Tsesarskaya v. City of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 14 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11 Civ. 4897 (AJP).,11 Civ. 4897 (AJP). |
| Citation | 843 F.Supp.2d 446 |
| Parties | Marina TSESARSKAYA, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, Lieutenant Michael McGuiness, Detective James Coll, Shield # 01121, and Detective Sean Mulcahy, Shield # 03204, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stephen Howard Weiner, Law Office of Stephen H. Weiner, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Philip Sebastian Frank, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Marina Tsesarskaya, represented by counsel, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York, Lieutenant Michael McGuiness, Detective James Coll and Detective Sean Mulcahy, alleging violations of her constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and under state law. (Dkt. No. 1: Compl; Dkt. No. 8: Am. Compl.) Tsesarskaya specifically claims deprivation of federal rights, false arrest, excessive force, failure to intercede and municipal liability under § 1983, and assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment and negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention under state law. (Compl.; Am. Compl.) 1
Presently before the Court is defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on Tsesarskaya's claims except her excessive force, assault and battery claims. (Dkt. No. 10: Defs. Notice of Motion; see also Dkt. No. 13: Defs. Br.; Dkt. No. 27: Defs. Reply Br.) The parties have consented to decision of this case by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. No. 15.)
For the reasons set forth below, defendants' summary judgment motion is DENIED as to the false arrest and municipal liability claims under § 1983, and false arrest and imprisonment claims under state law, but GRANTED as to the state law negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention claim.
On November 12, 2010, real estate agent Artis Minor contacted Tsesarskaya to see if two Italian women could rent her apartmentfor three days. 3 While the parties dispute exactly what happened after the Italian women arrived, they agree that the women had a disagreement with Tsesarskaya and left the apartment. Tsesarskaya noticed that the women had left two large shopping bags in the apartment, and she told Minor to tell the two women to wait in the lobby and that she would bring them their bags. (Ex. C: Tsesarskaya Dep. at 171–73; Ex. Q: Tsesarskaya CCRB Interview Tr. at 8.) The two women, however, returned directly to Tsesarskaya's apartment, banging on the apartment door and yelling. Tsesarskaya refused to open the door because the women had been told to wait in the lobby for Tsesarskaya to bring the bags down. (Ex. C: Tsesarskaya Dep. at 180–82.)
The two women called the police for assistance in recovering their property, and Officers Adriana DeLeon and Lazaros Asters responded. Officers Asters and DeLeon knocked (or, according to Tsesarskaya, banged) on Tsesarskaya's door and identified themselves as police, but Tsesarskaya refused to open the door. Officer Asters recalled that Tsesarskaya may have stated that she did not believe that they were real police officers. Officer Asters thought that Tsesarskaya was irrational because she would not open the door, and Officer DeLeon thought that Tsesarskaya had some psychological issues because she would not open the door and was not responding to them. Officer Asters called the Emergency Services Unit (“ESU”) in order to gain access to the apartment. (Ex. S: Asters CCRB Interview at 92–93; Ex. R: DeLeon CCRB Interview at 76–77, 79.)
ESU Detectives Coll and Mulcahy arrived, as well as ESU Sergeant (now Lieutenant) Michael McGuiness, who was informed that Tsesarskaya was acting crazy, threw the women out of the apartment and was unresponsive to the officers at the door. ( Dets. Coll and Mulcahy and Sgt. McGuiness attemptedto communicate with Tsesarskaya for approximately thirty minutes.
During the time the police were trying to get Tsesarskaya to open her apartment door, Tsesarskaya made and received calls, including two calls to 911 and one call from 911, and looked out her window and saw police officers, police vehicles, ambulances and fire trucks filling the street. ( After her first call to 911, Tsesarskaya called her friend Svetlana Sky, sounding scared but rational, and said that her door was being broken by people claiming to be the police. Sky called 911, and the 911 operator said: “ ‘if you were her friend, you should advise her so they don't break the door down, for her to open the door’ ” and “ ‘[f]or the certain call that this job was put in there, yes, they will break that door down.’ ” Sky called Tsesarskaya and conveyed this message.
Tsesarskaya eventually spoke with the officers at the door and told them that she was okay and did not want to open the door.
While Tsesarskaya told the 911 operator that she would leave the bags outside her apartment, Tsesarskaya did not communicate this to the officers outside her door.
When Tsesarskaya opened her door to avoid it being broken down, the officers rushed inside.
Dets. Coll and Mulcahy and Lt. McGuiness handcuffed Tsesarskaya and transferred her to officers from the 17th Precinct. At approximately 8:30 p.m., Tsesarskaya was taken without her consent by ambulance to Bellevue Hospital Center for a psychiatric evaluation; she was released around 2:30 a.m.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509–10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Lang v. Ret. Living Pub. Co., 949 F.2d 576, 580 (2d Cir.1991).
The burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists rests on the party seeking summary judgment. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir.1994); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir.1994). The movant may discharge this burden by demonstrating to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case on an issue on which the non-movant has the burden of proof. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552–53.
To defeat a summary judgment motion, the non-moving party must do “more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the non-moving party must “cit...
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