Town of Tukwila v. King County

• Decision Date: 12 January 1918
• Docket Number: 14297.
• Parties: TOWN OF TUKWILA et al. v. KING COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

169 P. 824

99 Wash. 439

TOWN OF TUKWILA et al. v. KING COUNTY et al.

No. 14297.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

January 12, 1918

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; King Dykeman, Judge.

Injunction by the Town of Tukwila against King County and others wherein Minnie M. Lutz intervenes. Judgment dismissing the suit, and plaintiff and intervener appeal. Affirmed.

Geo. H. Rummens, John F. Murphy, and R. M. Jones all of Seattle, for appellants.

Alfred H. Lundin, Edwin C. Ewing, and Peters & Powell, all of Seattle, for respondents.

HOLCOMB J.

This action was brought by Tukwila, a municipal corporation of the fourth class, Minnie M. Lutz intervening, to restrain King county and the board of county commissioners thereof from paving a portion of a highway within the corporate limits of the town of Tukwila with any other material than first-class paving brick. From a judgment of the trial court dismissing the action, both plaintiff and the intervener have appealed.

About May 20, 1913, the board of county commissioners of King county by resolution decided to condemn a right of way for a portion of what is known as the Seattle-Tacoma (Pacific) highway. The part of the right of way desired was on the streets of the town of Tukwila and across the property of the intervener. The county right of way agent and M. L. Hamilton one of the county commissioners, together with the deputy prosecuting attorney of King county, represented to the mayor and city council of Tukwila and to the intervener that the highway would be paved with first-class brick. Relying, as they contend, upon these representations and the promise that the highway would be so constructed, the town by ordinance granted King county a right of way on its streets, and the intervener deeded a strip of land from her lots in Tukwila to the county without compensation. There was no stipulation in the ordinance granting the right of way, or in the deed from the intervener, as to the character of the paving to be laid, nor was any formal action in that regard taken by the county commissioners prior to the securing of this right of way. The county took possession of, and at the time of trial had graded, the right of way. When it developed that the board of county commissioners intended to pave this portion of the highway with concrete, and not with brick, the present action was instituted.

Clearly it was not within the apparent scope of the authority of the right of way agent or the deputy prosecuting attorney to bind the county as to the character of the paving to be used. The right of way agent's duties were limited to procuring deeds for the right of way and ascertaining what compensation would be accepted by the property owners without resort to condemnation proceedings, and the deputy prosecuting attorney's duties were limited to seeing that the deeds were in proper form, and attending to other legal formalities. Their acts were all subject to approval or disapproval by the board of commissioners. The right of way agent's only authority for making such representations and promises is found in the oral instructions of Mr. Hamilton, the commissioner from the district in which the highway was to be constructed.

King county is divided into three districts, the north, central, and south, there being one commissioner from each district. The central district comprises the city of Seattle, in which no highways are constructed by the county. Appellants insist that it has been the custom for the commissioners from the north and south districts to have exclusive control over the construction of the roads and highways in their respective districts, and suggest that there was an understanding by which they agreed in advance to vote in support of each other's recommendations. We do not so read the testimony. But, even if it were so, the county is entitled to have each commissioner exercise his own independent judgment on each matter that is presented to the board. Any agreement by which a commissioner bartered away his discretion would be void as against public policy, and no one could acquire any rights thereunder.

Counsel for appellants cite Robertson v. King County, 20 Wash. 259, 55 P. 52, and Green v. Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 111 P. 226, 114 P. 457, but neither of these cases is in point. In the Robertson Case it appears that two of the commissioners stated in advance that the board would ratify whatever was done by the third commissioner. We are not inclined to extend the doctrine of that case. In the Green Case the contract was held void, a recovery being allowed on a quantum meruit; while in the present case appellants are seeking to establish a contract and to have it specifically enforced or violation thereof enjoined. See, also, Bier v. Clements, 167 P. 903.

When we consider that, under section 5879-7,...