Las Tunas Beach Geologic Hazard Abatement Dist. v. Superior Court

Decision Date28 September 1995
Docket NumberNo. B090779,B090779
Citation45 Cal.Rptr.2d 529,38 Cal.App.4th 1002
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7658, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,045 LAS TUNAS BEACH GEOLOGIC HAZARD ABATEMENT DISTRICT, and the Board of Directors of the Las Tunas Beach Geologic Hazard Abatement District, Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; The CITY OF MALIBU, Real Party in Interest.

Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Carl K. Newton, General Counsel, Los Angeles, Virginia R. Pesola, Los Angeles and Mary R. Gayle, Camarillo, for petitioners.

No appearance by respondent.

Christi Hogin, City Attorney (Malibu), for real party in interest.

KLEIN, Presiding Justice.

Petitioners Las Tunas Beach Geologic Hazard Abatement District and the Board of Directors thereof (the District) seek a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the District's motion for summary judgment and to enter instead an order granting the motion.

The essential issue is whether real party in interest City of Malibu (the City) was entitled in the resolution forming the District to reserve the right to dissolve the District, and whether the City thereafter could order dissolution of the District pursuant to that condition of formation.

Because the Cortese-Knox Local Government Reorganization Act of 1985 (Cortese-Knox) (Gov.Code, § 56000 et seq.) prescribes the exclusive procedure for dissolution of a geologic hazard abatement district (GHAD), the condition purporting to reserve to the City the right to order dissolution of the District is unenforceable. The petition therefore is granted.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a prior action (the Ticor action), the State sued individual owners of property at Las Tunas Beach, Ticor, which sold lots to the owner parties, and several insurance carriers which insured title to the properties. That action sought removal of eight steel groins on Las Tunas Beach which had eroded since their installation 60 or more years ago. The matter concluded in a settlement which, inter alia, required Ticor to pay certain monies to abate the hazard.

On October 22, 1991, the City adopted a formation resolution pursuant to Public Resources Code section 26500 et seq., creating the District, which is a GHAD within City boundaries. Apparently, the District was formed by the City in an expeditious manner to avoid jeopardizing the payment from Ticor. The formation resolution contained various conditions, including one which permitted the City to dissolve the District if the City found the District's plan to abate the hazard was not feasible or would not serve the purposes of state law.

In April 1993, the City adopted a resolution which, inter alia, found the proposed plan would not serve the purposes of the Public Resources Code and that the adverse environmental consequences associated with the project would far outweigh any benefit to be achieved in terms of restoration of the beach and protection of the beachfront homes. The dissolution resolution purported to order the District's board of directors to proceed forthwith with dissolution of the District.

On April 4, 1994, the District filed a declaratory relief action seeking a judicial determination the City lacked jurisdiction or authority to order the District to dissolve and a permanent injunction enjoining the City from attempting to exercise any jurisdiction or authority over the District.

On October 6, 1994, the District filed a motion for summary judgment. It argued: it was a valid entity of the State of California constituted pursuant to Public Resources Code section 26500 et seq.; the procedures for formation of a GHAD set forth in section 26500 et seq. are exclusive; and, the City acted in excess of the authority granted it by section 26500 et seq. by imposing conditions on formation of the District and in adopting a resolution ordering the District to dissolve, which actions were void ab initio.

In opposition, the City contended: the District's action was time-barred; the City was entitled to impose conditions on the formation of the District which were not in conflict with state law; the conditions of formation were not severable from the formation resolution, so that if the conditions were invalid, so was the resolution of formation; and in any event, the District should be estopped from denying it was bound by the conditions since the proponents of the formation induced the City to adopt the formation resolution by representing the District would be bound by the conditions.

On February 3, 1995, the trial court denied the District's motion for summary judgment. It ruled: "It is clear that [the District] was permitted to form in an accelerated fashion by Malibu only through [the District's] willingness to agree to a number of things.... Most noteworthy is the provision ... that Malibu could compel dissolution if it found [the District's] modified plan inadequate: ... [p] ... [p] [The District] would appear to be blocked by equitable estoppel. [The District] needed ... to be approved and formed in order to get the settlement money from Ticor.... [The City] alleges that [the District] convinced the City Council it would abide by the conditions set forth as long as a 'limited GHAD' was formed.... Based on such facts, [the District] must be estopped from asserting that the conditions are invalid."

