Trott v. Brinks, Inc.

• Citation: 972 So.2d 81
• Decision Date: 04 May 2007
• Docket Number: 1050895.
• Parties: Joyce P. TROTT, as the dependent widow of Ronald D. Trott, deceased, and as personal representative of the estate of Ronald D. Trott, deceased v. BRINKS, INC., et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

972 So.2d 81

Joyce P. TROTT, as the dependent widow of Ronald D. Trott, deceased, and as personal representative of the estate of Ronald D. Trott, deceased v. BRINKS, INC., et al.

1050895.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 4, 2007.

William W. Smith and Nicole Judge of Smith & Alspaugh, P.C., Birmingham, for plaintiff.

Adrian D. Johnson of Parnell & Crum, P.A., Montgomery, for defendants.

SMITH, Justice.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama has certified the following question pursuant to Rule 18, Ala. R.App. P.: "Whether an employer's insurance carrier is entitled to be reimbursed for medical expenses from amounts recovered from a third party in a wrongful death action filed by the employee decedent's personal representative?" This Court accepted the question; we now answer it in the negative.

Facts and Procedural History

In certifying this question, the federal district court set forth the facts of this case:

"On the morning of August 23, 2000, [Ronald D.] Trott, age 64, went to his job at Brinks, Inc. (`Brinks') in Birmingham where he was employed as a driver of armored trucks. On this particular day, Mr. Trott rode in the back of the truck with a co-employee, while two other employees rode in the front of the vehicle as they traveled to deliver bags of coins stored in the back of the truck to various locations.

"On Highway 72, about twelve miles outside of Huntsville, the driver of the truck ran off the side of the road causing the truck to overturn in an upside [down] position. During the rollover, Mr. Trott broke ten ribs, [his] right hip, left shoulder and cracked his backbone. While recovering from hip surgery, Mr. Trott's lung collapsed and he underwent another surgery. Ultimately it was determined that he suffered severe and irreversible internal injuries during the collision that resulted in his death on October 11, 2000. During the course of treatment, Mr. Trott incurred $415,098 of medical bills which were paid by his employer and/or its insurance carrier, [Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (`Liberty Mutual')].

"Joyce [P.] Trott, the widow of Mr. Trott [and the administratrix of Mr. Trott's estate], filed a wrongful death action against Indiana Mills and Manufacturing, Inc. (`IMMI') on November 11, 2000 in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. In her complaint, Mrs. Trott maintains that her husband was securely belted in the rear suspension seat prior to and during the rollover incident and that the seatbelt, manufactured by the defendant IMMI, unlatched at some point during the rollover. Release of the belt, she claims, caused the traumatic and ultimately fatal injuries which would not have occurred had the seatbelt held.

"After the case was removed to this Court, Liberty Mutual was allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff in the underlying action to preserve its subrogation interest.

"Liberty Mutual contends that it is entitled to be reimbursed both for death benefits and medical expenses paid to Mrs. Trott from any amount recovered in a third party action against the defendant IMMI and for medical benefits paid on behalf of Mr. Trott during his lifetime. Mrs. Trott disputes only the right of reimbursement for medical benefits paid on behalf of Mr. Trott during his lifetime. She maintains that recovery for medical expenses in a wrongful death action is inconsistent both with Ala. Code, 1975 § 25-5-11 and with the principles of subrogation. . . ."

(Footnote omitted.)

Discussion

Alabama Code 1975, § 25-5-11, provides, among other things, an employee the right to maintain an action against an employer for workers' compensation benefits in connection with an on-the-job injury while at the same time pursuing an action for damages against a third party for that same injury. Section 25-5-11 further allows a dependent of a deceased employee to file a wrongful-death action under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-410, against third parties for the wrongful death of the employee. Millers Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Young, 601 So.2d 962 (Ala.1992).

In addition to providing employees and their dependents the right to maintain actions against third parties, § 25-5-11(a) also provides an employer with a general right to be reimbursed out of any damages award for workers' compensation benefits it has paid. Alabama Code 1975, § 25-5-1(4), defines "employer" to include an employer's insurer; thus, the word "employer" in this opinion includes both Brinks, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. If an employer has paid workers' compensation benefits to an employee or death benefits to the dependents of a deceased employee, then the employer may be reimbursed for those benefits from any damages award received in the action against the third party: "To the extent of the recovery of damages against the other party, the employer shall be entitled to reimbursement for the amount of compensation theretofore paid on account of injury or death." Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-11(a).

