Town of West Hartford v. Freedom of Information Com'n

• Decision Date: 09 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. 14122,14122
• Citation: 588 A.2d 1368,218 Conn. 256
• Parties: TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 1368

588 A.2d 1368

218 Conn. 256

TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 14122.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 15, 1991.

Decided April 9, 1991.

Regina M. Hopkins-Griggs, Com'n Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Mitchell W. Pearlman, Gen. Counsel, for appellant (named defendant).

Elizabeth Dee Bailey, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, GLASS, HULL and BORDEN, JJ.

HULL, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the trial court, reversing a decision of the named defendant freedom of information commission (FOIC), wherein the FOIC had ordered the plaintiffs, the town of West Hartford and its director of finance, Andrew F. Urban, to provide the defendants Uniformed Firefighters' Association of Connecticut (UFAC) and its president, Raymond D. Shea, (the defendants) with a list of the addresses of retired town employees. We reverse.

The relevant facts are as follows. The defendants requested that the plaintiffs provide them with a list of the names and addresses of all retired town employees. Relying on General Statutes § 1-19(b)(2), ¹ the plaintiffs provided a list of the names but denied each of three requests for the addresses. Thereafter, on April 15, 1987, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 1-21i(b), ² the defendants filed a notice of appeal with the FOIC, seeking disclosure of the requested addresses. Following a hearing, the FOIC hearing officer recommended that the FOIC order disclosure, having found, inter alia, that although the addresses are part of a personnel file, because they are available in public directories and there was no evidence that any town retirees took extraordinary measures to keep their addresses out of the public domain and inaccessible, disclosure of such addresses would not constitute an invasion of personal privacy within the meaning of § 1-19(b)(2).

The FOIC adopted the hearing officer's report as its final decision and ordered the plaintiffs to disclose the addresses to the defendants. Pursuant to § 1-21i(d), ³ the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Superior Court, which sustained the appeal, concluding that because the defendants' appeal to the FOIC had been time-barred under § 1-21i(b), the FOIC lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. The trial court also rejected the FOIC's determination that the addresses of the retired employees are available in public directories, concluding that even if the FOIC had had jurisdiction, the addresses were exempt from disclosure as part of a personnel file, the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy within the meaning of § 1-19(b)(2). The FOIC appealed the decision to the Appellate Court and we thereafter transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

The FOIC claims that the trial court mistakenly concluded that: (1) the defendants' appeal to the FOIC had been time-barred and that, therefore, the FOIC lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal; and (2) the addresses of the retired town employees are exempt from disclosure under § 1-19(b)(2).

I

The FOIC first claims that, contrary to the view of the trial court, the FOIC had subject matter jurisdiction to address the defendants' appeal because their appeal complied with the time constraints contained in § 1-21i(b). We agree.

On February 23, 1987, after two earlier requests had been denied, the defendants renewed their request that the plaintiffs provide them with a list of the addresses of retired town employees. The plaintiffs denied the third request in writing on April 8, 1987. On April 15, 1987, the defendants appealed this denial to the FOIC. The trial court concluded, however, that because the request on February 23, 1987, had been deemed denied on March 2, 1987, pursuant to General Statutes § 1-21i(a), ⁴ the time period for appealing the denial of that request had elapsed thirty days therefrom, on April 1, 1987, and that, therefore, the appeal filed on April 15, 1987, had been untimely. The FOIC claims that because the appeal was filed within thirty days of the written denial of April 8, 1987, the appeal had been timely filed. We agree with the FOIC.

General Statutes § 1-21i provides in part: "(a) Any denial of the right to inspect or copy [public] records provided for under section 1-19 shall be made to the person requesting such right ... within four business days of such request. Failure to comply with a request to so inspect or copy such public record within such four business day period shall be deemed to be a denial.

"(b) Any person denied the right to inspect or copy records under section 1-19 ... may appeal therefrom to the freedom of information commission, by filing a notice of appeal with said commission. A notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty days after such denial...." The plaintiffs assert that because the phrase "shall be filed" is mandatory, "such denial" from which "[a] notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty days" is the first denial of a request for public records, whether statutory or written. We are unpersuaded.

