Glastonbury Educ. Ass'n v. Freedom of Information Com'n

• Decision Date: 08 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15049,15049
• Citation: 663 A.2d 349,234 Conn. 704
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2866, 103 Ed. Law Rep. 247, 23 Media L. Rep. 2441 GLASTONBURY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al. Marilyn CAMPBELL, Commissioner of Education et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

Page 349

663 A.2d 349

234 Conn. 704, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2866,

103 Ed. Law Rep. 247,

23 Media L. Rep. 2441

GLASTONBURY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

Marilyn CAMPBELL, Commissioner of Education et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 15049.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 30, 1995.

Decided Aug. 8, 1995.

Colleen M. Murphy, Associate Gen. counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Mitchell W. Pearlman, Gen. Counsel, for appellant (named defendant).

William J. Dolan, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff Glastonbury Educ. Ass'n.)

Ralph E. Urban, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee (plaintiff commissioner of education).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON and PALMER, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, compulsory arbitration proceedings under the Teacher Negotiation Act (TNA); General Statutes § 10-153a et seq.; are exempt from the public meeting requirement of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); General Statutes §§ 1-18a and 1-21; ¹ because they constitute "strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining." The complainants, Kathleen Stack and James Hallas, the editor and the publisher of the Glastonbury Citizen newspaper, filed a complaint with the freedom of information commission (FOIC) after Stack had been denied admission to an arbitration proceeding between the plaintiff Glastonbury Education Association (GEA) and the Glastonbury Board of Education (board). The FOIC determined that Stack improperly had been denied access to the arbitration hearing. The plaintiffs, the GEA, the commissioner of education and the arbitrators, appealed from the FOIC decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 1-21i(b) and 4-183(a). ² The Superior Court sustained the appeal, and the Appellate Court affirmed. Glastonbury Education Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 35 Conn.App. 111, 643 A.2d 1320 (1994). We granted certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, limited to the question: "Do binding interest arbitration proceedings conducted pursuant to General Statutes §§ 10-153a through 10-153n fall within the exemption from public disclosure [for strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining] contained in General Statutes § 1-18a(b)?" Glastonbury Education Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 231 Conn. 922, 648 A.2d 162 (1994). Because we conclude that at least part of such a hearing may be closed to the public under the "strategy or negotiations" provision of § 1-18a(b), we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. ³

The record reveals the following facts. After the GEA and the board had failed to reach agreement on a new union contract, compulsory binding arbitration was imposed by the commissioner of the department of education pursuant to General Statutes § 10-153f. ⁴ On December 8, 1990, an arbitration hearing was held to allow each side to present its "last best offer" and evidence and argument in favor of its position. See General Statutes § 10-153f(c)(2). Stack sought to attend this hearing, but was denied admission by the arbitration panel.

Stack and Hallas filed a complaint with the FOIC against the board and the arbitration panel. ⁵ After a contested hearing, the FOIC found that although the "purpose of the [arbitration] hearing was to allow the [board] and the [GEA] to each present a 'last best contract' offer and to submit evidence and argument on behalf of their positions"; "the parties ... can negotiate an agreement on their own with respect to any of the disputed issues, prior to the determination of the respondent panel...." The FOIC concluded that "although [such] hearings may and often do lead to further negotiation, the actual arbitration hearing in this case ... constituted a meeting within the meaning of § 1-18a(b), which should have been open to the public pursuant to § 1-21...." The FOIC determined that the hearing must be open unless the GEA, the board and the arbitrators "prove[d] ... that collective bargaining negotiations actually occurred during the hearing in question." It found that the parties had failed to meet this burden.

