Turner v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 27 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:17-cv-888-J-32MCR |
| Parties | ZACHERY KEITH TURNER, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this case by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and accompanying exhibits (Docs. 1-1 through 1-10, "Pet. Ex. ___."). He challenges a state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction and sentence for lewd and lascivious battery on a person less than 16 years of age. Respondent opposes the Petition. (Docs. 25, 28). Petitioner filed a reply brief (Doc. 30), and supplemental authority (Docs. 37, 41). The case is ripe for review.
On April 14, 2011, Petitioner was charged by information with one count of lewd and lascivious battery on a person less than 16 years of age, in violation of Florida Statutes Section 800.04(4). (Resp. Ex. B1 at 14).1 Petitioner was accused of sexually battering a runaway girl named D.S., whom he met while working as a cab driver. Petitioner sought to represent himself at trial and, after a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the trial court ruled Petitioner competent to waive the right to an attorney. (Resp. Ex. B7 at 20-38). As such, Petitioner proceeded to trial pro se, but with the assistance of standby counsel. A jury trial was held on September 30, 2011 (Resp. Ex. B3), after which the jury found Petitioner guilty as charged (Resp. Ex. B1 at 66). On November 22, 2011, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to the maximum sentence of 15 years in prison. (Id. at 122-31, 204).
Petitioner was represented by counsel on direct appeal, who initially filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 739 (1967). (Resp. Ex. B9). The First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) ordered additional briefing on the following issue: "whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing sua sponte to hold a competency hearing after counsel notified the court that she scheduled a competency evaluation for appellant and requested a continuance on that basis, which the court granted." (Resp. Ex. B12). Counsel for both sides filed briefs arguing the merits of that issue. .Ultimately, the First DCA affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence without a written opinion. Turner v. State, 121 So. 3d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
Thereafter, Petitioner filed several post-conviction motions and petitions in state court, none of which succeeded.2 He filed two Petitions Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel (IAAC) in the First DCA, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141. . The First DCA denied both petitions "on the merits." Turner v. State, 145 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Turner v. State, 164 So. 3d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
On June 8, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the trial court, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising two claims of trial court error and one claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Resp. Ex. E2 at 139-73). He raised five more claims of trial court error through two motions for leave to amend. (Resp. Ex. E1 at 1-22 (First Motion for Leave to Amend); Resp. Ex. E2 at 174-94 (Second Motion for Leave to Amend)). The trial court denied relief on all eight grounds. (Resp. Ex. E1 at 25-37).
Petitioner appealed the denial of the Rule 3.850 motion to the First DCA. The First DCA affirmed without a written opinion. Turner v. State, 225 So. 3d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). The federal habeas petition followed.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner's claims on the merits, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). A state court's factual findings are "presumed to be correct" unless rebutted "by clear and convincing evidence." Id. § 2254(e)(1).
AEDPA "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings" and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an unreasonable application of law requires more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) ().
Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citations modified).
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a § 2254 action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present[]" every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also Pope v. Rich, 358 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004) ().
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'" Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To provide the State with the necessary "opportunity," the prisoner must "fairly present" his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court withpowers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner's failure to properly exhaust available state remedies results in a procedural default, which raises a potential bar to federal habeas review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of procedural default as follows:
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