Goetz v. Smith

• Decision Date: 19 December 1925
• Citation: 278 S.W. 417,152 Tenn. 451
• Parties: GOETZ ET AL. v. SMITH ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

278 S.W. 417

152 Tenn. 451

GOETZ ET AL. v. SMITH ET AL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December 19, 1925

Appeal from Circuit Court, Knox County; A. C. Grimm, Judge.

Proceeding between H. E. Goetz and others and J. Parnick Smith, Trustee for Knox County, and others, under the Declaratory Judgments Act, to test the constitutionality of Private Acts 1925, c 343. Act declared void, and party first named and others appeal. Reversed, and act declared valid.

GREEN C.J.

To this controversy, presented under the Declaratory Judgments Act (chapter 29, Acts 1923), the parties are Knox county, the trustee, county judge, and superintendent of roads of Knox county, the Attorney General of the State, and the members of the board of highway commissioners, created for Knox county by chapter 343 of the Private Acts of 1925. The questions arising are with reference to the constitutionality of the last named act and certain sections thereof. The trial judge held the act void.

Some doubt is expressed by the Attorney General as to the propriety of a declaration herein. As the case was finally shaped and submitted to the court below, however, we think an expression from the court was required; that it to say, there were parties before the court having a real interest to deny and parties before the court having a real interest to affirm, the integrity as a whole of chapter 343 of the Private Acts of 1925. Hodges v. Hamblen County, this day decided; Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S.W 965.

The most serious assault made upon chapter 343 of the Acts of 1925 is that the body thereof is broader than the caption, contrary to the provisions of section 17 of article 2 of the Constitution.

The caption of the act is as follows:

"An act to provide an efficient system for laying out, classifying, building, maintaining and repairing the public roads, bridges and ferries in this state in counties having a population of not less than 112,000 and not more than 114,000 inhabitants as shown by the federal census of 1920 or any subsequent federal census. To provide for the levying of taxes to raise funds for said purposes; and providing for the issuance of county warrants on the county trustee in payment for work, material, supplies and other things coming under the provisions of this act. The management and control of the workhouse and the working of county prisoners on public roads in counties coming under the provisions of this act to create a board of highway commissioners to have charge of the building and repairing of all the highways, roads, bridges, culverts, ferries and other roadway structures in said counties; and providing for the naming of the first board of commissioners in certain counties, in the event they come within the provisions of this act. And providing for the election of all boards of highways commission thereafter, from the county at large at the regular county election; and providing for the condemnation of rights of way for such road purposes; and providing for the anticipation of the July budget of such counties; and providing for the appointment of a county superintendent of roads, a county superintendent of the workhouse, a county road engineer and other employees, and providing for the assistance of the county attorney in the carrying out of the provisions of this act."

The act is quite lengthy, containing 29 sections, and it would serve no purpose here to set it out or undertake a statement of all its provisions. Generally speaking, it undertakes to ordain a system for laying out, building, and maintaining the roads, bridges, and ferries in Knox county, through a board of highway commissioners, and confers certain powers, and imposes certain duties, upon said commissioners, and contains other germane matter.

It will be observed that the purpose of the act, as indicated in the first sentence of the title, is "to provide an efficient system" for building and maintaining the public roads, bridges, and ferries. In the remainder of the title certain details and particulars of the proposed system are set out, such as levying taxes, management of the workhouse, creation of a board of highway commissioners, etc.

The argument made against the act is that the general words of the first sentence of the caption are limited by the details and particulars of the remainder of the caption; that is, the title should be rendered as though it read an act to set up an efficient system by providing for, or by the adoption of, the particular means and instrumentalities then stated. It is insisted that no other means or instrumentalities could properly be embraced in the body of the act except those specifically named in the caption.

The maxim, expressio unius exclusio alterius, is invoked. This maxim embodies a useful rule of construction, and is frequently employed to determine the real purview of legislative enactments. We have no case, however, in which the rule has been applied to restrict the title of an act, which title contains a general statement of the purposes of the act.

Section 17 of article 2 of the Constitution is, of course, to be construed liberally, and not so as to embarrass legislation and defeat the beneficial purpose for which it was adopted. Kizer v. State, 140 Tenn. 582, 205 S.W. 423; Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844.

From a review of our decisions, it appears, if, upon analysis of the entire statute, its real object or purpose can be discovered, and this object or purpose is fairly indicated in the caption, the title is sufficient. If the various provisions of the act are germane to the object or purpose so discovered and indicated, they are not beyond the title. Bell v. Hart, 143 Tenn. 587, 223 S.W. 996.

It seems rather plain, from an examination of chapter 343 of the Private Acts of 1925, that its object and purpose is to provide what the Legislature deemed an efficient highway system for Knox county. This purpose is not merely indicated in the caption, but is expressed in as many words.

Unnecessary recitals in the title of an act are commonly disregarded as surplusage. State v. Nashville, 141 Tenn. 405, 210 S.W. 649; Railroads v. Crider, 91 Tenn. 489, 19 S.W. 618. The purpose of this act having been discovered, and that purpose appearing in the caption, other matter in the caption, provided it is not incongruous, may be brushed aside.

Most of the states have constitutional provisions similar to section 17 of article 2 of the Constitution of Tennessee. The precise argument made against the act under consideration has been advanced and rejected in other jurisdictions.

"Every reasonable presumption should be in favor of the title, which should be more liberally construed than the body of the law giving to the general words in such title paramount weight." State v. Board of Control, 85 Minn. 165, 88 N.W. 533.

Where the title expresses a general subject, and also details or particulars, the Legislature is not limited to the particulars or details specified, but may enact any provision germane to the general title, unless the title is so worded as to show a clear intent to confine the act to the particulars mentioned." Lewis' Sutherland Stat. Cons., § 132; State v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, 10 P. 901.

Where a general title, sufficient to cover all the provisions of an act, is followed by specifications of the particular branches of the subject with which it purposes to deal, the scope of the act is not limited nor the validity of the title impaired except as to such portions of the general subject as legislators and others would naturally and reasonably be led by the qualifying words to suppose would not be affected by the act. This is the rule established by all our cases. It is an application of the maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius. The express enumeration of the specific subjects must be affirmatively misleading as to the intent to exclude others, or the title will not be made invalid by it." In re Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 43 A. 985.

The general purpose of the act before us so clearly appears from its inspection as a whole, and this general purpose is so plainly expressed in the title, we do not think that the enumeration of certain details and particulars in the caption was at all misleading or was effective to limit the scope of the act.

Things in the act said to be outside the title are a provision for the appointment of district road commissioners, a provision for filling vacancies in the board of highway commissioners, a provision for the removal of such commissioners for malfeasance or misfeasance, a provision with reference to the class of citizens subject to road duty, and a provision for the condemnation of quarries and borrow pits. All these things seem but ways and means of "an efficient system for laying out, classifying, building, maintaining, and repairing the public roads, bridges, and ferries."

Prior to the adoption of chapter 343 of the Private Acts of 1925, the road system of Knox county was carried on under the provision of chapter 739 of the Private Acts of 1917. Both these acts undertook to, and did, we think, cover the entire subject of the building, maintenance, and control of the highways of Knox county.

Chapter 739 of the Private Acts of 1917 was likewise quite...