Transou v. Electronic Data Systems

• Decision Date: 27 June 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 90-70316.
• Citation: 767 F. Supp. 1392
• Parties: Gentry P. TRANSOU, Plaintiff, v. ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

767 F. Supp. 1392

Gentry P. TRANSOU, Plaintiff, v. ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 90-70316.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

June 27, 1991.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James C. Barnes, Jr., Barnes & Barnes, Southfield, Mich., for plaintiff.

Bruce S. Friedman, Southfield, Mich., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE AS MOOT

GADOLA, District Judge.

Plaintiff Gentry P. Transou filed his complaint against defendant Electronic Data Systems ("EDS") February 6, 1990, seeking damages and other relief for incidents arising out of plaintiff's employment with defendant and plaintiff's subsequent separation from the defendant corporation. Plaintiff's complaint alleged the following counts: 1) breach of implied employment contract, 2) breach of written employment contract, 3) race discrimination, 4) age discrimination, and 5) negligent evaluation. Plaintiff's claim for negligent evaluation has previously been dismissed by the court.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to the remaining four counts of the complaint April 24, 1991. Plaintiff filed its response May 10, 1991; and defendant filed a reply May 17, 1991. Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to liability on count three April 24, 1991. Defendant filed its response May 10, 1991, along with a motion for sanctions against plaintiff's counsel for bringing the motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a response May 29, 1991, to defendant's motion for sanctions. Plaintiff filed his motion in limine to strike and for costs May 7, 1991, to which defendant responded May 15, 1991. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a reply May 20, 1991, along with a motion for sanctions against defendant's counsel. Defendant failed to respond to plaintiff's motion for sanctions. Plaintiff then filed a second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh motion in limine May 30, 1991.

Oral argument on defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment was heard June 20, 1991. The court will consider all of the aforementioned motions in this memorandum opinion and order.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Plaintiff Gentry P. Transou began employment with General Motors Corporation ("GM") in 1962. Throughout most of his employment with the company, plaintiff held various jobs in the Management Information Services Division and was a computer operator. Plaintiff became an EDS employee January 1, 1985, as a result of the transition of GM's MIS employees to EDS employment.

As an EDS employee, plaintiff participated in a Stock Incentive Plan ("SIP"), which provided plaintiff an opportunity to invest in EDS stock over a ten year period. In conjunction with his participation, plaintiff executed a plan document which set forth the SIP's terms and conditions. At deposition plaintiff admitted to receiving, reviewing and understanding the SIP prospectus, which stated, in part:

12. No Effect on Employment. Nothing herein contained, including the sale or award of any shares and the grant of any rights or options, shall affect the right of the Company EDS to terminate any participant's employment at any time for any reason.

Transou deposition pp. 39-40; Transou deposition, exhibit 2.

Following plaintiff's transition to EDS, he held various jobs in several different EDS organizations. In May 1988 he transferred to EDS' account at GM's Lake Orion assembly plant as a computer operator. There, plaintiff was responsible for running production schedules and other systems. Defendant claims that although plaintiff would perform satisfactorily for periods of time, his work would then slip substantially below acceptable levels. Defendant asserts that it made plaintiff aware of his deficiencies through formal discussions between plaintiff and members of the company's management staff.

Defendant claims that plaintiff's unacceptable performance typically involved repeatedly making similar errors. In late October 1989, defendant determined that plaintiff was in a period of sub-par performance. Donald O'Shea, EDS account manager at Lake Orion, and David Evenson, plaintiff's supervisor, met with plaintiff to discuss plaintiff's inconsistent performance and to place him on a Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP"). The PIP specified the prior discussions between plaintiff and his managers regarding his performance and enumerated plaintiff's errors.

The PIP further provided that plaintiff would have to perform satisfactorily for thirty days following the start date of the plan, November 3, 1989, and would have to "sustain" his performance or "disciplinary action to include separation would occur." Transou deposition, exhibit 3. The PIP included the following language: "In addition, each of the items were sic specified without a time frame. This is to indicate that your performance needs to improve to these levels and consistently be maintained." Id., p. 2 (emphasis added). After his discussion of the PIP with the managers, plaintiff refused to sign the PIP.

There is no dispute that plaintiff's performance for the next few weeks was satisfactory. Defendant claims, though, that plaintiff's performance began to slip in early January 1990. On January 17, 1990, O'Shea, on behalf of the defendant EDS, terminated plaintiff's employment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "A fact is `material' and precludes grant of summary judgment if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties, and would necessarily affect the application of appropriate principles of law to the rights and obligations of the parties. Citation omitted. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 881 (6th Ed.1979)). The Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant as well as draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (6th Cir.1984).

The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of all genuine issues of material fact. See Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 861 (6th Cir. 1986). The initial burden on the movant is not as formidable as some decisions have indicated. The moving party need not produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party discharges that burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a genuine triable issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Gregg, 801 F.2d at 861.

To create a genuine issue of material fact, however, the nonmovant must do more than present some evidence on a disputed issue. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986),

There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the nonmovant's evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.

Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. (Citations omitted); See Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Consequently, a nonmovant must do more than raise some doubt as to the existence of a fact; the nonmovant must produce evidence that would be sufficient to require submission to the jury of the dispute over the fact.

ANALYSIS

I. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Count I: Breach of Implied Employment Contract

Count I of the complaint alleges that defendant EDS' actions toward plaintiff created an implied just cause employment contract and that as a result of that contract, plaintiff's employment with defendant could be terminated only upon defendant's showing of just cause rather than for any reason or for no reason.

Under Michigan law, employment is presumed to be terminable at will. Valentine v. General American Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 362 N.W.2d 628 (1984); Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937). However, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) the Michigan Supreme Court held that "an employer's express agreement to terminate only for cause, or statements of company policy to that effect, can give rise to rights enforceable in contract." Id. 408 Mich. at 610, 292 N.W.2d 880. The court indicated that a "just cause" limitation on discharge could be implied either by express agreement or as a result of an employee's legitimate expectations grounded in an employer's policy statements. Id. at 598, 292 N.W.2d 880.

Courts interpreting the landmark case continually have recognized, however, that Toussaint did not create any fundamental right to employment. Vale...