Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Reavis

• Decision Date: 03 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 05-19-00075-CV,05-19-00075-CV
• Citation: 627 S.W.3d 713
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. and Toyota Motor Corporation, Appellants v. Benjamin Thomas REAVIS and Kristi Carol Reavis, Individually and as Next Friends of E.R. and O.R., Minor Children, Appellees

627 S.W.3d 713

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. and Toyota Motor Corporation, Appellants
v.
Benjamin Thomas REAVIS and Kristi Carol Reavis, Individually and as Next Friends of E.R. and O.R., Minor Children, Appellees

No. 05-19-00075-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Opinion Filed June 3, 2021

Allyson N. Ho, Bradley Hubbard, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Anne McGowan Johnson, Jason Jordan, Nina Cortell, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Elizabeth C. Brandon, Reed Smith LLP, Victor D. Vital, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Dallas,Claire Swift Kugler, Winstol D. Carter Jr., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, William J. Boyce, Alexander Dubose & Jefferson LLP, Houston, James W. Halbrooks Jr., Suzanne H. Swaner, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Plano, Rachel Anne Ekery, Wallace B. Jefferson, Alexander Dubose & Jefferson LLP, Austin, for Appellants.

Frank L. Branson, Debbie Branson, Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C., Eugene "Chip" A. Brooker Jr., Brooker Law, PLLC, Dallas, Harry Max Reasoner, Marie R. Yeates, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Houston, Michael Heidler, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Austin, for Appellees.

Before Justices Schenck, Partida-Kipness, and Nowell

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Nowell

Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota Motor) and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (Toyota Sales) appeal from a judgment for actual and punitive damages in this products liability lawsuit. Appellants contend the design defect claim is barred by the statutory presumption of non-liability for

627 S.W.3d 725

products complying with federal safety standards; the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's findings on the design and marketing defect claims; the jury charge erroneously commingled valid and invalid theories in a single broad-form question; the trial court abused its discretion by admitting several pieces of evidence; the evidence is insufficient to support the findings on actual damages, gross negligence, and punitive damages; and the award of punitive damages does not meet constitutional and evidentiary standards.

After submission, appellees filed a motion for rendition of a take-nothing judgment as to Toyota Sales. Appellants agree we should render a take-nothing judgment in favor of Toyota Sales. We grant the motion, and, without regard to the merits, we reverse the judgment against Toyota Sales and render judgment that appellees take nothing against Toyota Sales. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background

Ben and Kristi Reavis were traveling south on Central Expressway in their 2002 Lexus ES300. Their two children, 5-year-old E.R. and 3-year-old O.R., were buckled in their car seats in the backseat behind Ben and Kristi. Ben was driving. Traffic stalled near downtown, and Ben stopped his car a short distance behind a Nissan Altima. Michael Mummaw was driving in Dallas for the first time in a borrowed Honda SUV. He looked down for a second, then looked ahead and saw the cars in front of him were stopped. He was unable to stop and rear-ended the Reavises’ ES300 at between 45 and 48 mph. The collision pushed the ES300 forward into the Nissan, causing a second collision. The Honda then collided again with the rear of the Lexus at a much slower speed.

Ben and Kristi suffered minor injuries to the tops of their heads. Their children, however, suffered significant head and brain injuries. After the collision, Kristi saw O.R. slumped forward, bleeding, and comatose. She felt a hole in his head and both parents thought O.R. would die. Ben saw E.R.’s right eye was swollen, and she was comatose and bleeding. E.R. and O.R. sustained skull fractures and traumatic brain injuries among other severe and permanent injuries.

The Reavises sued Toyota Motor, Toyota Sales, and Mummaw to recover damages for the injuries to O.R. and E.R. They alleged design and marketing defect claims against Toyota Motor and Toyota Sales, negligence against Mummaw, and gross negligence against all defendants. The Reavises’ design defect theory was that the defectively designed front seats, seatbacks, and occupant restraint system failed to prevent the adults from sliding backwards in their seats, intruding into the rear passenger compartment, and colliding with the children's heads resulting in severe brain injuries to the children. This phenomenon is known in the industry as ramping. The Reavises also alleged that Toyota Motor and Toyota Sales failed to adequately warn of the dangers to back seat passengers resulting from ramping.

After a three-week trial, the jury found Toyota Motor liable on the design and marketing defect claims, Toyota Sales liable on a marketing defect claim, Mummaw liable on a negligence claim, and actual damages of more than $98 million. The jury apportioned responsibility 90% to Toyota Motor, 5% to Toyota Sales, and 5% to Mummaw. The jury unanimously found both Toyota Motor and Toyota Sales were grossly negligent and awarded punitive damages against both. During jury deliberations, the Reavises reached a settlement with Mummaw. The trial court rendered

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judgment on the jury verdict for actual damages, after settlement credits, in the amounts of $98.7 million against Toyota Motor and $4.96 million against Toyota Sales, and punitive damages, after applying statutory caps, in the amounts of $95.2 million against Toyota Motor and $14.4 million against Toyota Sales. The trial court overruled Toyota Motor's and Toyota Sales's motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and new trial.

Discussion

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we determine "whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review." City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Id. at 807. Evidence is legally insufficient when (a) evidence of a vital fact is completely absent; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Id. at 810. Evidence is more than a scintilla if it "rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions." Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). However, evidence does not exceed a scintilla if it is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion that the fact exists. Serv. Corp. Int'l v. Guerra , 348 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Tex. 2011).

When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence and will set aside the verdict only if the evidence supporting the jury finding is so weak or so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner , 505 S.W.3d 580, 615 (Tex. 2016). This Court, however, is not a fact finder, and we may not pass upon the credibility of the witnesses or substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if a different answer could be reached upon review of the evidence. See Clancy v. Zale Corp. , 705 S.W.2d 820, 826 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). "[T]he jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony." Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson , 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). It is up to the jury "to resolve conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony of any one witness as well as in the testimony of different witnesses." Ford v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 151 Tex. 538, 252 S.W.2d 561, 563 (1952).

B. Design Defect Claim

To recover on a product liability claim based on an alleged design defect, "a plaintiff must prove that (1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the defect was a producing cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks recovery." Genie Indus., Inc. v. Matak , 462 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish , 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009) ); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.005(a). A "producing cause" is "a substantial factor in bringing about an injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred." Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma , 242 S.W.3d 32, 46 (Tex. 2007).

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Toyota Motor contends the Reavises cannot recover on their design defect claim because (1) the ES300 met or exceeded all federal safety standards, which raised a statutory presumption of non-liability that was not rebutted; (2) there is no evidence the front-seat design of the ES300 was unreasonably dangerous; and (3) there is no evidence of a safer alternative design that would have prevented the injuries in this crash without increasing the risk of injury to other passengers. Toyota Motor also asserts the evidence is factually insufficient on the unreasonably dangerous and safer alternative design elements.

1. Presumption of Non-liability

Section 82.008(a) of the civil practice and remedies code provides:

In a products liability action brought against a product manufacturer or seller, there is a rebuttable presumption that the product manufacturer or seller is not liable for any injury to a claimant caused by some aspect of the formulation, labeling, or design of a product if the product manufacturer or seller establishes that the product's formula, labeling, or design complied with mandatory safety standards or regulations adopted and promulgated by the federal government, or an agency of the federal government, that were applicable to the product at the time of manufacture and that governed the product risk that allegedly caused harm.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a). The claimant may rebut the...