Tran v. State, No. 05-04-00853-CR (TX 4/18/2005)

Decision Date18 April 2005
Docket NumberNo. 05-04-00853-CR.,05-04-00853-CR.
PartiesHUNG QUOC TRAN, aka JUSTIN HUNG TRAN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 296-81479-02.

AFFIRMED.

Before Justices BRIDGES, O'NEILL, and MAZZANT.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice MAZZANT.

Hung Quoc Tran, also known as Justin Hung Tran, appeals his conviction for murder. A jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at confinement for life. Appellant raises seven points of error arguing the court erred in admitting his written statement, denying his challenges for cause regarding five venire members, and admitting thirty-eight autopsy photographs. The facts of this case are known to the parties, and we do not recite them in detail here. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background

Appellant and Lisa Bun had been dating off and on for over a year. On July 9, 2002, appellant was at the apartment Bun shared with her roommate, Jacob Webster. While Webster was in his bedroom, appellant and Bun began to argue. Bun sternly told appellant to leave, but he did not. When Webster heard "some commotion" and heard Bun's bedroom door slam shut, he walked toward her room and heard Bun yell, "Jacob, get in here, I'm cut." Finding the bedroom door locked, Webster kicked in the door and saw appellant straddling Bun's body. Webster twice told appellant to leave and attempted to physically move him, but appellant shoved Webster away. When appellant shoved him, Webster noticed blood on appellant's hands. Webster began to call the police, and appellant slammed the door shut. Webster kicked the door again and saw appellant, holding a large knife, stab at Bun three times. Webster, now on the phone with the 911 operator, fled the apartment.

When paramedics arrived, they found appellant and Bun, both in critical condition and both having suffered multiple stab wounds.1 Determining appellant "had a better chance of making it," paramedics began to treat him. Bun, who had twenty-six sharp force injuries, including three stab wounds that were potentially fatal in and of themselves, died at the scene as a result of the injuries. Appellant was taken to the hospital and treated for his injuries. He was later convicted of Bun's murder.

Admission of Appellant's Written Statement

In his first point of error, appellant complains the court abused its discretion by admitting appellant's written statement because the State did not meet its burden of showing appellant's statement was voluntary.2 Appellant gave his statement while still in the hospital recovering from surgeries to treat his stab wounds, and he argues that the medications he was receiving at the time he gave his statement impaired his ability to understand and voluntarily waive his rights in giving his statement.

Appellant requested, and the trial court held, a hearing outside the presence of the jury regarding the admissibility of appellant's written statement. Appellant did not, however, raise specific objections on the record when the trial court admitted the statement during that hearing. When the statement was offered by the State in front of the jury, appellant "recall[ed] the objections made by Defense . . . out of the presence of the jury." However, appellant never specifed what his objections were regarding the statement's admissibility. He has, therefore, failed to preserve this point for review. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1).

Notwithstanding appellant's failure to preserve error, his argument fails. The determination of whether a confession is voluntary must be based on the totality of circumstances surrounding its acquisition. McCoy v. State, 713 S.W.2d 940, 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we thus limit our review to whether an abuse of discretion occurred. Id.; Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd). The State bears the burden to show that the statement was voluntary. Garcia, 829 S.W.2d at 833. We give almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts supported by the record. Dawsom v. State, 75 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex. App.-Texarkana, 2002, no pet.); see also Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). At the hearing on the motion to suppress appellant's statement, Officer Kenneth Penrod testified that when appellant gave his statement, appellant was coherent and able to speak. Appellant had been unable to speak the first few days he was in the hospital. However, after appellant began speaking, Penrod was notified and went to speak with appellant. Penrod spoke with hospital staff and learned appellant was able to carry on a conversation. Penrod was aware appellant was on medications, but appellant did not slur his speech or in any way indicate to Penrod there was a problem. Appellant seemed "very well aware of what was going on" and discussed with Penrod what would be included in his written statement. Appellant offered his medical records for admission but provided no information concerning the effects of any of the medications he was receiving.

As the trier of fact, the trial court was free to believe Penrod's testimony that appellant was coherent and not impaired by drugs or pain to the point that he was not able to understand what was going on around him. Those findings are supported by the record. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court erred by denying appellant's motion to suppress and admitting the statement. We overrule appellant's first point of error.

Challenges for Cause

In points of error two through six, appellant complains the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenges for cause of five venire members. Appellant argues the venire members were unable to consider the full range of punishment. The record does not support appellant's contentions.

We look at the entire record in reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a challenge for cause. Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We afford the trial court great deference in exercising its discretion as to a party's challenge for cause and will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Id. We give particular deference when a venire member's answers are vacillating, unclear or contradictory. Id. While a defendant may challenge any venire member who has a bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which he is entitled to rely, before he may be excused for cause on this basis, the law must be explained to him and he must be asked whether he can follow that law regardless of his personal views. Id; Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

During voir dire, the trial court explained to the panel that the law allowed the range of punishment to include probation under certain circumstances. After providing this explanation, the trial court stated, "I am not asking you if you will do anything or not do anything. I'm asking you if you have an open mind where you can consider everything that the law allows you to consider. This whole range of punishment. Can you do that?" The panel responded, "Yes." The trial court followed up by asking if anyone "could not, just because of the nature of the crime . . . consider the entire range of punishment." No venire member responded affirmatively, and the trial court said it would take their silence to indicate that they could all consider the entire range of punishment. When the State conducted its voir dire, the prosecutor asked if everyone in the panel could promise to follow the law regarding the range of punishment. No one responded they could not. However, when defense counsel conducted voir dire, he asked if "the law of probation should not apply" in specific circumstances. The trial court interrupted and explained "the question is not really whether you believe the law ought to be the law. . . . [but] if that is the law, will you follow the law and consider the entire range of punishment." But defense counsel then again asked venire members if they believed "that the law, that law of probation should not apply . . . ." He did not ask any complained-of venire member if he could follow the law.

Based on the record, we conclude the complained-of venire members all said they could follow the law...

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