Turner v. Hooks, 2016–0788

• Decision Date: 24 January 2018
• Docket Number: No. 2016–0788,2016–0788
• Citation: 152 Ohio St.3d 559,99 N.E.3d 354,2018 Ohio 556
• Parties: TURNER, Appellee, v. HOOKS, Warden, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

152 Ohio St.3d 559

99 N.E.3d 354

2018 Ohio 556

TURNER, Appellee,

v.HOOKS, Warden, Appellant.

No. 2016–0788

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted May 2, 2017

Decided January 24, 2018.^*

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Eric Hedrick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Stephanie Watson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} The Fourth District Court of Appeals granted a writ of habeas corpus to appellee, Denelle Turner, ordering his immediate discharge from the Ross Correctional Institution. We reverse.

Background

{¶ 2} On August 13, 2008, the state filed a complaint charging Turner with murder by means of a firearm. Turner was 17 years old at the time of the offense, so the complaint was filed in the Juvenile Branch of the Domestic Relations Division of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The state then filed a motion to transfer the matter to the general division of the common pleas court, to try Turner as an adult, which the juvenile court granted.

{¶ 3} Turner was convicted of murder and sentenced to prison. State v. Turner , Franklin C.P. No. 08CR–8193 (Oct. 6, 2010). The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Turner , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP–1051, 2011-Ohio-3705, 2011 WL 3210054. On January 8, 2015, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Mark Hooks, warden of the Ross Correctional Institution, in the Fourth District Court of Appeals. He argued that the general division of the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to try him because the juvenile court had failed to meet the requirements of R.C. 2152.12(G) before transferring his case.

{¶ 4} R.C. 2152.12(G) requires the juvenile court to give written notice of the time, place, and purpose of a hearing "to the child's parents, guardian, or other custodian and to the child's counsel at least three days prior to the hearing." Prior to Turner's bindover hearing, the court served that notice upon his biological mother, Tara Turner. The juvenile court also gave notice to Derrick Wilford, as Turner's father, although his paternity has apparently not been established. See 2016-Ohio-3083, 55 N.E.3d 1133, ¶ 25. Regardless of Wilford's paternity status, service upon Tara Turner alone would be sufficient. R.C. 1.43(A) (the "singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular"); see also State v. Reynolds , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP–915, 2007-Ohio-4178, 2007 WL 2325679, ¶ 11–12 (holding that interpreting the statute to require service on two parents in all circumstances would be illogical).

{¶ 5} However, in October 2005, the Franklin County Juvenile Court had awarded legal custody of Turner to his grandmother, Sylvia Watts. Although she remained legal custodian at the time of the transfer hearing, Watts was not given notice of the hearing. In his habeas petition, Turner argued that the failure to notify his legal custodian was a violation of R.C. 2152.12(G) and as a result, the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the matter.

{¶ 6} The court of appeals agreed that the failure to serve Watts prior to the bindover hearing was a jurisdictional defect. The court issued a writ of habeas corpus to compel Turner's immediate release. 2016-Ohio-3083, 55 N.E.3d 1133, at ¶ 64.

{¶ 7} Hooks appealed. We stayed the appellate court's order pending review. 146 Ohio St.3d 1462, 2016-Ohio-4968, 54 N.E.3d 173.

Analysis

{¶ 8} We begin with Hooks's second proposition of law, because it is dispositive. As noted above, R.C. 2152.12(G) requires notice "to the child's parents, guardian, or other custodian." The statute is written in the disjunctive, such that notification is sufficient if sent to the parents or a guardian or other custodian. Therefore, Hooks contends, the juvenile court satisfied the statutory requirements by serving notice on Turner's biological mother, Tara Turner.

{¶ 9} The court of appeals disagreed, holding that "the legislature did not intend the term ‘parents’ to include a biological mother who has lost all but residual parenting rights and has been implicitly declared an unsuitable parent through a neglect or dependency adjudication." 2016-Ohio-3083, 55 N.E.3d 1133, at ¶ 46. It arrived at this interpretation by applying a canon of statutory construction. But there was no reason for the appellate court to resort to a canon of construction in the first place.

{¶ 10} When the language of a statute is ambiguous, we resort to the rules of construction to discern its meaning. Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles , 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 573 N.E.2d 77 (1991) ("where a statute is found to be subject to various interpretations, a court called upon to interpret its provisions may invoke rules of statutory construction in order to arrive at legislative intent"). We see nothing ambiguous in the language of R.C. 2152.12(G).

