Tucker Taxi, Inc. v. Schofield
| Decision Date | 02 December 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. A-315,A-315 |
| Parties | TUCKER TAXI, INC., a corporation, Employer, and Maryland Casualty Company, a corporation, Carrier, Petitioners, v. Mary Frances SCHOFIELD, Tommy Schofield, Alice Schofield and Paul Schofield, Claimants, and The Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
J. Nixon Daniel, Jr., of Yonge, Beggs & Lane, Pensacola, for petitioners.
Jones & Harrell, Pensacola, for respondents.
Tucker Taxi, Inc., an employer, and Maryland Casualty Company, its insurance carrier under the Workmen's Compensation Act, F.S.A. § 440.01 et seq., the petitioners, bring this proceeding in certiorari to review an order of the Florida Industrial Commission which reversed an order of a Deputy Commissioner denying dependency benefits to the widow and children of Ernest Joe Schofield, deceased, claiming under the Act.
Schofield was employed as a taxicab driver by Tucker Taxi, Inc. On the Saturday of his death a fellow-employee and superior, one McNally, became informed that Schofield, then on duty, had been speeding in employer's taxicab. Being acquainted with Schofield's employment history of having on several occasions been reprimanded or discharged for drinking while on duty, McNally located and intercepted Schofield to ascertain whether he had been drinking. Upon Schofield's assurance that he had not been drinking and after determining, by following the taxicab operated by Schofield, that if he had in fact been drinking it was apparently not affecting his driving, McNally returned to the company headquarters.
Later in the day Schofield checked in at headquarters at the end of his tour of duty. At that time one Tucker, also a fellow-employee and superior of Schofield, determined from Schofield's mannerisms and actions that he had been drinking. McNally, who was standing nearby, also observed Schofield's actions, was convinced that Schofield was intoxicated, and confronted him with an accusation to that effect. At that point Schofield inquired of McNally, who was employer's manager, whether he was fired, and McNally replied in the affirmative, at the same time inviting Schofield's attention to the posted company rules, one of which provided that an employee drinking on the job would be automatically discharged.
Schofield then requested to be paid his accumulated wages and was informed that it would be necessary for him to wait until the following Monday because the bookkeeper had gone home for the weekend. Thereupon he became so fractious and used such vulgar and obscene language that McNally attempted to escort him to his car. As they reached the office door Schofield made an unprovoked assault upon McNally with his fists. Tucker intervened and terminated this assault, then attempted to escort Schofield to his car in the public street. McNally, standing in the office doorway, saw Schofield assault Tucker and went out on the street to the scene, whereupon Schofield observed McNally, turned Tucker loose, and for the second time assaulted McNally, who countered with several blows upon Schofield with his fists. In the course of that encounter Schofield staggered, slumped to the ground, was taken to the hospital and pronounced dead upon arrival. It is because if this unfortunate death and under these circumstances that Schofield's widow and children sought dependency benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Testimony of medical experts reflects that Schofield had been suffering for some time with a degenerative heart condition known as Brown's Atrophy, which had produced a generally weakened physical condition. While death unquestionably resulted from the blows struck by McNally in the encounter, the uncontradicted medical testimony is that the trauma from the blows was slight and would not have caused death in the absence of the degenerative heart condition.
The Deputy Commissioner found (1) that Schofield was not intoxicated to the extent that he had abandoned his employment and...
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