Travis v. County of Santa Cruz

• Decision Date: 29 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. S109597.,S109597.
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Steven TRAVIS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, Defendant and Respondent.

16 Cal.Rptr.3d 404

94 P.3d 538

33 Cal.4th 757

Steven TRAVIS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S109597.

Supreme Court of California.

July 29, 2004.

Steven Travis, Stanley M. Sokolow and Sonya Sokolow, in pro. per.; Pacific Legal Foundation, James S. Burling and Harold E. Johnson, Sacramento, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Paul B. Campos, San Ramon, for The California Building Industry Association, Home Builders Association of Northern

California and Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Harold Griffith, Freedom, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Offices of Rosario Perry and Rosario Perry, Santa Monica, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Pahl & Gosselin, Stephen D. Pahl and Karen Kubala McCay, San Jose, for California Apartment Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Samuel Torres, Jr., and Dana McRae, County Counsel, and Dwight L. Herr, Assistant County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.

Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Andrew W. Schwartz, William Chan and Ellen Forman, Deputy City Attorneys, for City and County of San Francisco and League of California Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, J. Matthew Rodriquez, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph Barbieri, Christiana Tiedemann and Alice Busching Reynolds as Amici Curiae.

WERDEGAR, J.

A Santa Cruz County ordinance imposes certain restrictions on second dwelling units on residential property. Plaintiffs Steven Travis and Stanley and Sonya Sokolow sought a writ of mandate to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance and remove permit conditions imposed pursuant thereto. Plaintiffs claim the ordinance conflicts with and is preempted by state statutes and that its enforcement unconstitutionally took their property without compensation. The question before us goes not to the merits of plaintiffs' challenge, but to whether it was timely brought.

We conclude that insofar as the action seeks removal of conditions imposed on Travis's development permit, it was timely brought within 90 days of the final decision imposing the conditions. (Gov.Code, § 65009, subd. (c)(1)(E).) That Travis challenges his permit conditions as invalid because they are based on a facially unconstitutional or preempted ordinance, rather than arguing the conditions or ordinance have an especially adverse effect on his property, does not affect the timeliness of his action. But because the Sokolows did not bring an action within 90 days of their permit's issuance, they may not now challenge, on any grounds, the conditions imposed on their permit. Finally, insofar as plaintiffs contend the ordinance is preempted by later enacted state statutes, and on this basis seek relief beyond removal of their permit conditions, such as an order requiring Santa Cruz County (the County) to amend or cease enforcing the ordinance, we conclude their action is untimely under the applicable statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (a)).

We will thus affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeal, which affirmed the superior court's denial of plaintiffs' writ petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 1981, the Board of Supervisors of the County (the Board) adopted an ordinance, effective January 15, 1982, allowing residential property owners to construct "affordable second dwelling units" on their property. The ordinance requires a development permit, limits second units to parcels of a certain minimum size, sets a maximum unit size, and restricts both the income of second unit tenants and the rent that can be charged for such units.

The ordinance is codified at section 13.10.681 of the Santa Cruz County Code (the Ordinance). Its restrictions on occupancy and rent, of particular importance in this litigation, are set forth as follows in subdivision (e): "The following occupancy standards shall be applied to every second unit and shall be conditions for any approval under this section:

"(1) Occupancy Restrictions: ... Rental or permanent occupancy of the second unit shall be restricted for the life of the unit to either: [¶] (i) Households that meet the Income and Asset Guidelines established by the Board of Supervisors resolution for lower income households; or [¶] (ii) Senior households, where one household member is sixty-two (62) years of age or older, that meet the Income and Asset Guidelines requirements established by Board resolution for moderate or lower income households; or [¶] (iii) Persons sharing residency with the property owner and who are related by blood, marriage, or operation of law, or have evidence of a stable family relationship with the property owner. [¶] ... [¶]

"(4) Rent Levels: If rent is charged, the rent level for the second unit, or for the main unit, if the property owner resides in the second unit, shall not exceed that established by the Section 8 Program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) or its successor, or the rent level allowed for affordable rental units pursuant to Chapter 17.10 of the County Code, whichever is higher."

Subdivision (e)(7) of the Ordinance requires property owners, before receiving a building permit, to record a declaration, binding on successors in interest, to the effect that the rent and occupancy standards of the Ordinance will be observed.

Plaintiffs own residential properties in unincorporated Santa Cruz County. In 1999, Travis applied for and was granted a permit to construct a second dwelling unit on his property, subject to conditions imposed under the Ordinance. Travis filed an administrative appeal against the occupancy and rent conditions, which the planning director denied on June 21, 1999. The Sokolows similarly applied for and were granted a second unit permit containing occupancy and rent restrictions. Their permit was issued October 12, 1998; they did not pursue an administrative appeal.

Plaintiffs filed their petition for writ of mandate on September 7, 1999. They alleged the County had a duty to "keep its Second Unit Dwelling ordinance ... in compliance with State and Federal laws and constitutions," a duty the County violated by placing Ordinance-dictated occupancy and rent conditions on second unit permits and by failing to amend the Ordinance so as to remove the restrictions. They prayed for a writ requiring the County to stop conditioning second unit permits on the Ordinance's occupancy and rent restrictions, to amend the Ordinance so as to remove those restrictions, to compensate second unit owners for lost rents and to refund any fines assessed, and to record with the County Recorder a document expunging all unlawful deed restrictions on second unit properties recorded pursuant to the Ordinance.

In a memorandum of points and authorities supporting their petition, plaintiffs explained their claims that the Ordinance violates state law and is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs contend the Ordinance's rent restriction conflicts with, and is preempted by, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ.Code, §§ 1954.50-1954.535; hereafter the Costa-Hawkins Act), in that the Costa-Hawkins Act generally exempts from local rent control laws dwelling units constructed after February 1, 1995 (Civ. Code, § 1954.52, subd. (a)(1)) and institutes vacancy decontrol for other units covered by local rent control laws (id., subd. (a)(3)(C)). They further contend the Ordinance's occupancy restrictions violate, or command the property owner to violate, statutory guarantees of nondiscrimination in housing found in the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ.Code, § 51.2), Government Code section 65008, and the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq.) insofar as the Ordinance regulates second unit occupancy according to age or income. Finally, plaintiffs claim the deed restrictions the Ordinance requires on rents and occupancy are exactions bearing no reasonable relationship to the legitimate government reasons for prohibiting second units and, therefore, work a taking of property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The trial court denied the writ petition. The court concluded all plaintiffs' "facial" claims, including their claims of preemption, were untimely under Government Code section 65009 because they were not brought within 90 days of either the Ordinance's enactment or the effective dates of the assertedly preemptive state statutes. The Sokolows' "as applied" challenge was untimely, under Government Code section 65009, because they did not bring the action within 90 days of the final decision on their permit application. Travis's "`as applied' regulatory taking claim" was timely but nonmeritorious.

The Court of Appeal affirmed solely on statute of limitations grounds. In the appellate court's view, all plaintiffs' claims were facial, rather than as applied, because plaintiffs did not allege the Ordinance was applied differently to their properties than to others or that the Ordinance had a "disparate fiscal effect" on them compared to other property owners. All claims were therefore subject to the limitation of Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B) and were untimely because not brought within 90 days of the Ordinance's last substantive amendment, which occurred in November 1997.

We granted plaintiffs' petition for review.

DISCUSSION

As this case principally concerns the applicability and effect of two subdivisions of Government Code section 65009 (hereafter section 65009), we begin by reviewing that statute. Located in division 1 (Planning and Zoning) of title 7 (Planning and Land Use) of the Government Code, section 65009 is intended "to provide certainty for property...