Trujillo v. City of Los Angeles
| Decision Date | 27 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | B314042 |
| Citation | 84 Cal.App.5th 908,300 Cal.Rptr.3d 754 |
| Parties | Ana Isabella TRUJILLO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Law Offices of Vahdat & Associates, G. Amy Vahdat, and Kevin M. Davis, San Diego, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Assistant City Attorney, Blithe S. Bock, Managing Assistant City Attorney, and Michael M. Walsh, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
A defendant sued for negligence moves for summary judgment and makes a settlement offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 9981 (a 998 offer) days before the hearing on its summary judgment motion. Mere minutes after the trial court orally grants summary judgment, the plaintiff zips off an email to the defendant purporting to accept the 998 offer. This scenario presents the following question: Does a 998 offer automatically expire when a trial court orally grants the offeror's summary judgment motion? We hold that that answer is "yes." Because the trial court came to the same conclusion, we affirm.
Around 11 p.m. on a Sunday night in July 2018, Ana Isabella Trujillo (plaintiff) decided to go for a jog with her sister. She took a route she had run over 100 times before. This time, however, she tripped on an uneven sidewalk in front of a house on Pickford Street in the City of Los Angeles (the City). The seam between two sidewalk squares where she tripped was offset between .75 and 1.0625 inches. Plaintiff fell and sustained injuries.
The City had not received any complaints or requests for repair for this stretch of sidewalk.
In March 2019, plaintiff sued the City for its negligence in maintaining the City-owned sidewalk in a dangerous condition.2
In September 2020, the City moved for summary judgment on the ground that the sidewalk was not a "dangerous condition" because the differential in elevation between the two sidewalk squares was trivial—and hence, not "dangerous"—as a matter of law.
After a full round of briefing, the trial court set a hearing for March 2, 2021, at 2:30 p.m. Although the hearing was not transcribed, the trial court concluded the hearing by orally granting the City's motion for summary judgment. The hearing ended at approximately 3:18 p.m. "Upon conclusion of the oral argument," the court issued a minute order memorializing its oral ruling.
A few days before the March 2, 2021 hearing on its summary judgment motion, the City had sent plaintiff a 998 offer to settle the case for $30,000.
At 3:22 p.m. on March 2, 2021, just four minutes after the summary judgment hearing concluded, plaintiff's counsel sent the City an email purporting to accept the City's 998 offer. Seven minutes after that—at 3:29 p.m.—plaintiff filed the executed 998 offer with the court.
On March 3, 2021, the City objected to plaintiff's attempt to accept its 998 offer after the trial court had ruled on its summary judgment motion. The next day, plaintiff filed a written reply to the City's objection.
On May 7, 2021, the trial court entered judgment for the City, implicitly ruling that plaintiff's acceptance of the City's 998 offer was inoperative.
1. Plaintiff's motion to compel
On May 10, 2021, plaintiff filed a motion to compel the trial court to enter judgment in accordance with the terms of the 998 offer plaintiff purported to accept. Following a full round of briefing, the trial court held a hearing on June 4, 2021. The court denied the motion. The court explained that it had orally "issued a ruling granting [the City's] [m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment on the merits," that its oral ruling "reflect[ed] a determination ... that [plaintiff's] action ... has no merit," and that the ruling accordingly "terminated [p]laintiff's power to accept [the City's] [o]ffer," such that plaintiff's "purported acceptance of the [998 o]ffer did not form a valid compromise agreement."
2. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration
On May 24, 2021, and while simultaneously litigating her motion to compel, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's entry of its May 7, 2021 judgment. Following yet another full round of briefing, and yet another hearing, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that plaintiff's motion did not satisfy the prerequisites for a motion for reconsideration because it was merely a "reiteration of [plaintiff's] original motion [to compel]" and did not raise "any new or different facts, circumstances, or law."
On July 8, 2021, plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal of the May 7, 2021 judgment.
