands were rural, and not proper to be included in the City. Affirmed, upon authority of State ex rel. v. Town of Boynton Beach, 129 Fla. 528, 177 So. 327, and State ex rel. Attorney General v. City of Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409.

Richmond v Town of Largo, 1944, ...