Trujillo v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 23 September 1969
• Citation: 276 Cal.App.2d 333,81 Cal.Rptr. 146
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Michael J. TRUJILLO, Petitioner and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 33920.

Page 146

81 Cal.Rptr. 146

276 Cal.App.2d 333

Michael J. TRUJILLO, Petitioner and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 33920.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Sept. 23, 1969.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Atty. City Atty., Edward C. Farrell, Asst. City Atty., Jack L. Wells, Deputy City Atty., for defendants and appellants.

Rich & Ezer, Beverly Hills, for petitioner and respondent.

SCHWEITZER, Associate Justice.

In this proceeding in manadamus the trial court entered a judgment ordering defendants to re-create the position of manager of harbor real estate, harbor department, city of Los Angeles and to reinstate petitioner Trujillo to said position, and directing payment of his salary, less amounts paid to him in a subordinate position, from date of abolition of the position to date of reinstatement.

Defendants appeal from the judgment, contending the trial court erred (1) in permitting the introduction of extraneous evidence of motives of the board of harbor commissioners in abolishing petitioner's position, and (2) in holding that petitioner's subsequent resignation from a subordinate position and withdrawal of his pension contributions did not constitute a severance of his exployment rights.

Defendants request that the case be remanded for the purpose of taking additional evidence to determine whether petitioner has received remuneration during the interim period from other employment. Defendants also petition this court, pursuant to section 909, Code of Civil Procedure, and rule 23, California Rules of Court, for leave to produce additional evidence on appeal as to the effect a November 1968 reorganization of the harbor department has on petitioner's rights. ¹

In 1955, acting upon recommendations of an indefendent management consulting firm, the Los Angeles harbor department created the civil service position of manager of harbor real estate to manage in excess of 1,000 acres of valuable harbor land, either under lease or available for lease, under the jurisdiction of the harbor department. The position was placed under the immediate supervision of the general manager, harbor department. Departmental procedure was for the real estate manager to negotiate and review leases, to submit proposals to the general manager for review, and if approved, the proposals would then be submitted to the board of harbor commissioners for final approval.

The importance of the position and an effect of the 1955 organizational change is reflected by the increase in lease revenues from approximately $1,500,000 in the 1954--55 fiscal year to in excess of $3,500,000 in the 1965--66 fiscal year from over 300 separate leases.

On March 1, 1964 petitioner was apppointed acting manager of harbor real estate to fill a then-existing vacancy. In September 1964, following a civil service examination, he was appointed manager. In March 1965, following the successful completion of his probationary period, he received permanent tenure, subject to civil service regulations.

Evidence of Motive for Board Action

On February 23, 1966 the board of harbor commissioners adopted a resolution abolishing petitioner's position of manager of harbor real estate, effective March 25, 1966, for the stated reason of 'economy and efficiency.' The resolution made no mention of its effect on the other personnel in the real estate department and, in particular, on the position of assistant manager of harbor real estate, then held by a Mr. Powell. It apparently was assumed that the real estate department would function without a manager. Powell, the assistant manager being in charge.

During the board's discussion of the resolution it was stated that petitioner had no civil service displacement rights over subordinates. Shortly after the resolution was adopted, the civil service commission notified the board of harbor commissioners that petitioner had a displacement right over subordinate employees, and that he had elected to exercise such right by taking the position then occupied by Powell.

Over defendants' objections the trial court admitted evidence of the board's motives in adopting the resolution--to get rid of petitioner and replace him with Powell. The evidence in support of this conclusion was overwhelming and for the most part was undisputed. There had been no study or discussion on the subject of 'economy' and 'efficiency.' The action was not taken in connection with any departmental reorganization. ² There was no evidence of lack of funds to meet the expenses of the real estate staff. There was evidence that the office of manager of harbor real estate was performing a vital and important service. No charges of any kind had been brought against petitioner and none were contemplated. The undisputed evidence was that petitioner was an honest, able and loyal employee, that his one fault was that he refused to compromise his judgment and integrity because of commercial and political pressures by recommending leases which in his opinion were below fair rental standards.