This Court has held that § 25-5-11(a) allows an employer to intervene in a wrongful-death action to be reimbursed for benefits or compensation it paid. Ex parte Cincinnati Ins. Co., 689 So.2d 47 (Ala. 1997); Millers Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Young, supra. Before 1992, § 25-5-11 allowed reimbursement only for "compensation," which this Court had concluded did not include medical expenses. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Manasco, 271 Ala. 124, 123 So.2d 527 (1960). Thus, although an employer could be reimbursed for any workers' compensation benefits or death benefits paid to the employee or the deceased employee's dependents, the employer could not be reimbursed for medical benefits expended to care for the injured employee. In 1992, § 25-5-11(a) was amended to add the following language, which is pertinent in the instant case: "For purposes of this amendatory act, the employer shall be entitled to subrogation for medical and vocational benefits expended by the employer on behalf of the employee." (emphasis added); see Ala. Acts 1992, No. 92-537, § 8 (effective May 19, 1992).¹

Trott argues that the word "subrogation" in § 25-5-11(a) refers to the equitable remedy of subrogation and that it includes all the various rights and defenses attached to that remedy. Under equitable subrogation, a subrogee (here, the employer) has no greater rights than the subrogor (the employee); thus, the subrogee is entitled to only those remedies to which the subrogor is entitled, and no greater remedies. The instant action is a wrongful-death action under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-410. In such a case, the only recoverable damages are punitive damages intended to punish the tortfeasor for its actions—not to compensate the plaintiff. Medical expenses, such as those Liberty Mutual seeks to recover here, are compensatory in nature and are not recoverable by a plaintiff in a wrongful-death action. Thus, Trott argues, because she, as the representative of Ronald Trott's estate, could not recover damages from Indiana Mills and Manufacturing, Inc., for medical expenses, Liberty Mutual could not recover such damages either. In other words, Trott contends, Liberty Mutual cannot recover damages for medical expenses in a wrongful-death action when Trott herself cannot recover such expenses.

"The fundamental principle of statutory construction is that words in a statute must be given their plain meaning." Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So.2d 801, 814 (Ala.2003). "When a court construes a statute, `[w]ords used in [the] statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says.'" Ex parte Berryhill, 801 So.2d 7, 10 (Ala. 2001) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992)). Additionally, "`[c]ourts must liberally construe the workers' compensation law "to effectuate its beneficent purposes," although such a construction must be one that the language of the statute "fairly and reasonably" supports.'" Ex parte Weaver, 871 So.2d 820, 824 (Ala.2003)(quoting Ex parte Beaver Valley Corp., 477 So.2d 408, 411 (Ala.1985)).

Section 25-5-11(a) provides that an employer has a right to "reimbursement" of compensation and benefits. As to medical benefits, however, the Code section states something different: "the employer shall be entitled to subrogation for medical and vocational benefits." The use of two different terms—"reimbursement" and "subrogation"—is a distinction that we infer has meaning. The 1992 amendment specifically used the term "reimbursement" in reference to compensation and "subrogation" in reference to medical benefits. "[W]hen the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended. . . . The use of different terms within related statutes generally implies that different meanings were intended." 2A Norman Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46:06, at 194 (6th ed.2000) (footnotes omitted).² We presume that the use of two different words indicates that the legislature intended the two words be treated differently.

"Reimbursement" is a broad term implicating a simple repayment or indemnification. Black's Law Dictionary 1312 (8th ed.2004). Prior decisions interpreting this term for purposes of § 25-5-11(a) have interpreted it to refer to the repayment of compensation from the proceeds of an action against a third party, whether a negligence action or a wrongful-death action. Thus, an employer who had paid workers' compensation benefits, including disability or death benefits, is entitled to be reimbursed for those payments, even from a punitive-damages award. See, e.g., Millers Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Young, supra (an employer may be reimbursed from the punitive-damages award in a wrongful-death action filed by a deceased employee's estate for death benefits the employer...