The District filed the instant petition. We issued an alternative writ.

CONTENTIONS

The District repeats its trial court assertions: it cannot be estopped from asserting lack of jurisdiction; the conditions purporting to authorize the City to exercise jurisdiction over the District were void ab initio and therefore the conditions cannot be validated by a curative statute or by the passage of time; and, the City's contract theory is without merit.

The City continues to argue the instant action is time-barred; the City may impose conditions on the formation of a district which are not in conflict with state law; the conditions are not severable from the formation resolution; and, the trial court properly concluded the District is estopped to deny it is bound by the conditions.

We address the relevant issues in the discussion, post.

DISCUSSION
1. In Cortese-Knox, the Legislature enacted a broad comprehensive statutory scheme dealing with the formation and dissolution of districts. 1

In Cortese-Knox, at Government Code section 56000 et seq., the Legislature enacted a broad statutory scheme covering changes of organization of districts as well as cities. 2 Government Code section 56100 declares in pertinent part "this division provides the sole and exclusive authority and procedure for the initiation, conduct, and completion of changes of organization and reorganization for cities and districts." A change of organization In Ferrini v. City of San Luis Obispo (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 239, 197 Cal.Rptr. 694, involving MORGA, the predecessor to Cortese-Knox, the municipality completed the annexation of Ferrini's acreage in accordance with the statutory scheme. Thereafter, the electorate approved a charter amendment requiring voter approval of annexations, a special election was held on the Ferrini annexation and the annexation was rejected. Ferrini brought a declaratory relief action. The trial court held the charter amendment was unconstitutional and the annexation was valid and effective. (Id., at pp. 242-243, 197 Cal.Rptr. 694.)

                is defined as any of the following:  city incorporation and disincorporation, district formation and dissolution, annexation to or detachment from a city or district, consolidation of cities or special districts, and a merger or establishment of a subsidiary district.  (Gov.Code, § 56021.)   District dissolution is defined as "the dissolution, disincorporation, extinguishment, and termination of the existence of a district and the cessation of all its corporate powers, except for the purpose of winding up the affairs of the district."  (Gov.Code, § 56035.)   Thus, the Legislature has established a comprehensive scheme governing district formation and dissolution
                

The reviewing court affirmed. It held: "[T]he municipal charter may not contain provisions pertaining to annexation which are contrary to the general laws of statewide application. 'The annexation of territory to a city is governed by the general laws of the state and is not a municipal affair [citation], ...' [p] The intention of the state Legislature to occupy the field in annexation procedures is evidenced by its declaration that MORGA shall provide the exclusive method for changes of organization ... which include annexations.... '[W]here the statute contains express provisions indicating that the Legislature intends its regulations to be exclusive within a certain field, local government may not legislate in that field.' " (Ferrini, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 247, 197 Cal.Rptr. 694.)

Unlike Ferrini, where the voters attempted to overrule a previously approved and completed annexation process, in L.I.F.E. Committee v. City of Lodi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1139, 1148, 262 Cal.Rptr. 166, the voters attempted to reserve the right to halt annexation before it could commence. L.I.F.E. Committee held "[e]ither scheme interferes with and frustrates state annexation procedures and cannot be sustained." (Ibid.)

a. Overview of proceedings pursuant to Cortese-Knox.

Pursuant to Cortese-Knox, a local agency formation commission (LAFCO) exists within each county. (Gov.Code, §§ 56027, 56325.) The role of LAFCO is to "review and approve or disapprove with or without amendment, wholly, partially, or conditionally, proposals for changes of organization or reorganization." (Gov.Code, § 56375, subd. (a).)

Proceedings before LAFCO "for a change of organization or a reorganization may be initiated by petition or by resolution of...

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