Tucker v. United States
| Decision Date | 26 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:18-cv-02255-GMN-VCF |
| Parties | KRISTOPHER TUCKER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Pending before the Court is the United States of America's ("the Government's"), Motion to Bifurcate Trial, (ECF No. 21). Plaintiff Kristopher Tucker ("Plaintiff") filed a Response, (ECF No. 23), and the Government filed a Reply, (ECF No. 24).1 Also pending before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment, (ECF Nos. 26, 27), filed by the Government and Plaintiff. Both parties filed Responses, (ECF Nos. 29, 30), and Replies, (ECF Nos. 31, 32), to their respective Motions.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the Government's Motion to Bifurcate Trial, GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
This case arises out of a collision on December 21, 2016, at 7:00 a.m., between Plaintiff and Dale Wayne Owens ("Owens") near the Southern Nevada Veterans Affairs Medical Center ("VA Hospital"). Plaintiff had been driving his motorcycle to work at Nellis Air Force Base,and Owens was driving a vehicle for the VA Hospital's Disabled Veterans Transportation Network as a volunteer. (Dep. Dale Owens at 21, Ex A to Gov.'s Mot. Summ J. ("MSJ"), ECF No. 27-2). The collision occurred when Owens made a left-hand turn to leave the VA Hospital as Plaintiff drove northbound on Pecos Road. (Id. at 31).
On October 2, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an administrative claim to the National Tort Center for the United States to recover compensation for his injuries from the collision. (Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 1). Because the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs had not fully evaluated Plaintiff's claim within six months of receiving it, Plaintiff filed this action with the Court on November 26, 2018, asserting one claim of negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act. (Id. ¶¶ 19-24). Plaintiff asserts that Owens failed to exercise due care when attempting to make a left turn while leaving the VA Hospital, causing Plaintiff to collide with the side of Owens's vehicle. (Id.). Plaintiff named the Government as the defendant since it was the entity who owned, controlled, and maintained the vehicle driven by Owens acting in the scope of his employment as a volunteer for the Department of Veterans Affairs during the incident. (Id.); see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
As litigation proceeded, the parties stipulated to bifurcate deadlines for liability and damages. (Order Granting Stip. Am. Scheduling Order, ECF No. 20). The parties also agreed to defer medical expert discovery "until after liability has been adjudicated." (Id.). The Government thereafter filed the pending Motion to Bifurcate Trial, (ECF No. 21), and both parties moved for summary judgment in their favor.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) permits bifurcation of trial "for convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Courts accordingly may order a separate trial of one or more issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-partyclaims. Id. For example, "[i]t is clear that Rule 42(b) gives courts the authority to separate trials into liability and damage phases." Estate of Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592, 601 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting De Anda v. City of Long Beach, 7 F.3d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1993)). The decision to bifurcate is within the court's discretion. Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could rely to find for the nonmoving party. See id. "The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough 'to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). "Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor." Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the nonmoving party "may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists," Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegationsthat are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
At summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is "to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255. However, if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249-50.
The Government moves to bifurcate this trial into two parts: (1) liability; and (2) damages. Moreover, on the issue of liability, both parties filed motions for summary judgment with Plaintiff's single claim of negligence. The Court's below discussion begins with the appropriateness of bifurcating trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 42(b), then addresses summary judgment.
The Government argues that bifurcating trial into phases of liability and damages will promote convenience, conservation of judicial resources, and preservation of costs by the parties. (Mot. Bifurcate 3:18-20). To support its argument, the Government asserts that trial on liability will likely take one day and require only a few witnesses alongside video evidence, which would not involve significant costs. (Id. 4:12-14). Establishing damages, however, could stretch to around ten days and will require significant funding by both sides to retain various experts—such as a neurologist, orthopedic specialist, life care planner, and economist—warranting expenses likely over $100,000.00. (Id. 3:20-4:21). Plaintiff responds that bifurcation is not appropriate because the issues here of liability and damages are "sointerwoven that they cannot be submitted . . . independently." (Resp. 4:18-20, ECF No. 23).
After considering the guiding factors for bifurcation under FRCP 42(b), the Court grants the Government's request to bifurcate trial into two phases—liability and damages. Central to this decision is that a finding of liability against Plaintiff could resolve the entire...
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