Bray v. State
| Decision Date | 04 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. A14A2114.,A14A2114. |
| Citation | 330 Ga.App. 768,768 S.E.2d 285 |
| Parties | BRAY v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Benjamin Alston Pearlman, for Appellant.
Kristopher Michael Bolden, Asst. Dist. Atty., Kenneth W. Mauldin, Dist. Atty., for Appellee.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found Kirk Devin Bray guilty of multiple offenses arising out of a police car chase and collision with another vehicle, including two counts of serious injury by vehicle, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Bray filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Bray contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of serious injury by vehicle because the State failed to prove the statutory element of “serious disfigurement”; that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the firearm-related offenses because the State failed to prove that he knowingly possessed the handgun in question; and that his sentence under Georgia's recidivist statute was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
Construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, see Trujillo v. State, 304 Ga.App. 849, 849, 698 S.E.2d 350 (2010), the evidence showed that the Oconee County Sheriff's Office received information to be on the lookout (“BOLO”) for a gray Ford F350 pickup truck with a particular license tag number that had been stolen from its owner in Greene County on May 1, 2011. On the afternoon of May 5, 2011, sheriff's investigators in two separate vehicles that were traveling northbound on Georgia Highway 441 in response to an unrelated matter observed a pickup truck that matched the description in the BOLO. The truck was in the lane to the right of the investigators and drove up the entrance ramp onto the Georgia 10 Loop.
One of the investigators confirmed with the police dispatcher that the license tag number on the pickup truck matched the tag number identified in the BOLO. The confirmed sighting of the truck was relayed to other patrol units in the area, and a police chase ensued in which several deputies had the blue lights and sirens activated on their vehicles. During the chase, the pickup truck, which was traveling at a speed of 80 to 100 miles per hour, crossed over the median of the Georgia 10 Loop and traveled the wrong direction up the exit ramp onto Georgia Highway 316. The truck then proceeded down Highway 316 until the truck reached the intersection of Highway 316 with the Oconee Connector. At that intersection, the truck crossed over a grass median and over two lanes of oncoming traffic, where it collided head-on with a car that was traveling in the right direction. That car was occupied by an elderly married couple, who were rushed to the hospital by ambulance. Because of complications caused by her blood thinner medication and concerns over her heart rate, the wife remained in the hospital for several days after the collision.
After the collision, the driver of the stolen pickup truck, later identified as Bray, fled on foot into the woods. He was apprehended a few hours later when he emerged from the woods near the scene of the collision. A deputy searched Bray and found a bag of methamphetamine in his pocket, and an investigator searched the pickup truck and discovered, among other items, a handgun in a nylon zippered case on the front passenger floorboard. The handgun was registered to a third party who lived in Forsyth County and had been stolen from him a few months earlier.
Following his apprehension, Bray was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and agreed to speak with investigators the day after the collision. During the recorded interview, Bray admitted to the investigators that he had worked as a “middle man” who would drive stolen trucks to another person who would buy them. Bray further admitted that he had driven the stolen pickup truck involved in the collision, that he was a long-time methamphetamine addict, and that he had “dope” in his pocket when he was apprehended. Bray denied knowing that the stolen handgun was in the truck.
Bray subsequently wrote a letter “[t]o the lady who was injured in the accident.” In the letter, Bray stated that his “mind [had] not been right in a long time because of [his] drug use” and that he had “remorse for [his] actions.” He asked for forgiveness for causing her injuries.
Bray was indicted for 16 criminal offenses, including theft by receiving the stolen pickup truck, two counts of serious injury by vehicle, two counts of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, possession of methamphetamine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.1 By consent of the parties, a bench trial was conducted in November 2012.
At the bench trial, the sheriff's investigators and deputies involved in the pursuit and apprehension of Bray testified to the events as set out above, and several eyewitnesses testified about the collision and the driver of the truck fleeing from the scene. The State also introduced into evidence the letter that Bray wrote apologizing to the elderly wife and the video recording of his interview with the investigators. A transcript of the video recording was prepared and provided to the trial court as well.
The elderly couple testified about the collision and the injuries they sustained. The husband testified that after the collision, he temporarily lost consciousness, “couldn't get [his] breath,” and had to receive “oxygen in the ambulance.” According to the husband, he broke his sternum and several ribs and was so bruised that he was “the color of an eggplant.” The husband further testified that his “urine was black for about a week.”
The wife testified that she broke her toe, cut and dislocated her finger, cut her knees
and the back of her head, and was “black all over” from bruising. The wife also testified that she was hospitalized for six days, including three days in intensive care.
In addition to the elderly couple's testimony, the State introduced testimony from the emergency room physicians who treated them after the collision as well as photographs of their injuries. Among other things, the physicians testified that the husband and the wife both sustained sternum and rib fractures
revealed by CT scan and that the laceration to the wife's head required staples. The photographs showed severe bruising in the area of the husband's rib cage, lower back, side, and pelvis, and the wife's dislocated finger and the lacerations to one of her knees and to her head.
Similar transaction evidence of Bray's receipt and operation of other stolen trucks was introduced by the State in connection with the theft-related charge. To support the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the State introduced a certified copy of Bray's prior indictment, plea, and sentence for theft by taking in March 2008.
After receiving all of the evidence,2 the trial court found Bray guilty of 14 of the charged offenses, including the specific offenses previously listed. A sentencing hearing ensued in which the State introduced certified copies of Bray's indictment, plea, and sentence to two counts of theft by receiving stolen property in July 2008, and to seven counts of theft by receiving stolen property in September 2008. Taking into account these prior convictions in addition to the theft-by-taking conviction introduced at trial, the trial court sentenced Bray as a recidivist and imposed various concurrent sentences that amounted to 15 years in confinement without parole, followed by 10 years on probation. This appeal followed.
1. Bray contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the two counts of serious injury by vehicle. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to prove the statutory element of serious disfigurement with respect to either the elderly husband or his wife. We are unpersuaded.
On appeal from a bench trial resulting in a criminal conviction, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. We do not re-weigh testimony, determine witness credibility, or address assertions of conflicting evidence; our role is to determine whether the evidence presented is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Trujillo, 304 Ga.App. at 849, 698 S.E.2d 350.
“Any person who drives any vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property commits the offense of reckless driving.” OCGA § 40–6–390(a). A person commits the offense of serious injury by vehicle if, without malice, he causes bodily harm to another by “seriously disfiguring his body or a member thereof” through the violation of OCGA § 40–6–390(a). OCGA § 40–6–394. “Serious disfigurement” means to gravely or greatly impair or injure the appearance of a person. Keef v. State, 220 Ga.App. 134, 137(1)(a), 469 S.E.2d 318 (1996). See Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 318(2), 271 S.E.2d 360 (1980) ; In the Interest of H.S., 199 Ga.App. 481, 405 S.E.2d 323 (1991). There is no requirement that the disfigurement be permanent. See Baker v. State, 245 Ga. 657, 667(6), 266 S.E.2d 477 (1980) ; Keef, 220 Ga.App. at 137(1)(a), 469 S.E.2d 318 ; In the Interest of H.S., 199 Ga.App. at 481, 405 S.E.2d 323. Furthermore, the question whether an injury constitutes serious disfigurement is normally for the trier of fact. Silvers v. State, 245 Ga.App. 486(1), 538 S.E.2d 135 (2000). And if the indictment alleges that the victim was seriously disfigured in more than one way, the State need only prove that the victim suffered serious disfigurement in one of those separate ways to sustain a conviction. Se...
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