TST, LLC v. Manufactured Hous. Dispute Resolution Program of the Office of the Attorney Gen. of Wash.
| Decision Date | 27 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 53352-9-II,53352-9-II |
| Citation | 485 P.3d 977 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | TST, LLC dba Oaks Mobile and RV Court, Petitioner, v. MANUFACTURED HOUSING DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM OF the OFFICE OF the ATTORNEY GENERAL of the State of Washington, Respondent. |
Robert S. Phed, Robert S. Phed, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 820492, Vancouver, WA, 98682-0010, Mark G. Passannante, Attorney at Law, 8904 NE Hazel Dell Ave., Vancouver, WA, 98665-8020, for Petitioner.
Shidon Burton Aflatooni, Washington State Attorney General's Ofc., 800 Fifth Ave. Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, for Respondent.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶ 1 TST, LLC dba Oaks Mobile and RV Court appeals the administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision granting the Manufactured Housing Dispute Resolution Program's (the Program) motion for summary judgment. TST argues that the ALJ committed an error of law by erroneously interpreting the provisions of the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA), chapter 59.20 RCW, governing rent increases. We disagree and affirm the ALJ's order granting summary judgment.
¶ 2 On June 1, 2016, TST acquired Oaks Mobile and RV Court from Tom Esteb Properties, LLC. No current, written leases existed at that time. But a rent roll showing that the tenants were paying $320 per month did exist. The rents had not been raised for 10 years.
¶ 3 After acquiring Oaks Mobile, TST sent a letter to the residents notifying them that Oaks Mobile was under new ownership, providing the new address rents should be mailed to, and stating that rent payments had to be postmarked by the 5th of the month. On July 1, 2016, TST sent a letter to the residents of Oaks Mobile, stating that TST was in the process of creating new leases and new rules and regulations for the mobile home park.
¶ 4 On July 15, 2016, TST provided the residents with the new lease agreement and rules and regulations. TST asked that the residents review and sign all the paperwork by August 5, 2016. Donna Gosney, Lorraine Simoni, and Nanette Stickley, all residents of Oaks Mobile, did not sign the lease agreements.
Administrative Record (AR) at 62.
¶ 6 On August 20, 2016, TST sent a letter to the residents stating that if they were on a current valid lease agreement, TST would abide by that lease. The letter also informed residents that if they could not provide a current, valid lease or return the new lease agreement to TST, they would "be regarded as not having any lease at all." AR at 170.
¶ 7 On August 29, 2016, TST sent a "90 Day Notice to Change Rent" to Lane, Gosney, Simoni, and Stickley, notifying them of a rent increase from $320 to $525 per month. The rent increase would become effective on December 1, 2016.
¶ 8 On August 28, 2017, TST notified Gosney, Simoni, and Stickley of a rent increase from $525 to $550 per month effective December 1, 2017. And on September 6, 2017, TST notified Lane of a rent increase from $525 to $550 per month effective January 1, 2018.
¶ 9 On December 15, 2017, TST entered into written rental agreements with Gosney, Simoni, and Stickley. TST also entered a new lease agreement with Lane. These agreements commenced on January 1, 2018 and expired on December 31, 2018.
¶ 10 Lane, Gosney, Simoni, and Stickley all filed complaints against TST with the Program based on the rent increases. The Program found that TST violated the MHLTA and issued a notice of violation. The Program concluded that TST violated former RCW 59.20.090(2) (2010)1 by increasing rent without providing proper notice. TST appealed the notice of violation and requested an administrative hearing.
¶ 11 The Program filed a motion for summary judgment. TST did not dispute any of the underlying facts. TST argued that a proper interpretation of the relevant statutes allowed for the rent increases and that, under the terms of the rental agreement Lane executed, they were permitted to raise his rent, regardless of the interpretation of the statute.
¶ 12 In its decision, the ALJ specifically noted that there were no genuine issues of material fact. The only issue in the dispute was the differing interpretations of the relevant statutes. The ALJ concluded that under former RCW 59.20.090(2) rent may only be increased at the end of the rental term. The ALJ granted the Program's motion for summary judgment and affirmed the notice of violation against TST.
