Tuffree v. Inc. Town of State Ctr.

• Decision Date: 19 December 1881
• Citation: 57 Iowa 538,11 N.W. 1
• Parties: TUFFREE v. INCORPORATED TOWN OF STATE CENTRE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

57 Iowa 538

11 N.W. 1

TUFFREE

v.INCORPORATED TOWN OF STATE CENTRE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed December 19, 1881.

Appeal from Marshall district court.

Action to recover for a personal injury. The plaintiff avers that the defendant negligently suffered one of its streets to become obstructed, and that she was thrown from a buggy by reason of the obstruction and received an injury. The defendant denies all negligence upon its part, and avers that the plaintiff's injury, if she received any, was the result of her own negligence. There was a trial by jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.James Allison and Brown & Binford, for appellant.

John M. Parker and O. Caswell, for appellee.

ADAMS, C. J.

Evidence was introduced tending to show that the plaintiff was riding in a buggy with another lady upon one of the streets of State Centre; that while so riding she paused at the house of a friend, having driven near to the gate in front of the house; that a few feet in front of the house where she stopped, a child's rope swing was suspended from the limb of a tree; that the plaintiff, after starting to resume her journey, drove against the swing; that it caught upon a projecting knuckle of the buggy top, and caused the buggy to be tilted, whereby the plaintiff was thrown out and received the injury of which she complains. The jury made certain special findings, which were, in substance, that the swing was at the side of the street near the sidewalk, and between the sidewalk and the traveled portion of the street; that it was daylight at the time, and the swing was in plain view, in front of the plaintiff's horse, and only a few feet ahead when she started; that she had seen the swing, but drove so close to it that it caught upon the buggy, whereby the buggy was stopped and partly overturned. Notwithstanding these findings, the jury rendered a general verdict for the plaintiff. They must have done so, we think, under the supposition that there was some circumstance which was sufficient to excuse the plaintiff in driving against the swing when the same was directly before her and in plain sight. It cannot be said, of course, that she was excusable because the swing was not apparently a dangerous object. If it was not apparently dangerous, then the town was not guilty of negligence in suffering the swing to be there. It seems probable that the jury must have found that the plaintiff's attention was...