Turner v. Harris

• Decision Date: 02 August 1955
• Citation: 198 Tenn. 654,281 S.W.2d 661,2 McCanless 654
• Parties: Annie P. TURNER v. R. Lester HARRIS et ux. 2 McCanless 654, 198 Tenn. 654, 281 S.W.2d 661
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 661

281 S.W.2d 661

Annie P. TURNER v. R. Lester HARRIS et ux.

2 McCanless 654, 198 Tenn. 654, 281 S.W.2d 661

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Aug. 2, 1955.

Carmack Cochran and Martin & Cochran, Nashville, for appellant.

Elkin Garfinkle and Alvin M. Brandt, Nashville, for appellees.

NEIL, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by Annie P. Turner, from the action of the Chancellor in sustaining the demurrer of R. Lester Harris and wife, to complainant's bill seeking a permanent injunction to restrain them from transferring or incumbering certain described property of which they are alleged to be the owners.

The bill alleges that she sustained personal injuries as the result of the admitted negligence of the defendant, Mrs. Thelma W. Harris. The negligence complained of was the failure of Mrs. Harris to observe a stop sign before entering an arterial highway, and as the proximate result of such negligence in operating her automobile she collided with the automobile which complainant was driving upon the arterial street or highway. The resulting damage was $10,000 for personal injuries and $1,000 as damages to her automobile. The bill further alleges that she and her husband had brought suit in the Circuit Court of Davidson County against Harris and wife for the injuries and damages growing out of said accident, Mrs. Annie P. Turner suing for $35,000 damages and her husband, James R. Turner, suing to recover the sum of $15,000 for loss of services, hospital and medical expenses.

At the time of the accident the defendant, Mrs. Harris, stated that she and her husband had two automobiles; the one involved in the accident was not covered by any public liability insurance policy, while the other, which belonged to them, was covered by insurance. The bill further alleges that as a result of the foregoing situation the defendants could not comply with the Financial Responsibility Law of the State of Tennessee, Chapter 206 of the Acts of 1951, Code Section 2715.49 et seq., by exhibiting an insurance policy as required by law, and that the said defendants should be required to give a financial responsibility bond as provided by statute, or deposit with the Commissioner of Safety of the State the sum of $11,000 in cash. The complainant further alleged that she had fully complied with the Financial Responsibility Law by filing proper affidavits as to the extent of her damage.

The defendants are alleged to be the owners of three tracts of land in Davidson County, for which they paid a total purchase price of $33,500 and that the complainant, Mrs. Annie P. Turner, has an equitable lien upon said real estate to require a compliance with the Financial Responsibility Law 'to the end that her claim for damages could be satisfied; and that unless her lien is perfected that the defendants could transfer and dispose of their property and thus defeat her right to damages.'

It is further alleged in the bill that complainants 'had no adequate remedy at law to prevent conveyances by the defendants.'

The bill prayed for an injunction to restrain the defendants from transferring or incumbering the property described. The writ of injunction was accordingly issued as prayed for in the bill.

The defendants demurred to the bill on the following grounds:

'There is no equity on the face of the bill because the complainant asserts no basis for a lien on defendants' property and there is no legal or equitable grounds for an injunction restraining the defendants from their control or disposition of their property.'

The Chancellor sustained the demurrer, and complainant appealed assigning the action of the Chancellor as error.

The question to be decided is clearly stated on the brief of appellant as follows:

'Where 'C' has been injured through the unlawful and negligent operation of an automobile by 'D' who is without public liability insurance, but who has substantial real property, does the Chancery Court have jurisdiction to protect the property rights of 'C' by preventing 'D' from encumbering or disposing of his property until he has complied with the Financial Responsibility Law of Tennessee by giving bond or posting cash with the Commissioner of Safety for the ultimate benefit of 'C'?' (Emphasis supplied by counsel.)

Following this correct statement of the issue the counsel make the following frank admission: 'The question is novel. The question is new. It has never before been passed upon by any Court of last resort, so far as we have been able to discover.'

We approach the consideration of the issue with eagerness because it is novel and is apparently without precedent.

The 'Financial Responsibility Law', which is the basis of the complainant's suit, was enacted by the Legislature in 1951 and is carried into the Code at 2715.49 et seq. These Code Sections reflect the public policy of the State and are enforceable in the exercise of the State's police power. The statute is in derogation of the common law.

The demurrer admits the following allegations in the bill: (1) that the complainant was injured, and sustained damages specified, as a direct result of the unlawful act of Mrs. Thelma Harris in operating her automobile; (2) that the defendant is required to comply with the Financial Responsibility Law as charged in the bill; (3) that the defendants have failed to comply therewith, although financially able to do so, the said Thelma Harris being the owner of two pieces of real estate for which she paid $17,000; and (4) that complainant fully complied with the law.

The several Code Sections upon which the complainant relies, and which are pertinent to the issue now before us, are the following (we refer to the sections in the order in which they are discussed in the complainant's brief).

Section 2715.51 (Code Supplement) provides in substance that the operator of a motor vehicle, which is in any manner involved in an accident in which any person is killed or injured, or in which damage to property of any one person, including himself, in excess of $50 is sustained shall within ten days after such accident report the matter in writing to the Commissioner of Safety. The operator or owner shall make such other and additional reports relating to such accident as the Commissioner shall require.

Section 2715.52 (Code Supplement) provides in substance that the Commissioner, within sixty days after receipt of a motor vehicle accident report, shall revoke the license of each operator and all registrations of each owner of a motor vehicle in any manner involved in such accident, unless such operator or owner, or both, shall show financial responsibility for the accident.

Section 2715.49, subd. N, (Code Supplement) provides that financial responsibility may be only shown (1) by filing written proof of insurance coverage with the Commissioner on forms approved by the Commission; or (2) the deposit of cash with the Commissioner in the amount of $11,000 or in the total amount of all damages suffered whichever is less; or (3) the execution and filing of a bond with the Commissioner; or (4) by submitting to the Commissioner of notarized releases executed by all parties who had previously filed claims with the Department of Safety as a result of the accident.

The statute further provides that money deposited with the Commissioner in compliance with the Act shall be applicable only to the payment of any judgment rendered against the party making the deposit. If no court action is brought within one year after the accident the money deposited shall be returned to the one depositing it.

The requirements of the Act, as to showing of financial responsibility, does not apply to any owner or operator who submits satisfactory proof to the Commissioner that he has settled all claims against him resulting from the accident.

Section 2715.61 makes it unlawful to reregister any vehicle, the registration of...