Section 998 is a statutory mechanism meant to "encourage both the making and the acceptance of reasonable settlement offers" "prior to trial." ( Scott Co. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1114, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 979 P.2d 974 ; Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 797, 804, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 838 P.2d 218.) It does so by creating "a strong financial disincentive to a party—whether plaintiff or defendant—who fails to achieve a better result than that party could have achieved by accepting his or her opponent's settlement offer." ( Bank of San Pedro , at p. 804, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 838 P.2d 218.) Specifically, section 998 authorizes the parties in a civil lawsuit—whether plaintiff or defendant—to make a written offer of settlement 10 or more days "prior to commencement of trial or arbitration" of their "dispute." ( § 998, subd. (b).) Such an offer expires "30 days after it is made."
(Id. , subd. (b)(2).) If the offer is accepted within this time window and "prior to trial or arbitration," the trial court must "enter judgment" consistent with the offer. (Id. , subd. (b)(1) & (2).) If the 998 offer is made by the defendant and the plaintiff "fails to obtain a more favorable judgment" than contained in the 998 offer, then the plaintiff suffers a penalty—namely, the plaintiff cannot collect any of her own postoffer costs and must pay the defendant's postoffer costs, and these amounts reduce the amount of any verdict in the plaintiff's favor. ( § 998, subds. (c)(1) & (f).) If the 998 offer is made by the plaintiff and the defendant "fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award," then the defendant suffers a penalty, namely, the defendant has to pay the plaintiff's postoffer costs and has to pay the "postoffer costs of the services of [the plaintiff's] expert witnesses." ( § 998, subd. (d).)
In arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to acknowledge plaintiff's acceptance of the City's less-than-30-day-old 998 offer, this appeal presents the following question: When, if at all, does a trial court's grant of summary judgment cause a party's outstanding 998 offer to expire? The parties have offered up a veritable smorgasbord of possible answers, including (1) when the summary judgment hearing commences, (2) when the court orally rules, (3) when the court memorializes its oral ruling in a minute order, (4) when the court enters judgment, or (5) never, at least as long as 30 days have not expired after the 998 offer is made. Because ascertaining the correct answer turns on questions of statutory interpretation, we confront the issue de novo. ( Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 857, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 505 P.3d 212.)
We conclude that a still-pending 998 offer expires when a trial court orally grants summary judgment.
Two considerations inform our analysis.
First, we look to section 998 ’s text , which is the " ‘most reliable indicator’ " of our Legislature's intent when enacting section 998. ( Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 663, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 390, 74 P.3d 166.) The text of section 998 provides that a 998 offer may be made "prior to commencement of [(1)] trial or [(2)] arbitration ... of a dispute to be resolved by arbitration." ( § 998, subd. (b), italics added.) Because the sole purpose of trial is also to resolve disputes ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493 ), a section 998 offer may only be made when there exists a dispute to be resolved. As our Supreme Court has said time and again, a grant of summary judgment resolves all the disputes in a case. ( Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 284, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242 [], superseded by statute on other grounds as described in Simms v. NPCK Enterprises, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 233, 242-243, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 557 ; Aguilar , at p. 843, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493 [].) Indeed, that is why the grant of summary judgment is entitled to preclusive effect in future litigation. (Cf. Schulze v. Schulze (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 75, 83, 262 P.2d 646 [].)
Second, we look to the purpose animating section 998, which also guides our interpretation of the statute. ( Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 662, 288 Cal.Rptr.3d 742, 502 P.3d 389.) As noted above, the purpose of section 998 is to encourage the early settlement of disputes. Settlement is the means by which parties can achieve the certainty of a known outcome and simultaneously eliminate the uncertainty that inheres in litigation. ( Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 658, 667, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 [...
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California Employment Law Notes
...in any protected activity.OFFER TO SETTLE EXPIRED WHEN THE COURT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION Trujillo v. City of Los Angeles, 84 Cal. App. 5th 908 (2022)In a negligence case, the City of Los Angeles made a settlement offer to the plaintiff pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998 a few da......