To meet its dilemma caused by civil service requirements the board of harbor commissioners voted to create a new position for petitioner, giving him the same title with the same job description as that of Powell. To accomplish its purpose, the board transferred to Powell most of the duties and responsibilities theretofore assigned to petitioner, and instructed the general manager, harbor department, to assign to petitioner miscellaneous work unconnected with real estate. Powell's salary was increased; petitioner's was decreased so that it was less than that formerly paid to his assistant.

Based on this evidence the trial court found that '(t)he abolishment of the position of Manager of Harbor Real Estate was not taken in good faith by the Harbor Commission for the stated reason of economy and efficiency, nor was it taken to eliminate an unnecessary position. The stated reason of economy and efficiency was a mere subterfuge to mask the true intent of the Harbor Commission, which was to totally eliminate Petitioner's connection with and employment by the City of Los Angeles. * * *' Defendants do not question the sufficiency of the evidence to support this finding; their argument is that the evidence of motive was inadmissible. On the other hand, petitioner contends that the evidence was properly admitted, that it clearly shows bad faith, and seeks to set aside the orders of the board and to recover the difference in salary paid him and that to which he was entitled as manager of harbor real estate.

Defendants' objection to the receipt of extraneous evidence of motive on the part of the board of harbor commissioners was based on the long established rule that in passing on the legality of acts of legislative bodies, the courts cannot inquire into the motives behind such acts, as discussed fully in Stahm v. Klein, 179 Cal.App.2d 512, 518--520, 4 Cal.Rptr. 137 (hearing denied). Defendants rely on Livingstone v. MacGillivray, 1 Cal.2d 546, 36 P.2d 622, where the petitioner's civil service position in a city's water department was abolished by resolution of the board of water commissioners for the stated reason of economy. Petitioner there contended the action was taken for political reasons and in bad faith. The court noted that bad faith had not been pleaded, but stated on page 558, 36 P.2d page 628: 'Furthermore, even if bad faith had been pleaded, proof of extraneous facts for the purpose of showing motive was not allowable in the absence of some showing on the face of the resolution of abolition that it was adopted from improper motives. (Citation.)'

As noted in Stahm, supra, 179 Cal.App. at pages 520--521, 4 Cal.Rptr. 137, the rule is subject to exceptions. Where the law, ordinance or resolution shows on its face or in its results an improper purpose, motive or intent, thereby causing damage to a person, courts may intervene. Petitioner contends that this case falls within the exception, that the evidence of the results of the resolution clearly shows bad faith and therefore was properly admitted and considered by the trial court. Petitioner relies on Rexstrew v. City of Huntington Park, 20 Cal.2d 630, 128 P.2d 23, where bad faith was shown by results. Nine police and firemen were discharged by resolution 'for purposes of economy' when, in fact, there was plenty of money in the treasury. Two probationary employees were retained or rehired soon after, as well as several others of those discharged. The Supreme Court stated on page 633, 128 P.2d on page 25:

'The power to abolish a position may not be used to effect the discharge of an employee protected by the salutary provisions of civil service regulations, unless such power is exercised in good faith. Livingstone v. MacGillivray, 1 Cal.2d 546, 553, 36 P.2d 622; Childress v. Peterson, 18 Cal.2d 636, 117 P.2d 336; Winslow v. Bull, 97 Cal.App. 516, 523, 275 P. 974. Here respondents held their respective positions under tenure acquired through the adoption of the civil service ordinances. Each had attained the status of a permanent employee and neither was charged with misconduct or any dereliction of duty referred to in the ordinances. The trial court's findings that the positions were not abolished in good faith, being supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed by this court.'

A similar result was reached in Hanley v. Murphy, 40 Cal.2d 572, 255 P.2d 1, and Charamuga v. Cox, 207 Cal.App.2d 853, 24 Cal.Rptr. 811. (See Garvey v. Lowell, 199 Mass. 47, 50, 85 N.E. 182, cited and quoted in O'Neill v. Williams, 53 Cal.App. 1, 199 P. 870.)

We conclude that this case falls squarely within the holding of Rexstrew, supra, and that the trial court properly admitted and considered the extraneous evidence. Furthermore, we find support for this conclusion on another ground, recently referred to by our Supreme Court in Walker v. County...