Turley v. Rednour
| Decision Date | 25 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 09-cv-829-SCW |
| Parties | GREGORY J. TURLEY, Plaintiff, v. DAVID REDNOUR, JEANETTE COWAN, BETSY SPILLER, MARC QUILLMAN, MICHAEL SCHNICKER, and DONALD LINDENBERG Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
I. Introduction
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 131). Specifically, Defendants David Rednour, Jeannette Cowan, Betsy Spiller, Marc Quillman, and Michael Schnicker seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claim, while Defendant Donald Lindenberg argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's excessive force claim. Plaintiff has filed a Response in opposition to the motion (Doc. 144). Based on the following, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 131).
II. Background
The claims that remain in this case, which Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment on, are Plaintiff's retaliation claim against Defendants Cowan, Rednour, and Spiller for Defendants moving Plaintiff to protective custody, a retaliation claim against Defendants Quillman and Schnicker for writing a false disciplinary ticket against him, and an excessive force claim againstDefendant Lindenberg for slamming the cell door too loudly causing Plaintiff injury to his hearing.1 The following facts are derived from the parties' briefs and exhibits.
On August 4, 2009, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Defendant Cowan with two grievances regarding the retaliation Plaintiff was experiencing from personnel.2 The letter informed Defendant Cowan that Plaintiff was "under attack by personnel at this facility" and that it was his intention "to go to Protective Custody here in the very near future as [his] life is in danger" due to attacks by staff (Doc. 89 Ex. V). The attached grievances alleged that Plaintiff had been transferred to the South Lower Cellhouse in retaliation, and due in part to a conspiracy to retaliate against him, by numerous employees and that employees were improperly promoted and were not qualified for their current positions . The grievances listed Defendant Spiller as one employee that was conspiring against him (Doc. 144 Exs. B & C). Defendant Cowan contacted Defendant Rednour, the acting Shift Commander, about Plaintiff's concerns and protective custody request which she had construed from the letter (Doc. 144 Ex. I at ¶¶ 3 & 21). Plaintiff was moved to protective custody on August 6, 2009. Neither Defendant Cowan nor Defendant Rednour informed the Warden of Plaintiff's transfer (Doc. 144 Ex. F at ¶ 14; Ex. I at ¶¶ 21 & 22).
On August 9, 2009, while in protective custody, Defendant Quillman wrote a disciplinary ticket charging Plaintiff with Damage or Misuse of Property, Intimidation or Threats and Insolence (Doc. 1 Ex. F). The incident report indicates that Defendant Quillman was passing out toilet paper to inmates, including Plaintiff, and after handing Plaintiff a roll of toilet paper and while Defendant Quillman was walking away, Plaintiff threw the roll on the gallery and began cussing atDefendant Quillman (Id.). Defendant Quillman wrote the disciplinary ticket and listed Defendant Schnicker as a witness (Id.). Defendant Quillman was assigned to North 1 back of 4 Gallery of August 9, 2009, and it was his job duty to pass out weekly supplies of toilet paper (Id.; Doc. 144 Ex. J at ¶¶ 3, 8, & 15).
On September 1, 2009, Plaintiff was taken to an interview with Internal Affairs Investigator Thomas regarding Plaintiff's "Enemy List", a list of several staff members that Plaintiff considered his enemies (Doc. 144 Ex. Q). Defendant Lindenberg was one of the individuals named on Plaintiff's list (Id.). Lindenberg was in charge of the Infirmary Area Bull Pen on the date that Plaintiff was held in the Bull Pen while awaiting his interview with Thomas. Lindenberg placed Plaintff, who was handcuffed, in the Bull Pen (Doc. 71 at ¶ 26). Plaintiff alleges that while waiting in the Bull Pen to go back to his cell, Lindenberg yelled and cursed at Plaintiff and after removing another inmate from the Bull Pen, Lindenberg slammed the steel door causing harm to Plaintiff's ears.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary Judgment is proper only "if the admissible evidence considered as a whole shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Dynegy Mktg. &Trade v. Multi Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)(citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a)); see also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005).. The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating - based on the pleadings, affidavits, and/or information obtained via discovery - the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
After a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. LibertyLobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)(quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)(2)).3 A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Ballance v. City of Springfield, Illinois Police Department, 424 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2005); Hottenroth v. Village of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovent's petition is insufficient; a party will be successful in opposing summary judgment only when it presents definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Abiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 931-32 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted).
On summary judgment, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court adopts reasonable inferences and resolves doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Id.; Nat'l Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d at 512. Even if the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate when the information before the court reveals that "alternate inferences can be drawn from the available evidence." Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Anderer v. Jones, 385 F.3d 1043, 1064 (7th Cir. 2004).IV. Analysis
A prisoner has a right under the First Amendment to challenge the conditions of his confinement by filing grievances, and prison officials are not allowed to retaliate against an inmate for exercising his First Amendment Rights. See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000)(citing Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1996)). In order to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was "engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment" and that he "suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future." Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff must also demonstrate that "his speech was at least a motivating factor in the [defendant's] action" in order to make his prima facie case. Zellner v. Herrick, 639 F.3d 371, 378-79 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006)). However, once Plaintiff has made his prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendant "to rebut with evidence that the [defendant's animus] though a sufficient condition was not a necessary condition of the conduct, i.e. it would have happened anyway." Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff "must then demonstrate that the defendant's proffered reasons for the decision were pretextual and that the retaliatory animus was the real reason for the decision." Zellner, 639 F.3d at 379. At the summary judgment stage of proceedings, "mere speculation" on the plaintiff's part is insufficient; instead, a plaintiff must come forward with some evidence of causation. Rockwell Automation, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 544 F.3d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff also alleges in his Complaint that the acts of retaliation taken against him were part of a larger conspiracy by the Defendants to retaliate against him. A claim of civil conspiracy is actionable but is not an independent basis for liability under § 1983. See Lewis v. Washington, 300F.3d 829, 831 (7th Cir. 2002); Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008). In order for liability to attach to a conspiracy claim, the "defendants must conspire to deny plaintiffs their constitutional rights." Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 1996). In order to succeed on his conspiracy to retaliate claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the defendants had an express or implied agreement to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and (2) he was deprived of his constitutional rights by defendants' overt actions in furtherance of the agreement. Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2003); Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1988).
Defendants Rednour, Cowan, and Spiller argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claim for being placed in protective custody because there is no evidence that Defendants were motivated by Plaintiff's grievances and Plaintiff, himself, asked to be moved to protective custody in his grievances. Plaintiff, however, has offered evidence that Cowan, Rednour, and Spiller conspired to retaliate against him because he submitted grievances to Defendant Cowan complaining about several staff employees prior to his being transferred to protective custody. He also has pointed to evidence...
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