Turner v. State
| Decision Date | 06 November 1922 |
| Docket Number | 241 |
| Citation | 244 S.W. 727,155 Ark. 443 |
| Parties | TURNER v. STATE |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Little River Circuit Court; James S. Steel, Judge affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
June R. Morrell, for appellant.
J S. Utley, Attorney General, Elbert Godwin and W. T. Hammock, Assistants, for appellee.
Appellant was convicted under an indictment charging him with the crime of arson, committed by burning his own house, which was situated in the town of Ashdown.
Under the former statutes of this State it was decided by this court in State v. Hanna, 131 Ark. 129, 198 S.W. 881, that the burning of one's own house did not constitute the crime of arson, but subsequently the Legislature enacted a new statute on the subject (Acts of 1919, p. 66, Crawford & Moses' Digest, § 2417), which reads as follows:
"Every person who shall wilfully and maliciously burn or cause to be burned any dwelling-house or other house, although not herein specifically named, the property of himself or of another person, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be imprisoned in the State Penitentiary for a period of not less than two nor more than ten years."
It did not constitute arson at common law for a person to burn his own house (2nd Wharton on Crim. Law, § 1051), but our statute, quoted above, undoubtedly enlarges the definition so as to make it arson for a person to burn his own house. There can be no doubt about the meaning of the language used in the statute, and we perceive no reason why a statute to that effect should be held to be invalid. Of course, the burning must be maliciously done--that is to say, malicious in the sense of an intention, with bad motive, of violating the law. Shotwell v. State, 43 Ark. 345. Similar statutes have been upheld as valid in other States. State v. Rohfrischt, 12 La.Ann. 382; Shepherd v. People, 19 N.Y. 537; State v. Hurd, 51 N.H. 176; State v. Cohn, 9 Nev. 179.
It was within the power of the Legislature to define the crime of arson and declare what elements should constitute that offense, and it does not conflict with any natural right of man to "do what he will with his own" by making it an offense to wilfully and maliciously burn his own property. We entertain no doubt therefore as to the validity of the statute.
It is next contended that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Appellant owned two adjoining buildings in the town of Ashdown, one of which he occupied himself, the first floor as a grocery store and the second floor as a rooming-house. The other building was occupied by appellant's tenant, a colored woman by the name of Susie Hart. Appellant is a negro himself.
The fire broke out in the early hours of the morning, before daybreak, and the alarm was given by appellant, who, according to the testimony of some of the witnesses, was fully dressed in the same clothes that he had worn the day before and during the early hours of the night. The fire was first discovered to be in the part of the building which was occupied by appellant. The origin of the fire was not proved, and appellant did not undertake to show how it started.
The proof adduced by the State tended to show that appellant had a very small stock of goods in his store, and that he carried an excessive amount of insurance on the buildings. There was proof to the effect that the buildings were not worth more than six or seven hundred dollars and that he carried about $ 2,700 insurance.
Susie Hart and her daughter both testified that shortly before the fire appellant repeatedly approached Susie on the subject of taking out insurance on her household goods in the building, and they testified that he said the houses were "compelled to burn." He made an offer to Susie Hart, according to the testimony, to take out insurance in the sum of $ 2,000, and that if she would agree to give him half of it in case of loss by fire he would pay the premium. Two of the witnesses testified that appellant stated that he knew he was going to the penitentiary and that he was "not going to leave anything here for nobody to enjoy."
A man named Marsh owned a livery stable, or barn, which was located immediately back of appellant's buildings. Marsh was a farmer, living in the country, and he testified that, shortly before the fire, appellant approached him on the subject of taking out insurance, and came to see him two or three times on the subject, informing him (witness) that he was in touch with some insurance companies that would give him insurance on his building.
Another circumstance shown by the State as tending to show bad intention on the part of appellant was that the day before the fire he sent out all the bedclothing in his rooming-house to be washed, and it was not in the building on the night of the fire. Appellant undertook to explain this by saying that a committee had visited his place and told him that he must "clean up" the premises, that he understood this admonition literally and acted upon it. The State undertook to draw out from him the statement that the admonition by the citizens was not meant literally, but that he must put a stop to immoral and unlawful practices in his house.
We are of the opinion that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the fire which destroyed appellant's house was of incendiary origin, and that appellant was the one who set it on fire.
The State introduced a witness, Roberta Brown by name, who testified about the alarm of fire being given, and also testified concerning the statements alleged to have been made by appellant to Susie Hart with reference to insurance on the building. This witness testified that, after the fire occurred, appellant came to see her and asked her "not to tell any more than she had to." This testimony was elicited by questions repeatedly propounded by the prosecuting attorney, and after calling her attention to her testimony before the grand jury. The witness first appeared not to be able to remember very well, but after attention...
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