Townsend v. Ray

• Decision Date: 01 July 1939
• Parties: TOWNSEND et al. v. RAY et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

130 S.W.2d 96

174 Tenn. 634

TOWNSEND et al. v. RAY et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 1, 1939

Appeal from Chancery Court, Decatur County; Tom C. Rye, Chancellor.

Bill by W. B. Townsend and others against Hence Ray and others to enjoin defendants from acting as school commissioners of Decatur county. The chancellor overruled defendants' demurrer, and granted defendants an appeal.

Decree reversed, demurrer sustained and bill dismissed.

J. L White, W. V. Tucker, and E. C. Kennedy, all of Decaturville and Ross & Ross, of Savannah, for appellants.

E. J Harris, of Bolivar, and W. H. Fisher, of Memphis, for appellees.

McKINNEY Justice.

By the bill the complainants ask that the defendants be enjoined from acting as School Commissioners of Decatur County upon the theory that the legislative acts under which they are functioning are invalid. The defendants demurred to the bill upon the ground that said acts are constitutional. The chancellor overruled the demurrer but granted defendants an appeal to this court.

By Chapter 181, Private Acts 1939, the Legislature abolished the County Board of Education of Decatur County. That Board consisted of seven members who were elected by the Quarterly County Court from the county at large, as provided by the general school law, Chapter 115, Public Acts 1925. Complainants were serving on said Board when it was abolished.

By Chapter 187, Private Acts 1939, the Legislature created a new Board of School Commissioners, consisting of one member from each of the twelve civil districts in the county, each member to be a resident of his district and to be elected by the legal voters of that district for a term of two years. The Act provides that one School Commissioner is to be elected by the qualified voters in each civil district of the county at the general election in August, 1940, and every two years thereafter.

The Legislature designated or named the twelve Commissioners, one from each civil district, who were to serve as the County Board of School Commissioners until their successors are chosen in the general election in August, 1940.

On the argument of this cause counsel abandoned all attacks on the Act except their insistence that the change in form for the administration of the schools of the county is not real but colorable, the purpose being the deposing of one set of officers and the substitution of others. Counsel conceded that the similarity of the situation presented in this cause and in that of Haggard v. Gallien, 157 Tenn. 269, 8 S.W.2d 364, 365 is striking, and that the decision in the latter cause is an authority against their contention. In the opinion in that cause it was said:

"In the instant case complainants below are members of a board elected, not by the people, but by the county court, and not chosen from or residing in particular civil districts, but from the county at large. It may well be conceived that the Legislature found it advantageous and conducive to better and fairer results of administration to give to the people of the several civil districts the power to choose from each of their districts a resident representative on this important board, and to give to them the power to elect every two years their choice, rather than leave this choice to the possible log rolling proclivities of the county court, with power to select men from the county at large, who might or might not be in touch with the conditions and requirements of certain of the districts.

"We are unable to escape the conclusion that changes which affect not only the number of the members and the length of their terms of office, but go to the source of their authority and determine their residential qualification, are not colorable merely, but substantial. The basic structure of the governmental form is necessarily affected by a change in the manner of selection of the members of the governing body, such as a change from an appointive to an elective membership, or, as here, from a membership chosen by a court from a county at large, to a membership elected by the people from the several districts. It is significant that Mr. Justice Green, in his opinion in Goetz v. Smith, supra [152 Tenn. 451, 278 S.W. 417], sustaining the constitutionality of the Knox County Highway Act of 1925 *** says, 'Another difference not mentioned is that under the first act the superintendent of roads was elected by the people for four years, while under the last act he is elected by the board of highway commissioners, and holds office at the pleasure of such board,' thus recognizing the importance of a change in the mode of the selection, the source of the title of office holders."

Counsel for complainants emphasize a distinction in the 1939 Act and that involved in Haggard v. Gallien in that in the former the Legislature designated the persons to fill the vacancies until the next general election, while in the latter it was provided that ten days after it was passed and approved the Election Commissioners of the county were directed to call an election for the purpose of choosing one District School Commissioner in each civil district to serve as members of the Board until the next general election. The argument is made that in the latter cause the Legislature demonstrated its good faith in changing the system of school management by permitting the qualified voters in the county to choose...