Tupper v. Hancock

• Decision Date: 07 January 1946
• Parties: TUPPER v. HANCOCK et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

319 Mass. 105

64 N.E.2d 441

TUPPER

v.HANCOCK et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Jan. 7, 1946.

Petition by Alton F. Tupper, administrator, for instructions as to whether judgment creditors of decedent, who had given releases to administrator, were entitled to share in distribution of additional assets of estate. From a decree that releases did not bar judgment creditors from participating in the distribution, Grenville L. Hancock and another, executors, appeal.

Decree reversed with directions.Appeal from Probate Court, Middlesex County; Poland, Judge.

Before FIELD, C. J., and LUMMUS, DOLAN, RONAN, and SPALDING, JJ.

J. P. Sullivan, of Boston, for Hancock and another.

C. C. Steadman, of Boston, for Stanton and others.

SPALDING, Justice.

The question here is whether the appellees Stanton and Mitchell are barred from participating in a distribution made in the estate of Francis C. Adams by reason of releases given by them to the administrator of the estate. The judge of probate entered a decree that they were not barred, and the case comes here on the appeal of the executors of the late Thurber C. Adams, a creditor and one of the next of kin of Francis C. Adams. The judge made no finding of material facts, but there was a report of the evidence. See G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 215, § 12. The relevant facts disclosed by the evidence and not disputed are these: On April 29, 1935, Alton F. Tupper, hereinafter called Tupper, was appointed administrator of the estate of Francis C. Adams, late of Arlington, county of Middlesex. Thereafter, in 1936, Tupper represented the estate as probably insolvent, Stanton and Mitchell were judgment creditors of the estate, and their claims were allowed on May 19, 1938, in the amounts of $1,949.67 and $1,644.25 repectively. (On December 12, 1938, the order of allowance was revoked as to Mitchell's claim and it was allowed in the amount of $874.64.) In June, 1938, the appellees file a petition in the Probate Court seeking the removal of Tupper as administrator because of his alleged improper conduct in the handling of the estate. Shortly thereafter they also filed a petition asking that Tupper's first account, which had been allowed on May 19, 1938, be reopened for the correction of errors. On November 9 and 10, 1938, Stanton and Mitchell respectively executed and delivered to Tupper releases in substantially the same form, one of which is set forth in the footnote. ¹

On November 21, 1938 on motions of the appellees their petitions to remove Tupper and to reopen the first account were dismissed. On the following day one Kennedy, representing Tupper, turned over to Steadman, an attorney acting for the appellees, Tupper's personal check for $200. In return for this check Steadman delivered to Kennedy the following receipt: ‘November 22, 1938 Received of H. F. Kennedy check of Alton F. Tupper for Two Hundred Dollars ($200) in accordance with releases executed by Ann Stanton and Arthur F. Mitchell. Chester C. Steadman.’ In January, 1939, pursuant to an order of the Probate Court, a distribution of slightly less than forty per cent was made to all creditors of the estate (including the appellees) whose claims had been allowed.

In October, 1943, new and further assets in the amount of $3,407.30 come into the Adams estate as a result of a distribution from an estate of relatives of Adams. These were sufficient to pay in full the claims of all creditors, including those of the appellees, leaving a small balance for the next of kin. The present appeal arises out of a petition for instructions brought in the Probate Court by Tupper to determine whether, in view of the releases mentioned above, the appellees were entitled to participate in the distribution of the additional assets.

The decree appealed from is erroneous.

Although it does not appear in the record that seals as such were attached to the releases, there is a recital in each that it was sealed. This gave the releases the legal effect of sealed instruments. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 4, § 9A; Glendale Coal Co. v. Nesson, 312 Mass. 293, 294, 44 N.E.2d 691. We thus have general releases under seal which, if free from fraud, are sufficiently comprehensive to bar the claims of the appellees provided they had the legal effect of releasing the estate of Francis C. Adams. No contention is made by the appellees that any fraud or misrepresentation was practised upon them with respect to the releases. Nor do the present proceedings seek to reform them on the ground of mutual mistake. See Barrell v. Britton, 252 Mass. 504, 148 N.E. 134;Crowley v. Holdsworth, 264 Mass. 303, 308, 162 N.E. 334. It may well be that, when the releases were delivered, no one had in mind the possibility that the estate would receive additional assets. But the subsequent acquisition of such assets by the estate did not change the lagal effect of the releases. They contained general and comprehensive language which is not to be limited merely because of the happening of a contingency which might not have been contemplated by the parties when they were executed. Radovsky v. Wexler, 273 Mass. 254, 257, 173 N.E. 409;Willett v. Herrick, 258 Mass. 585, 595, 155 N.E. 589;Klopot v. Metropolitan Stock Exchange, 188 Mass. 335, 337, 74 N.E. 596. Where, as here, the releases were absolute and unequivocal in their terms, they cannot be explained by parol evidence and must be construed according to the language that the parties have seen fit to use. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Hale, 315 Mass. 556, 559, 53 N.E.2d 675;Miller v. Gane, 288 Mass. 57, 58, 192 N.E. 313. If any existing liability was intended to be excepted, it should have been expressly set forth in the releases. Radovsky v. Wexler, 273 Mass. 254, 258, 173 N.E. 409;Deland v. Amesbury Woolen & Cotton Mfg. Co., 7 Pick. 244, 246. We need not discuss the evidence which was introduced in the court below with respect to Tupper's...