Because the Freedom of Information Act does not bar successive requests or successive denials, there is no requirement that an appeal to the FOIC, pursuant to § 1-21i(b), be taken from the denial of the first request or any particular request. Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 451, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988). Such a rigid requirement "would frustrate the 'strong legislative policy in favor of the open conduct of government and free public access to government records.' Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, [181 Conn. 324, 328, 435 A.2d 353 (1980) ]." Id. The plaintiffs' proposed interpretation of § 1-21i would require that an appeal to the FOIC be taken from a particular denial, specifically a statutory denial. It would be illogical to conclude, however, that while an appeal need not be taken from the denial of a particular request, that the right of appeal is limited to a particular denial.

" ' " 'In construing a statute, common sense must be used, and the courts will assume that the legislature intended to accomplish a reasonable and rational result.' " ' Ford Motor Credit Co. v. B.W. Beardsley, Inc., 208 Conn. 13, 20, 542 A.2d 1159 (1988). 'A statute ... should not be interpreted to thwart its purpose.' Builders Service Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 267, 276, 545 A.2d 530 (1988)." Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, 217 Conn. 110, 126-27, 584 A.2d 1172 (1991). The plaintiffs contend that their interpretation of § 1-21i(b) would encourage prompt disposition of matters involving disclosure of public records. To the contrary, it would merely increase the number of requests made. Furthermore, such a construction might discourage good faith negotiations about requests for disclosure lest relief from the FOIC be foreclosed by the lapse of the appeal period. Moreover, because the Freedom of Information Act is designed to facilitate the disclosure of public information upon the requests of laypersons as well as lawyers, construing § 1-21i(b) as the plaintiffs suggest would undoubtedly result in unnecessary surprise to laypersons, who would ordinarily be unaware of such a short period of time in which to file an appeal, especially when they had received no response to their requests. Finally, contrary to the expressed need therefor in § 1-21i(a), the plaintiffs proffered construction would render written denials of requests for public records useless.

We conclude that the statutory denial set forth in § 1-21i(a) does not limit the right to appeal a written denial of a request for disclosure of public records, but merely ensures an expedient right of appeal for those who do not desire to await a written denial. Although written denial of a request for disclosure of public records is required; General Statutes § 1-21i(a); there is no statutory recourse against a public agency for failure to comply with this requirement. Without the statutory denial provision, therefore, if a public agency failed to respond to a request, the person seeking disclosure would have no further recourse because the right of appeal to the FOIC in § 1-21i(b) is the right to appeal a denial. We further conclude that § 1-21i(b) affords a right to appeal to the FOIC any denial, whether written or statutory, of a request for disclosure of public records.

The defendants in this case filed a notice of appeal with the FOIC on April 15, 1987, seven days after the plaintiffs denied their third request for a list of the addresses. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court should not have concluded that the appeal had been untimely so as to bar the FOIC's subject matter jurisdiction. ⁵

II

The FOIC's second claim is that the trial court mistakenly concluded that the addresses of retired town employees are automatically exempt from disclosure pursuant to § 1-19(b)(2). We agree.

Section 1-19(b)(2) provides that "[n]othing in sections 1-15, 1-18a, 1-19 to 1-19b, inclusive, and 1-21 to 1-21k, inclusive, shall be construed to require disclosure of ... (2) personnel ... files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy." While the parties agree that disclosure of the addresses would require disclosure of personnel files, they disagree over whether disclosure of such would constitute an invasion of personal privacy. ⁶

"Connecticut courts have considered a person's reasonable expectation of privacy and the potential for embarrassment as significant factors in determining if disclosure [of public records] would constitute an invasion of privacy. Galvin v. Freedom of Information Commission, 201 Conn. 448, 461, 518 A.2d 64 (1986); Judiciary Committee v. Freedom of Information Commission, [39 Conn.Sup. 176, 188, 473 A.2d 1248 (1983) ]." Chairman v. Freedom...