Travis v. Grabiec

• Decision Date: 22 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 44070,44070
• Citation: 52 Ill.2d 175,287 N.E.2d 468
• Parties: , 61 A.L.R.3d 686 H. R. TRAVIS et al., Appellees, v. Barney J. GRABIEC, Director of Labor, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 468

287 N.E.2d 468

52 Ill.2d 175, 61 A.L.R.3d 686

H. R. TRAVIS et al., Appellees, v. Barney J. GRABIEC, Director of Labor, et al., Appellants.

No. 44070.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 22, 1972.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 29, 1972.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Schlafly, Godfrey & Fitzgerald, Alton (Francis T. Crowe, Herman R. Tavins and Z. Zola Groves, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for petitioners.

John Dale Stobbs, Alton, for respondents.

SCHAEFER, Justice:

This case is here upon leave granted to appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court, Fifth District. (130 Ill.App.2d 886.) It involves the interpretation of the phrase 'stoppage of work' as it relates to the eligibility of striking employees for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act.

On August 18, 1962, about 2070 of the 300 employees of Shall Oil Company at its Wood River plant went on strike; they did not go back to work until February 3, 1963. In administrative proceedings under the Act, the Director of Labor found that the work stoppage continued from August 18, 1962, to February 3, 1963, and that no unemployment compensation benefits were payable. In this administrative review action the circuit court of Madison County first affirmed the Director's determination, but thereafter, on motion of the employee plaintiffs, modified its order and remanded the case to the Director for the taking of evidence relating to the 'resumption of substantial production during any period of the strike.'

Pursuant to the order of remand, a further administrative hearing was had. The second decision of the Director stated that there was 'sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that by December 27, 1962, the company was producing 175,000 barrels of its product, which was substantially the same daily thru-put as was achieved prior to the strike and during periods when all workers were at their regular jobs.' The Director also stated, however, that by this finding he did 'not intend in any way to indicate his concurrence in or acceptance of this tandard for determining the cessation of a stoppage of work under the statute,' and expressed his opinion that the correct standard for that determination was that stated by this court in Abbott Publishing Co. v. Annunzio (1953), 414 Ill. 559, 112 N.E.2d 101. He again decided that the dlcimants were ineligible for benefits.

Section 604 of the Unemployment Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 48, par. 434) provides: 'Labor Dispute. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits for any week with respect to which it is found that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed * * *.'

The Director denied benefits because he was 'of the opinion that the correct standard for determining the cessation of a stoppage of work is as dictated in the three-fold test announced by the Supreme Court' in Abbott Publishing Co. v. Annunzio (1953), 414 Ill. 559, 112 N.E.2d 101. There the court said: 'Briefly stated, the majority rule holds that where the employer has permanently replaced all the employees whose employment was terminated in the course of a labor dispute, has fully resumed its normal plan of operations and resumed previous production, then, the unemployment of its former employees is no longer due to a stoppage of work because of a labor dispute at the employer's plant.' (414 Ill. 559, at 566, 112 N.E.2d 101, at 105.) The Director interpreted this passage to impose three conditions to the ending of a work stoppage. Specifically, he found through his representative that there had not been (1) a permanent replacement of the claimants or (2) a termination of the claimants' unemployment or (3) a resumption of normal operations.

On the other hand, in vreversing the decision of the Director, the trial judge held: 'When Shell Oil Company, by whatever methods used inside its own plant, reached substantially normal production on December 27, 1962, the stoppage of work due to a labor dispute ended, and since the production record continued at substantially normal production until the end of the strike on February 2, 1963, the remaining eligible employees of the 450 claimants are entitled to benefits from December 27, 1962 to and including February 2, 1963.' The appellate court affirmed this ruling.

The difference between the Director and the circuit and appellate courts concerns the test to be applied in determining when a work stoppage has ended. The Director emphasizes a return to Full normal operations, while the trial court is concerned only with Substantially normal production, by whatever methods obtained, so long, apparently, as work is not farmed out.

The parties have cited several decisions by courts in other jurisdictions which involve somewhat similar factual situations. Differing results were reached in those cases, which illustrate some of the many problems that have arisen in the construction of unemployment compensation statutes. Meadow Gold Dairies-Hawaii Ltd. v. Wiig (1968), 50 Hawaii 225, 437 P.2d 317; General Electric Co. v. Director of Division of Employment Security (1965), 349 Mass. 358, 208 N.E.2d 234; Cumberland & Allegheny Gas Co. v. Hatcher (1963), 147 W.Va. 620, 130 S.E.2d 115; Inter-Island Resorts v. Akahane (1962), 46 Hawaii 140, 377 P.2d 715; Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Thornbrough (1958), 229 Ark. 362, 314 S.W.2d 493; Producers Produce Co. v. Industrial Com. of Missouri (Mo.App.1955), 281 S.W.2d 619.

In our opinion, both the position asserted by the Director and that expressed by the trial and appellate courts are too doctrinaire to conform to the intention of the legislature. The Director's position is based upon a literal reading of our opinion in the Abbott Publishing Co. case. That opinion involved a situation in which all of the striking employees had been permanently replaced and full production was being achieved by fully normal methods of operation. It was therefore held that the former employees who had gone on strike were entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. But that opinion, like all others, must be read...