{¶ 11} The court of appeals held that R.C. 2152.12(G) was ambiguous because the term "parents" is undefined in the Revised Code and has multiple meanings. 2016-Ohio-3083, 55 N.E.3d 1133, at ¶ 37–38. The appellate court cited the following definition and usage notes for the word "parent":

"The lawful father or mother of someone. In ordinary usage, the term denotes more than responsibility for conception and birth. The term commonly includes (1) either the natural father or the natural mother of a child, (2) the adoptive father or the adoptive mother of a child, (3) the child's putative blood parent who has expressly acknowledged paternity, and (4) any individual or agency whose status as guardian has been established by judicial decree. In law, parental status based on any criterion may be terminated by judicial decree."

Id. at ¶ 37, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1137 (7th Ed.1999). Viewing all these possibilities, the appellate court was unwilling to say that the statutory term had the single clear meaning of biological parent.

{¶ 12} However, there is nothing ambiguous about the meaning of the word "parents" in the statute. A statute is ambiguous " ‘if a reasonable person can find different meanings in the [statute] and if good arguments can be made for either of two contrary positions.’ " (Emphasis added). Sunset Estate Properties, L.L.C. v. Lodi , 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0023-M, 2013-Ohio-4973, 2013 WL 6021470, ¶ 20, quoting 4522 Kenny Rd., L.L.C., v. Columbus Bd. of Zoning Adjustment , 152 Ohio App.3d 526, 2003-Ohio-1891, 789 N.E.2d 246, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.) ; State ex rel. Bailey v. Madison , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-284, 2012-Ohio-4950, 2012 WL 5266320, ¶ 8. In this case, the court is not confronted with contrary or inconsistent interpretations: the statutory notice requirement was satisfied here by service upon a biological parent whose parental rights had not been fully terminated. And where, as here, "the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to apply rules of statutory interpretation." Cline at 96, 573 N.E.2d 77.

{¶ 13} Turner contends that interpreting R.C. 2152.12(G) in the manner Hooks suggests would lead to an absurd result, because it would deprive juvenile defendants of advice and guidance from a competent and fit parental figure at the hearings. It is not the role of this court to decide whether Tara Turner was the best choice to receive notice of Turner's hearings. That is a matter of policy for the General Assembly to assess. It is sufficient to say that notice to her satisfied the statutory requirements.

{¶ 14} We agree with Hooks's second proposition of law and therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. Because we conclude that the state met its notice obligations under R.C. 2152.12(G), it is unnecessary to reach Hooks's remaining propositions of law.

Judgment reversed.

O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., concur.

O'Connor, C.J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.

O'Neill, J., dissents, with an opinion.

O'Connor, C.J., concurring in judgment only.

{¶ 15} R.C. 2152.12(G) requires that before the juvenile court conducts a hearing to transfer a child charged with delinquency to the adult division, the court "shall give notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose" of any hearing "to the child's parents, guardian, or other custodian and to the child's counsel at least three days prior to the hearing." The majority opinion holds that "the statutory notice requirement was satisfied here by service upon a biological parent whose parental rights had not been fully terminated." Majority opinion at ¶ 12. The majority opinion rejects the Fourth District Court of Appeals' conclusion that the statutory language—and, in particular, the word "parents"—is ambiguous.

{¶ 16} But statutory interpretation is not necessary here. Turner does not dispute that a parent was served with notice of his transfer hearing. Instead, his objection is a factual one. He argues that by serving his biological mother, who did not have legal custody, the notice was insufficient to satisfy R.C. 2152.12(G).

{¶ 17} R.C. 2152.12(G) is a notice statute, so the central question is whether notice was sufficient. Adequate notice—notice that satisfies one's due-process rights—is that which is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). Because the "notice required will vary with circumstances and conditions," a rigid formula is impossible. Walker v. Hutchinson , 352 U.S. 112, 115, 77 S.Ct. 200, 1 L.Ed.2d 178 (1956).

{¶ 18} In R.C. 2152.12(G), the General Assembly provided options for who must receive the notice: "the child's parents, guardian, or other custodian." Notice to any one or more of those persons may provide sufficient notice. Any one or more of those options may not. We may presume that the General Assembly intended to comply with the...