Turner v. Joseph Walker School Dist. 9

• Decision Date: 07 November 1949
• Docket Number: 16275.
• Parties: TURNER et al. v. JOSEPH WALKER SCHOOL DIST. NO. 9 et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

56 S.E.2d 243

215 S.C. 472

TURNER et al. v. JOSEPH WALKER SCHOOL DIST. NO. 9 et al.

No. 16275.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 7, 1949

Paslay & Paslay, Spartanburg, for appellants.

J. Davis Kerr, Spartanburg, Thomas A. Evins Spartanburg, for respondents.

FISHBURNE Justice.

The County Board of Education of Spartanburg County ordered the consolidation of Joseph Walker School District No. 9 with Campobello School District No. 49 and Landrum School District No. 45 under the authority vested in the Board by Section 5319 of the Code of 1942. Appellants, who are trustees of Joseph Walker School District, and opposed to the consolidation, appealed on behalf of themselves and other taxpayers, voters and freeholders, to the Court of Common Pleas, which court affirmed the order of the County Board.

The appeal in this case challenges the regularity and validity of the various steps taken before the County Board to effect the consolidation, and seeks a reversal of the decree of the lower court affirming such consolidation.

Petitions purporting to contain the signatures of a majority of the qualified voters and freeholders of each of the above named school districts were duly filed with the County Board of Education on April 9, 1948. Thereafter the Board met, took testimony, heard and considered oral and written arguments from counsel for those sponsoring the consolidation and those opposing consolidation. On May __, 1948, the Board duly filed its 'Findings, Conclusions and Order,' sustaining the validity of the petitions and ordering the consolidation.

When the appeal to the Court of Common Pleas from the action of the County Board came on to be heard, that court overruled a motion of the respondents, previously moticed, to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The motion was based upon the ground that the consolidation of school districts is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the County Board of Education, and that any appeal taken from the findings of such Board lies only to the State Board of Education as provided by Section 5317 of the Code, which section governs in matters of local controversy. And further, that if the question before the County Board was not one of 'local controversy,' as contemplated by Section 5317, no appeal would lie to the Circuit Court, as such court could acquire jurisdiction only by way of petition and writ of certiorari. It was argued that the law provides no method of appeal to the Circuit Court under Code Section 794.

The lower court held that it was vested with jurisdiction, and directed counsel for respondents to argue the case on the exceptions made by the appellants, but specifically stated that such participation would not in any sense constitute a waiver of the contention as to the want of jurisdiction.

As we view the case, the paramount question to be determined is whether the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction to pass upon the appeal from the action of the County Board. That court decided all issues involving the merits favorably to respondents, but overruled the contention made by respondents that it lacked jurisdiction. Other interesting questions are raised by appellants relating to the merits of the controversy, but because of the decision we have reached with reference to the question of jurisdiction, it will not be necessary to consider these.

In our opinion, under the facts and issues made, the lower court was not vested with jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the County Board of Education.

Section 794 of the Code provides in part as follows: 'Appeals from inferior courts--supersedeas--hearing on the papers.--When a judgment is rendered by a magistrate's court, by the county commissioners or any other inferior court or jurisdiction, save the probate court heretofore provided for in this code of procedure, the appeal shall be to the circuit court of the county wherein the judgment was rendered, * * * Provided, that in those counties where county courts are now established or which may hereafter be established appeals in such cases, except those from the probate courts, and those that exceed the jurisdictional amounts of the respective courts, shall be to the county court of the county.'

By the provisions of the above section, the law designates with particularity from what courts an appeal will lie, and has confined appeals to the Court of Common Pleas (or the county court) from judgments rendered by a magistrate's court by the county commissioners or any other inferior court or jurisdiction, save the probate court. As we construe the statute, the County Board of Education does not come within the purview of the law relating to appeals. It is not an inferior court or jurisdiction, for the duties conferred upon it are purely administrative in character. Had the legislature seen fit to permit appeals from the various Boards, it could easily have so stated.

It is well established in this jurisdiction that the right of appeal is not an inherent or vested right, but is a matter of grace. It was unknown to the common law. Horn v. Blackwell, 212 S.C. 480, 48 S.E.2d 322; Cobb v. South Carolina Nat. Bank, 210 S.C. 533, 43 S.E.2d 465; Osteen v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 119 S.C. 438, 112 S.E. 352; 2 Am.Jur., Sec. 6, Page 847. In Horn v. Blackwell, supra [212 S.C. 480, 48 S.E.2d 323], the following principle is quoted from Carmand v. Wall, 1 Bailey, 209: 'It is a general rule that an appeal is not to be allowed from an inferior tribunal, except where it is expressly granted by law. It is not only a rule of the English courts, but it is one by which our courts have uniformly been governed.'

The right of appeal depends upon, and must be found in, the statute, having no existence in the absence of provisions therein conferring it. Schools and School Districts, 56 C.J., Sec. 82, Page 244.

In passing upon the question of whether or not an appeal lies from an administrative board, viz.: the State Board of Canvassers, the court held in Whipper v. Talbird, 32 S.C. 1, 10 S.E. 578, that the statute in question gives no such right of appeal, and that the State Board of Canvassers is not an inferior court or jurisdiction. It was there stated: 'The right of appeal does not exist in every case, and can only be claimed under some constitutional or statutory provision conferring such right.' A kindred question arose in Feldman v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22, in which case it was held that the law provides no mode of procedure for appeal from the order of the Tax Commission revoking the license of a retail liquor dealer, and that the proper method of reviewing the action of the Commission in such case is by writ of certiorari.

This being the settled rule, it is incumbent upon appellants to point out some law investing them with the right of appeal from the action of the Spartanburg County Board. In support of their contention that the Court of Common Pleas is vested with appellate jurisdiction, they cite the case of Patrick v. Maybank, 198 S.C. 262, 17 S.E.2d 530, and the case of School Dist. No. 60 of Williamsburg County v. Montgomery, 150 S.C. 391, 148 S.E. 218. But these cases are in no sense applicable or controlling to the issue here made.

The question involved in Patrick v. Maybank, supra [198 S.C. 262, 17 S.E.2d 533], was based upon facts analogous to those in the current case. In that case the court held that the State Board of Education is without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the action of the County Board of Education, permitting a school district to withdraw from a consolidated school district created by...