The GEA, the commissioner of education and the arbitration panel appealed to the trial court, which sustained their appeal. That court held that, because compulsory arbitration proceedings are a continuation of strategy and negotiations with respect to collective bargaining, they do not constitute "meetings" pursuant to § 1-18a(b) and thus they need not be open to the public. On appeal from the trial court, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and the reasoning of the trial court. Glastonbury Education Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 35 Conn.App. at 118-19, 643 A.2d 1320. Viewing compulsory arbitration under the TNA as a part of the collective bargaining process, the Appellate Court held that such arbitration is excluded from the definition of "meeting" contained in the FOIA. Id.

The FOIC challenges the Appellate Court's conclusion that the relationship between compulsory binding arbitration hearings and collective bargaining automatically excludes such hearings in their entirety from the ambit of "meetings" of government agencies that are presumptively open to the public under § 1-21(a). The statutory exclusion from the open meeting requirement contained in § 1-18a(b) provides that " 'meeting' shall not include ... strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining...." In the view of the FOIC, the legislature intended this exclusion to encompass only those aspects of any collective bargaining process, including compulsory binding arbitrations, that directly involve strategy or negotiations. Although we agree with the FOIC in part, on the present record we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

This appeal raises two interrelated issues of statutory construction. What is the scope of the exclusion for collective bargaining contained in § 1-18a(b)? ⁶ To what extent are compulsory arbitration proceedings under the TNA properly characterized as collective bargaining and as strategy or negotiations relating thereto?

Inquiry into the scope of the statutory exclusion for collective bargaining contained in § 1-18a(b) must commence with the recognition of the legislature's general commitment to open governmental proceedings. "The overarching legislative policy of the FOIA is one that favors 'the open conduct of government and free public access to government records.' " Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 166, 635 A.2d 783 (1993), citing Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 328, 435 A.2d 353 (1980); see also Board of Education v. Freedom of lnformation Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 450, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988) ("general policy of openness expressed in the FOIA legislation"). The sponsors of the FOIA understood the legislation to express the people's sovereignty over "the agencies which serve them"; see Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 181 Conn. at 328, 435 A.2d 353, citing 18 H.R.Proc., Pt. 8, 1975 Sess., p. 3911, remarks of Representative Martin Burke; and this court consistently has interpreted that expression to require diligent protection of the public's right of access to agency proceedings. "Our construction of the [FOIA] must be guided by the policy favoring disclosure and exceptions to disclosure must be narrowly construed." Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 641, 651, 631 A.2d 252 (1993); Superintendent of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 222 Conn. 621, 626, 609 A.2d 998 (1992); see also Kureczka v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 271, 277, 636 A.2d 777 (1994); Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 393, 398, 604 A.2d 351 (1992); Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 232, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 201 Conn. 421, 431, 518 A.2d 49 (1986); Maher v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 310, 315, 472 A.2d 321 (1984); Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 181 Conn. at 328-29, 435 A.2d 353.

In light of these principles, the statutory definition of public meetings contained in § 1-18a(b) must be read to limit rather than to expand the opportunities for public agencies to hold closed hearings. Accordingly, the language providing that public meetings "shall not include ... strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining" means, as the FOIC maintains, that what is excluded from the term "meeting" is not all collective bargaining, but only "strategy or negotiations" sessions that relate to collective bargaining. This interpretation accords proper respect for the manifest legislative policy expressed in the FOIA. It also comports with its legislative history, which suggests that the collective bargaining exception was understood to provide privacy for "the give-and-take in negotiating sessions of collective bargaining...." (Emphasis added.) 18 H.R.Proc., supra, p. 3896. Had the legislature intended a broader exclusion, it could have excluded "collective bargaining" without limitation, or it could have excluded "collective bargaining, including but not limited to strategy and negotiations relating thereto." See Bloomfield Education Assn. v. Frahm, 35 Conn.App. 384, 389, 646 A.2d 247, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 926, 648 A.2d 161 (1994). It chose neither of these options.

Our interpretation of § 1-18a(b) finds further support in related provisions of the FOIA that provide limited exceptions to the public disclosure requirement for those portions of proceedings that relate to strategy or negotiations. In § 1-18a(e)(2), for...