Trujillo v. The State

• Decision Date: 07 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. A10A0338.,A10A0338.
• Citation: 698 S.E.2d 350,304 Ga.App. 849
• Parties: TRUJILLOv.The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

304 Ga.App. 849

698 S.E.2d 350

TRUJILLOv.The STATE.

No. A10A0338.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 7, 2010.

Kevin J. Wilson, for appellant.

Garry T. Moss, Dist. Atty., Katherine I. Terry, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

BERNES, Judge.

Following a bench trial, Elijio Trujillo was convicted of burglary and sentenced to three years imprisonment. He argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. He further argues that the trial court imposed an unlawful sentence upon him in violation of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. We find no error and affirm.

On appeal from a bench trial resulting in a criminal conviction, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. (Citation omitted.) Head v. State, 303 Ga.App. 475, 693 S.E.2d 845 (2010); Smith v. State, 291 Ga.App. 725, 726, 662 S.E.2d 817 (2008). “We do not ... re-weigh testimony, determine witness credibility, or address assertions of conflicting evidence; our role is to determine whether the evidence presented is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hall v. State, 294 Ga.App. 274, 275, 668 S.E.2d 880 (2008).

So viewed, the evidence adduced during the bench trial showed that Trujillo was accused of burglarizing a residence owned by a mother and daughter. During the early morning hours on the night in question, the daughter and her boyfriend were asleep in a basement bedroom when they were awakened by noises outside their bedroom door. They then observed Trujillo crouched down behind several boxes containing their valuables in the common area of the basement. Believing Trujillo was unaware that he had been detected, the daughter and her boyfriend went upstairs, locking the basement door behind them, and called 911.

Law enforcement officers arrived a short time later and apprehended Trujillo, who was still in the basement. They found him to be in possession of the mother's panties, garter belt, and stockings, which he had apparently taken from one of the boxes. When the mother approached the arresting officer to provide her identification as requested, Trujillo stated, “[s]orry, lady.”

Trujillo testified on his own behalf. Both he and his cousin lived in the same subdivision as the residence in which he was found. He testified that he had consumed 18 beers on the night in question and, although he had no memory of the events or his subsequent arrest, he believed that he was trying to go to his cousin's house and had gotten lost in his drunken stupor.

1. The evidence set forth above was sufficient to sustain Trujillo's conviction of burglary. See OCGA § 16-7-1(a). As alleged, the state had the burden of proving that Trujillo, without authority and with the intent to commit a theft therein, entered or remained within the dwelling house of another. Id. The state established that Trujillo had entered into and remained within the subject residence during the early morning hours without authority and, after he was apprehended, had the resident's belongings on his person. This evidence supported the trial court's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See OCGA § 16-7-1(a); In the Interest of J.B.M., 294 Ga.App. 545, 546-547(1), 669 S.E.2d 523 (2008); Minor v. State, 278 Ga.App. 327, 328-329, 629 S.E.2d 44 (2006); Grice v. State, 166 Ga.App. 706, 706-707(1), 305 S.E.2d 438 (1983).

Trujillo nonetheless argues that the state failed to prove that he entered into the residence with the intent to commit a theft therein. Specifically, Trujillo contends that the evidence against him was circumstantial and that the state failed to exclude other reasonable hypotheses, such as him having entered the home “to get out of the cold,” “to sleep,” or simply by error.

First, we note that this is not a circumstantial evidence case. But, to the extent that the state used circumstantial evidence to establish Trujillo's intent, his argument nonetheless fails. “As a general rule the state must, of necessity, rely on circumstantial evidence in proving intent.” Nelson v. State, 277 Ga.App. 92, 95(1)(a), 625 S.E.2d 465 (2005). The question as to whether a defendant entertained an intent to commit a theft after unlawfully entering into the residence of another is an issue to be resolved by the factfinder. Id.; Minor, 278 Ga.App. at 329, 629 S.E.2d 44. And, “[w]hen the trial court is authorized to find the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except the defendant's guilt, the verdict will not be disturbed unless the verdict is insupportable as a matter of law.” (Citation omitted.) Hall, 294 Ga.App. at 275, 668 S.E.2d 880.