¶ 13 TST filed a petition for review in the superior court. The superior court certified the case for direct review by this court. Based on the superior court's certification, a commissioner of this court granted discretionary review.2
¶ 14 The Washington Administrative Procedures Act3 (APA) governs our review. RCW 59.30.040(10). Under the APA, the party challenging an agency action has the burden of demonstrating the action is invalid and must show substantial prejudice. RCW 34.05.570(1)(a), (d). A reviewing court may reverse an administrative order if the order violates the constitution, exceeds statutory authority, or involves an error in interpreting or applying the law. RCW 34.05.570(3)(a), (b), (d). In this case, we will grant relief only if the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law.4 RCW 34.05.570(3)(d).
¶ 15 Additionally, we are reviewing the ALJ's order granting summary judgment. "While the APA does not explicitly authorize agencies to use summary judgment procedures, case law has established that judicial review of such summary proceedings must ‘overlay the APA standard of review with the summary judgment standard.’ " City of Seattle v. American Healthcare Services, Inc. , 13 Wash. App. 2d 838, 850, 468 P.3d 637 (2020) (quoting Verizon Nw., Inc. v. Emp't Sec. Dep't , 164 Wash.2d 909, 915-16, 194 P.3d 255 (2008) ).
¶ 16 " ‘Summary judgment is appropriate only where the undisputed facts entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Id. (quoting Verizon , 164 Wash.2d at 916, 194 P.3d 255 ). We " ‘view the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’ " Id. (quoting Verizon , 164 Wash.2d at 916, 194 P.3d 255 ).
¶ 17 Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review de novo. Jametsky v. Olsen , 179 Wash.2d 756, 761-62, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014). The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent. Id . When possible, we give effect to the plain meaning of the statute as an expression of legislative intent. Id . The plain meaning of a statute is "derived from the context of the entire act as well as any ‘related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.’ " Id. (quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C. , 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) ). We give effect to all the language in the statute and do not render any portion meaningless or superfluous. In re Welfare of K.M.M. , 187 Wash. App. 545, 573, 349 P.3d 929 (2015).
¶ 18 When the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, no further construction or interpretation is necessary. Jametsky , 179 Wash.2d at 762, 317 P.3d 1003. However, if we determine that the statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, then the statute is ambiguous. Id . If a statute is ambiguous, then we " ‘may resort to statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in discerning legislative intent.’ " Id. (quoting Christensen v. Ellsworth , 162 Wash.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007) ).
¶ 19 Former RCW 59.20.090(2) states, "a landlord seeking to increase the rent upon expiration of the term of a rental agreement of any duration shall notify the tenant in writing three months prior to the effective date of any increase in rent." Our Supreme Court has determined that "[b]y its plain language, former RCW 59.20.090(2) does not give a landlord an immutable right to increase rent; it is a ‘limitation’ on rent increases." Western Plaza, LLC. v. Tison , 184 Wash.2d 702, 708, 364 P.3d 76 (2015) (quoting McGahuey v. Hwang , 104 Wash. App. 176, 182, 15 P.3d 672, review denied , 144 Wash.2d 1004, 29 P.3d 718 (2001) ). "[T]he only limitation on increases of any kind found in the MHLTA is the requirement ... that rental rates ... be increased only upon lease expiration and three months’ notice." McGahuey , 104 Wash. App. at 182, 15 P.3d 672. Thus, under former RCW 59.20.090(2), a landlord seeking to increase the rent must do so only upon the expiration of the lease.
¶ 20 Former RCW 59.20.060(1) states that "[a]ny mobile home space tenancy regardless of the term, shall be based upon a written rental agreement, signed by the parties" and shall contain certain terms.5 Where a mobile home space does not have a written rental agreement, the agreement is considered an "implied rental agreement" for a period of one year, renewed automatically for one year. Gillette v. Zakarison , 68 Wash. App. 838, 842, 846 P.2d 574 (1993). Further, a rental agreement exists where tenants live in a mobile park and provide rent to the landlord while using the mobile park based on rules provided by the landlord. See Allen v. Dan and Bill's RV Park , 6 Wash. App. 2d 349, 370, 428 P.3d 376 (2018), review denied , 194 Wash.2d 1010, 452 P.3d 1238 (2019).
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