Trapp v. Newjersey
| Decision Date | 19 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-10709 (FLW) (LHG) |
| Parties | SHAWN TRAPP, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, CITY OF ELIZABETH NEW JERSEY, ELIZABETH MUNICIPAL COURT, ELIZABETH POLICE DEPARTMENT, GEORGE LEUS, and ROBERT CARROLL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
:
Pending before the Court are two separate motions to dismiss filed by i) Defendant the State of New Jersey ("the State" or "State Defendants"); and ii) Defendants the City of Elizabeth, the Elizabeth Municipal Court ("Municipal Court"), Municipal Court Judge Roman Montes, the Elizabeth Police Department, and Elizabeth Municipal Prosecutor Robert Carroll ("Municipal Defendants") (collectively, the "Moving Defendants"). Pro se Plaintiff Shawn Trapp ("Trapp" or "Plaintiff") instituted this suit against Moving Defendants, as well as Elizabeth police officer George Leus (together with the Moving Defendants, "Defendants"), for violations of his constitutional rights in connection with his arrest by Defendant Leus and prosecution by Defendant Carroll. In their motions, Moving Defendants maintain that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that Plaintiff fails to state a claim. For the following reasons, Moving Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED.
Plaintiff brings this matter against Defendants alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and false imprisonment. In his complaint, Trapp alleges that he brings this suit under "Article III of the United States Constitution; Article V of the United States Constitution, Due process Clause, The Brady Doctrine, 8 U.S.C. 1324c(a), 18 U.S.C. 371, 18 U.S.C. 1621." ECF No. 1 at 3.
Trapp alleges that on April 25, 2015, he was assaulted and arrested by Leus, an officer of the Elizabeth Police Department. Id. at 4. He further alleges that after his arrest he was subjected to malicious prosecution and abuse of process by Carroll, a prosecutor in the underlying municipal court proceedings. Id. Approximately two and a half years after the alleged assault, on November 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed the present civil action. Id. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Leus assaulted him during the course of his arrest; that Carroll engaged in "fraud on the court and subornation of perjury", as well as "abuse of process," "malicious prosecution," "selective prosecution," and engaged in "ex parte communication with the court"; that the Elizabeth Police Department subjected him to false imprisonment, "failed to file his Internal Affairs complaint," and "failed to turn over the DVD of the in station cameras." Id. With respect to the Municipal Court itself, he claims that 1) it failed to provide any judge with motions he filed; 2) it failed to provide the judge's notes from the judge hearing the case; 3) it assisted Defendant in the alleged malicious prosecution and abuse of process; 4) the Municipal Court, and specifically Judge Montes, had ex parte communications with Carroll and improperly issued several warrants against Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff also asserts that the City of Elizabeth "failed to provide safeguards" to prevent any of these alleged wrongs from happening and "failed to provide adequate training for the Elizabeth Police Department." Id. Plaintiff asserts that theState is named as a Defendant because Carroll represented the State in the criminal proceeding against him. Id.
Municipal Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint. ECF No. 11. Municipal Defendants argue that the claims against them should be dismissed based on sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity, and because the Elizabeth Police Department is not a party that can be sued under Section 1983. The State seeks dismissal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), of all claims against it, invoking Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. ECF No. 22.1
Plaintiff filed his pro se Complaint on November 2, 2017. On February 1, 2018, Municipal Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. On February 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed a notice of motion seeking a default judgment against the State, which this Court denied on March 22, 2018, while granting the State's cross claim for an extension of time to file a responsive pleading. The State filed its motion to dismiss on April 3, 2018. Plaintiff did not file any opposition.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Because subject matter jurisdiction is required for a district court to reach the merits of a claim, "the court should consider the 12(b)(1) challenge first because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, all other defenses and objections become moot." Bishop v. Department of Homeland Sec., No. 14-5244, 2015 WL 2125782, at * 2 . Unlike a Rule12(b)(6) motion, there is no presumption of truth attached to the allegations in the complaint when determining the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See id.; see also Mortensen v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F. 2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is treated as either a "facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction." Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F. 3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). A facial attack, such as in this case, "is an argument that considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is insufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court because ... it does not present a question of federal law ...". Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F. 3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). In that regard, the court views only the allegations in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. ex Rel. Atkinson v. PA. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F. 3d 506, 509 (3d Cir. 2007).
Defendants also move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a claim "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts well-pleaded allegations contained in the Complaint as true, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Letherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993). For a plaintiff to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff is obligated to provide factual allegations that are sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculation that all of the allegations in the complaint are true and that are facially plausible on their face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 1959 (2007). A complaint is plausible when the plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A "sheer possibility that the defendant hasacted unlawfully" will not satisfy the plausibility requirement. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 127). A complaint cannot simple state legal conclusions or recite elements of a cause of actions in order to be sufficient. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Additionally, it is well recognized that the pleading standards required by pro se plaintiffs in a complaint are less stringent than the formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 596 (1972). Therefore, "[c]ourts are to construe complaints so "as to do substantial justice," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f), keeping in mind that pro se complaints in particular should be construed liberally. Alston v. Parker, 363 F. 3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F. 3d 365,369 (3d Cir. 2003)).
At the outset, Plaintiff asserts claims under "Article III of the United States Constitution, Article 5 of the United States Constitution, Due Process Clause, The Brady Doctrine, 8 U.S.C. 1324c(a), 18 U.S.C. 371, 18 U.S.C. 1621." ECF No. 1 at 3. As none of these constitutional provisions, statutes, or doctrines provide Plaintiff an appropriate cause of action and because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his claims as having been asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Before the Court can consider the merits of Plaintiff's claims, Moving Defendants' assertion of sovereign immunity must be addressed. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (). Moving Defendants argue that they are immune from suit, and that none of the exceptions to immunity apply.
The Eleventh Amendment protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in federal court regardless of the type of relief sought. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Thus, based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, states cannot be sued in federal court, unless Congress has abrogated that immunity or the State has waived it. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). The consent to be sued "must be 'unequivocally expressed' in statutory text, and cannot simply be implied." Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992)).
First, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the State, as it is protected by sovereign immunity, and none of its exceptions apply. Congress has not abrogated the State's immunity, nor is there any indication that the State has waived it. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400-02 (1976). Accordingly, all of Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.
Second, Municipal Defendants also ask the Court to dismiss...
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