Tuller v. Tuller, 84-767
| Decision Date | 23 May 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-767,84-767 |
| Citation | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1293,469 So.2d 212 |
| Parties | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1293 Charles H. TULLER, Appellant, v. Theresa Marie TULLER, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
J. Richard Staley, Orange City, for appellant.
James R. Clayton, of Clayton & Teal, P.A., DeLand, for appellee.
The husband appeals from the final judgment dissolving the marriage between the parties, contending that the court made an inequitable distribution of the marital assets. We affirm.
The marriage lasted approximately nine years and produced no children. It broke up because the husband became enamored of another woman who was bearing his child at the time of the final hearing. Both parties were employed and their net earnings were substantially similar. The trial court awarded no periodic alimony, but used the vehicle of lump sum alimony as a means of making an equitable division of the marital assets. The husband contends that he was shortchanged.
The court found that, with some minor exceptions, all real and personal property, no matter how titled, had been acquired with marital funds and constituted marital property. It also found that non-marital personal property was in the possession of the party to whom it belonged. The wife was awarded the marital home ($75,000 less a mortgage of $49,000 which the wife is required to pay--for a net equity of $26,000); a 1977 Camero ($3,000); an account receivable from members of her family ($3,000); and the furnishings in the marital home. The husband was awarded two automobiles and a motorcycle ($2,200); a vacant lot ($5,000); all mechanic's tools and woodworking tools acquired during the marriage ($7,500); and an antique pitcher and wash basin.
Lump sum alimony is a viable tool for an equitable division of marital property. Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So.2d 203 (Fla.1985). Although the husband contends he was shortchanged and at first blush this contention appears sustainable, the trial court found that the husband was responsible for the loss of approximately $29,000 of marital funds through investments in the silver market and this was a factor which the court could have taken into consideration in determining how to divide the property. We will not disturb his findings on factual matters. Conner v. Conner, 439 So.2d 887 (Fla.1983). Equitable division does not necessarily mean equal division Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So.2d 1372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The trial court could have concluded that the husband was more responsible than the wife for the poor economic condition in which the parties found themselves because of his large losses in the silver market. Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So.2d 1016 (Fla.1979). In the light of the evidence here, we do not find an abuse of discretion such as would warrant our reversal of the trial court's determination of what division of assets is equitable. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980).
AFFIRMED.
This case involves equitable distribution of marital assets.
During their nine-year marriage the parties had no children. Each party works; weekly the husband grosses $192.80 and nets $164.34; the wife grosses $217.60 and nets $200.17. All assets of the parties constitute marital property acquired by the joint and several efforts of the parties during the marriage except the husband owned his tools as separate property before the marriage. The jointly owned marital home was the main asset of value, the parties' equity being worth $26,000. The trial judge distributed the marital property as follows:
To the wife: equity in the house, $26,000; 1977 Camaro automobile, $3,000; furniture, $5,000; accounts receivable $3,000, for a total value of $37,000.
To the husband: vacant lot, $5,000; husband's tools (his separate property--value $5,000-$7,500); 1973 El Camino, 1960 Valiant, 1970 Honda motorcycle, $2,200;...
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