Turner v. Hammocks Beach Corp.

Decision Date28 August 2009
Docket NumberNo. 450A08.,450A08.
PartiesHarriett Hurst TURNER and John Henry Hurst v. The HAMMOCKS BEACH CORPORATION, Nancy Sharpe Caird, Seth Dickman Sharpe, Susan Spear Sharpe, William August Sharpe, North Carolina State Board of Education, and Roy A. Cooper, III, in his capacity as Attorney General of the State of North Carolina.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

The Francis Law Firm, PLLC, by Charles T. Francis, Raleigh, for plaintiff-appellants.

Hunton & Williams LLP, by Frank E. Emory, Jr., Charlotte, for defendant-appellee The Hammocks Beach Corporation.

NEWBY, Justice.

This case presents two issues. First we must determine whether the trial court's interlocutory order denying defendant's motion to dismiss is suitable for immediate appellate review. If that order is immediately appealable, we must then decide whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. We hold that the interlocutory order at issue affects a substantial right of defendant, and we therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the order is immediately appealable. We further hold that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief might be granted, and thus the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss.

The controversy at hand arises out of the creation of a trust, which accompanied a real estate transaction that took place in 1950. Dr. William Sharpe owned 810 acres of property in Onslow County known as "The Hammocks," and he intended to devise The Hammocks to his friends John and Gertrude Hurst. Upon learning of Dr. Sharpe's intentions, Ms. Hurst, who had formerly been a teacher in the then-racially-segregated public school system, requested that Dr. Sharpe instead make a charitable gift of the property for the benefit of African-American educators and youth organizations. In accordance with Ms. Hurst's wishes, Dr. Sharpe deeded The Hammocks to the nonprofit Hammocks Beach Corporation "in trust for recreational and educational purposes for the use and benefit of the members of The North Carolina Teachers Association, Inc. and such others as are provided for in the Charter of the Hammocks Beach Corporation, Inc." That charter stated that the corporation's purpose was to administer The Hammocks "primarily for the teachers in public and private elementary, secondary and collegiate institutions for Negroes in North Carolina ... and for such other groups as are hereinafter set forth."

Anticipating that circumstances might arise making it impossible or impracticable to use The Hammocks for the trust purposes, the 1950 deed stated:

IT IS FURTHER PROVIDED AND DIRECTED by the said grantors, parties of the first part, that if at any time in the future it becomes impossible or impractical to use said property and land for the use as herein specified and if such impossibility or impracticability shall have been declared to exist by a vote of the Majority of the directors of the Hammocks Beach Corporation, Inc., the property conveyed herein may be transferred to The North Carolina State Board of Education, to be held in trust for the purpose herein set forth, and if the North Carolina State Board of Education shall refuse to accept such property for the purpose of continuing the trust herein declared, all of the property herein conveyed shall be deeded by said Hammocks Beach Corporation, Inc. to Dr. William Sharpe, his heirs and descendants and to John Hurst and Gertrude Hurst, their heirs and descendants; The Hurst family shall have the mainland property and the Sharpe family shall have the beach property. ...

As of 1987, the North Carolina Attorney General had advised that the State Board of Education had "no interest in succeeding Hammocks Beach Corporation as trustee and would not agree to do so." The Attorney General and the State Board of Education thus moved to be dismissed as parties from the present action, and the trial court entered an order granting that motion on 24 August 2007.

In 1986 the Hammocks Beach Corporation filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to quiet title to The Hammocks and ensure fulfillment of the purposes of the trust created by Dr. Sharpe. According to the complaint in the instant case, in response to the 1986 request for declaratory relief,

the Sharpe and Hurst heirs contended that fulfillment of the trust terms had become impossible or impracticable, that The Hammocks Beach Corporation had acted capriciously and contrary to the intent of the settlor in not declaring its recognition of such, and that the court should declare the trust terminated and either mandate a conveyance of all of the property to the Sharpe and Hurst families or adjudicate title in their names.

Prior to trial in the 1986 action, the parties reached a settlement and signed a consent judgment, which was entered by the trial court on 29 October 1987 ("the 1987 consent judgment" or "the consent judgment").

Plaintiffs brought this action in December 2006, alleging that "fulfillment of the trust terms has become impossible or impracticable" and seeking an accounting, termination of the trust, and damages for breach of fiduciary duty. On 5 July 2007, before any discovery in the case, defendant filed a motion under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, asserting that the issue of plaintiffs' rights to the property now in question (a portion of The Hammocks) had already been determined by the 1987 consent judgment and that relitigation is barred by collateral estoppel. The trial court entered an order denying defendant's motion to dismiss on 23 August 2007. Defendant sought review, and the Court of Appeals concluded the order was immediately appealable. The Court of Appeals went on to reverse the trial court's order, holding that defendant's motion to dismiss should have been granted.

We begin our review by determining whether the interlocutory order denying defendant's motion to dismiss is immediately appealable. "Interlocutory orders are those made during the pendency of an action which do not dispose of the case, but instead leave it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy." Carriker v. Carriker, 350 N.C. 71, 73, 511 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1999) (citing Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)). As a general rule, interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable. Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 524, 631 S.E.2d 114, 119 (2006). However, "immediate appeal of interlocutory orders and judgments is available in at least two instances": when the trial court certifies, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay of the appeal; and when the interlocutory order affects a substantial right under N.C.G.S. §§ 1-277(a) and 7A-27 (d)(1). Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 161-62, 522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999).

The trial court did not certify for immediate review its order denying defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant's argument in favor of appealability is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a claim for relief affects a substantial right when the motion to dismiss makes a colorable assertion that the claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We agree. Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, "parties and parties in privity with them ... are precluded from retrying fully litigated issues that were decided in any prior determination and were necessary to the prior determination." King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 356, 200 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1973) (citations omitted). The doctrine is designed to prevent repetitious lawsuits, and parties have a substantial right to avoid litigating issues that have already been determined by a final judgment. We therefore hold that a substantial right was affected by the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss, and we proceed to the merits of defendant's appeal.

The remaining issue before this Court is whether plaintiffs' claims for relief are, in fact, barred under the collateral estoppel doctrine. To successfully assert collateral estoppel as a bar to plaintiffs' claims, defendant

would need to show that the earlier suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits, that the issue in question was identical to an issue actually litigated and necessary to the judgment, and that both [defendant] and [plaintiffs] were either parties to the earlier suit or were in privity with parties.

Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 429, 349 S.E.2d 552, 557 (1986) (citing King, 284 N.C. at 357-60, 200 S.E.2d at 805-08).

We begin our consideration of the merits of defendant's collateral estoppel claim by determining whether the issue of plaintiffs' remaining rights in the contested land is identical to an issue already decided by the 1987 consent judgment. If the consent judgment fully extinguished all of plaintiffs' rights in the land, then collateral estoppel bars litigation of whether plaintiffs retain any rights in the property. We emphasize at the outset that we are reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). When ruling on such a motion to dismiss, the trial court is to treat the plaintiff's factual allegations as true. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 362 N.C. 431, 442, 666 S.E.2d 107, 114 (2008) (citing Stein v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 360 N.C. 321,...

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