Trimble v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 11 July 1911
• Citation: 64 Wash. 102,116 P. 647
• Parties: TRIMBLE et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

116 P. 647

64 Wash. 102

TRIMBLE et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 11, 1911

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; John F. Main Judge.

William P. Trimble and wife appealed to the superior court from the action of the Seattle city council in confirming an assessment upon leased tidelands. From a judgment of the superior court for the city of Seattle, Trimble and wife appeal. Affirmed.

Geo McKay, for appellants.

Scott Calhoun and Howard A. Hanson, for respondent.

DUNBAR, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court of King county, confirming an assessment against certain leasehold interests in first-class tidelands. The leases were issued under the Acts of 1897 (Laws 1897, c. 89), as amended in 1899 (Laws 1899, cc. 86, 122). They were executed in 1899.

In the legislative act of 1905 it was provided that: 'All leasehold, contractual or possessory interests in any tide lands owned by the state of Washington in fee simple (in trust or otherwise), situated within the limits of any incorporated city or town in this state, and which have been leased by the state, or which are held by any person, firm association, private corporation or municipal corporation under a contract of purchase from the state, may be assessed and charged for the cost of all local improvements specially benefiting such leasehold, contractuary or possessory interest, which may be ordered by the proper authorities of such city or town,' etc.

Section 1 of the act of 1907 is as follows: 'Any city of the first class in the state of Washington is hereby authorized and empowered to include within any local improvement district formed by it the whole or any part of any land in school sections or tide lands, title of which remains in the state of Washington; and said city is authorized and empowered to assess the cost of any local improvement against any such tide or school land in the same manner as if the same were private property: Provided, however, that the interest of the state in such property shall not be sold to satisfy the lien of such assessment, but only such interest or contract, or other right therein as may be in private ownership, shall be subject to such sale.'

These laws were in existence at the time the city of Seattle passed an ordinance creating a local improvement district, and providing for an assessment to pay the costs and expenses of such improvements within the limits of said districts. The leasehold interests in question, it will be noticed, were executed prior to the passage of this ordinance, and also prior to the passage of the laws just quoted. The findings of the court, among other things, are to the effect that the property described, which property is the subject of this controversy, is subject to assessment for said improvement, and especially benefited by said improvement in an amount in excess of the sum assessed against the same upon such reassessment roll, and said property is assessed proportionately to other property throughout said local improvement district. It is not contended that the proper proceedings relating to the reassessment were not taken by the city of Seattle. Due notice of the hearing upon the reassessment roll was given, as provided by the law and the charter and ordinances of the city of Seattle.

The findings of fact are not contested by the appellants, except as to one or two findings which it is contended by the appellants are more properly conclusions of law than findings of fact. But the principal contention is that, inasmuch as these leasehold interests had been acquired by the appellants prior to the passage of the laws providing for their assessment, which we have quoted above, the appellants' rights must be determined under the rule of the common law that, in the absence of a covenant or condition to the contrary, it is an implied covenant in every lease that the lessor shall pay all taxes and assessments levied on the leased land during the term, and that no statutory provision to the contrary had been passed at the time the leasehold interests were executed. Conceding this to be the established law in relation to private contracts or contracts between private individuals, it seems to us that a distinction must exist between a contract between private individuals, where the property leased or granted or sold is property which is already subject to taxation, and where the parties must necessarily enter into the contract having in mind the burden of taxation upon said property, and a contract entered into by a private individual and a sovereignty, where the property, by reason of its being the property of the sovereign, was not subject to taxation. It has been the universal announcement by courts and law writers that, inasmuch as taxation is necessary to the existence and perpetuation of government, there will be no implied exemptions from that burden. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, in Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 7 L.Ed. 939, among other things, said: 'That the taxing power is of vital importance; that it is essential to the existence of government--are truths which it cannot be necessary to reaffirm. They are acknowledged and asserted by all. It would seem that the relinquishment of such a power is never to be assumed. We will not say that a state may not relinquish it; that a consideration sufficiently valuable to induce a partial release of it may not exist; but, as the whole community is interested in retaining it undiminished,...