Here, the circumstances under which Trujillo was found in the subject residence supports the trial court's determination that he entered with the intent to commit a theft. See Studiemeyer v. State, 278 Ga.App. 756, 756-757(1), 629 S.E.2d 593 (2006) (“[A]n intent to steal may be inferred when the evidence shows an unlawful entry into the building of another where valuable goods are stored or kept inside.”) (citations and punctuation omitted); Hall, 294 Ga.App. at 275, 668 S.E.2d 880 (burglary conviction based upon theft of $24); Grice, 166 Ga.App. at 706-707, 305 S.E.2d 438 (finding intent to commit theft even though defendant had not taken anything from the residence after his unlawful entry). Despite Trujillo's contention, the trial court's pronouncements during sentencing did not indicate the trial court's belief that the state failed to prove Trujillo's intent; to the contrary, when read in context it is clear that the trial court, although questioning whether Trujillo had ill intent beyond that of mere theft, ultimately rejected every other hypothesis and concluded that the evidence proved Trujillo's intent to commit theft beyond a reasonable doubt.¹

Nor does Trujillo's alleged confusion due to voluntary intoxication absolve him of criminal liability for his conduct. See Sermons v. State, 294 Ga.App. 293, 295, 669 S.E.2d 210 (2008). Although it is possible that “the influence of alcohol on a person's mind [can render him] so impaired that he is incapable of forming an intent to commit an act or understand the consequences of such an act,” Trujillo's apology to the mother as he was being placed under arrest lends support to the trial court's conclusion that Trujillo was not so impaired that he was incapable of forming the requisite intent or understanding the consequences of his actions. Smith v. State, 181 Ga.App. 595, 596-597, 353 S.E.2d 35 (1987).

2. Trujillo next argues that the sentence of the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process and equal protection under the law. Specifically, Trujillo contends that the trial court impermissibly based its decision to deny him probation solely on his status as an illegal alien.

It is undisputed that Trujillo is in the United States illegally. During the sentencing hearing, Trujillo's trial counsel argued that probation was the appropriate sentence given Trujillo's lack of criminal history. The trial court expressed great concern that he could not order Trujillo, an illegal alien, to obtain suitable employment-a standard condition of probation-without ordering him to violate the law and/or be an accessory to any employer who would hire him in violation of the law. Trujillo's trial counsel then proposed that the trial court waive the specific requirements that Trujillo work and pay a fine as a condition of probation, and instead require him to contribute significant community service hours. To this end, Trujillo introduced testimony that he had friends and family who would be willing to help him meet his financial obligations while on probation.

After devoting a significant amount of time and consideration to the issue, the trial court responded:

[T]he irony here of what you're requesting is that ... not only would I give [Trujillo] ... a probated or suspended sentence, but I would take away the requirement that he work and take away the requirement that he pay a fine. Because certainly, if he doesn't work, he can't pay a fine. I wouldn't do that for any able-body person who is convicted of burglary that I can think of.... Secondly, if I did that, then he would have idle time. I don't relish the idea of slave labor as you have suggested: [m]onumental community service work hours with no ability to support himself or his family.... I cannot impose a sentence that contemplates the contribution even of family members, let alone people that aren't related to him, that might have [been] promised, and I have received no such promises.... I just don't know of any way for the [c]ourt to rely on [third-party assurances] and make it work, nor enter a sentence in reliance thereon, because everything that we're saying here, even with promises, can be reneged on, and the [c]ourt could not revoke [Trujillo's probation] because impossibility would be a defense.

The trial court thereafter sentenced Trujillo to three years to serve and waived the payment of any fees.

Georgia courts are vested with broad discretion when determining the appropriate sentence to impose upon a criminal defendant, and it is the duty of the trial court to exercise that discretion as to all aspects of the sentence that it imposes. See OCGA §§ 17-10-1(a)(1), 42-8-34(c); Jefferson v. State, 209 Ga.App. 859, 863(3), 434 S.E.2d 814 (1993). That discretion must nonetheless be exercised within the perimeters of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects all “persons”-including those residing in this country illegally- from invidious governmental discrimination based solely upon their immigration status. See, e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210(II), 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (“Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons' guaranteed...