Turner v. State Dep't of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs.
| Decision Date | 05 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | FSTCV156026331S |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Paul Turner v. State of Connecticut Department of Mental Health & Addiction Svcs |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Effective July 1, 2014, the plaintiff's employment by the defendant was terminated, allegedly for cause. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement covering that employment relationship, a grievance process was initiated, culminating in an arbitration decision directing the defendant to reinstate the plaintiff to his prior position, with back pay etc.
This proceeding was commenced as an application to confirm that arbitration award, and an order confirming the award was entered on October 13, 2015. (#104.00.) Approximately 2 1/2 months later, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking to compel compliance with the arbitration award/judgment, claiming that the defendant had failed/refused to reinstate the plaintiff to his former position. The motion recites a contention of the defendant that " at some point after the Award and prior to the plaintiff's reinstatement, it had changed its policy in a manner that precluded the plaintiff from serving on the Mobile Crisis Unit as previously, " but the motion goes on to contend that there is no evidence of any such policy change and inferentially, no valid reason for the defendant not to have reinstated the plaintiff to his prior position.
Approximately 4 weeks later, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the application to compel compliance, principally arguing that " [t]he Grievant has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedy under the State Employees Relation Act (SERA)[1] aka Collective Bargaining for State Employees which vests in the State Board of Labor Relations exclusive jurisdiction over any prohibited practice arising under SERA." To the extent that the plaintiff also was seeking attorneys fees, the motion to dismiss claims that such a claim is barred by sovereign immunity.
The plaintiff responded to the motion with a memorandum in opposition to the motion, followed by a supplemental memorandum (#109.00 and # 110.00); in mid-May, the plaintiff filed a motion for expedited resolution of the pending issues, claiming urgency based on the plaintiff's medical condition (# 112.00).
Somewhat simplistically, the dispute pits two generally-applicable principles against each other: courts have authority to enforce their judgments (the basis for the plaintiff's claim) but the various entities created within the state Labor Department are entrusted with resolving labor disputes including enforcement of grievance decisions--in particular the State Board of Labor Relations (the basis for the defendant's claim).
The plaintiff does not seem to dispute the baseline proposition that, but for the judicial confirmation of the award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417, the issue of whether the defendant had complied with a final/binding a grievance decision would be entrusted to the State Board of Labor Relations. The Board has statutory authority to resolve claimed failures to comply with grievance awards under the rubric of prohibited practices/unfair labor practices; see especially, General Statutes § § 5-272 through 5-274.
In the matter of State of Connecticut, Eastern Connecticut State University and Protective Services Employees Coalition (Gilbert Miranda), Decision No. 4281 at page 14 (January 18, 2008)[2] (footnote referring to specific provision in MERA, omitted).[3]
In light of the almost 30-year history of this interpretation as recited in ECSU, the court concludes that this constitutes " a time-tested interpretation by the board" that is entitled to deference by the court, Vincent v. City of New Haven, 285 Conn. 778, 783-84, n.8, 941 A.2d 932 (2008).
The ECSU decision involved a situation having parallels to the present one--the extent to which there must be literal and rigorous compliance with an award, consideration of otherwise-applicable provisions relating to work assignments, etc. There are potential subtleties that may implicate considerations beyond the four corners of the award, e.g., is the claimed improper reassignment a matter of noncompliance with the grievance decision, or is it a potentially-grievable failure to comply with the collective bargaining provisions relating to assignments/reassignments?[4]
Under the approach advanced by the plaintiff, the confirmation of a grievance award via General Statutes § 52-417 ousts the Board of jurisdiction to determine whether the conduct of the defendant comports with the decision as confirmed. The court understands the formal and almost simplistic nature of the analysis--once converted to a judgment, the award is entitled to the full panoply of rights associated with a judgment--but in that analysis, to other considerations that point in a different direction are effectively ignored.
The related concepts of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are based on the recognition that administrative bodies develop expertise in handling matters entrusted to them, and it is more efficient to allow the agencies to attempt to address disputes prior to seeking judicial recourse.
[A] primary purpose of the [exhaustion] doctrine is to foster an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review, offering a reviewing court the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions. It relieves courts of the burden of prematurely deciding questions that, entrusted to an agency, may receive a satisfactory administrative disposition and avoid the need for judicial review . . . Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to [the legislature's] delegation of authority to coordinate branches of [g]overnment, that agencies, not the courts, [should] have primary responsibility for the programs that [the legislature] has charged them to administer . . . Therefore, exhaustion of remedies serves dual functions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessarily burdened with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency's role in administering its statutory responsibilities. (Internal quotation marks and citation, omitted.) Piteau v. Board of Education of the City of Hartford, 300 Conn. 667, 679, n.13, 15 A.3d 1067 (2011).
Piteau makes it clear that when the subject is an unfair or prohibited labor practice by a municipal employer, recourse through the State Board of Labor Relations is mandatory, and the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to address the substance of such a claim (prior to Board action). Piteau is based on application of MERA, General Statutes § 7-467 et seq., and especially General Statutes § 7-471. There are analogous provisions relating to State employees, General Statutes § 5-272, but in the listing of explicitly-prohibited practices of State-level employers, there is no counterpart to General Statutes § 7-470(a)(6), making it a prohibited practice when an employer " [refuses] to comply with a grievance settlement, or arbitration settlement, or a valid award or decision of an arbitration panel or arbitrator . . ." ECSU, discussed above, fills that lacuna.[5]
As noted earlier, the issues raised by the plaintiff do not neatly fit into the category of enforcement of the grievance decision, especially in light of the recognition that reassignment is not prohibited in connection with a reinstatement. The defendant invokes statutory and contractual provisions relating to managerial prerogatives, and the plaintiff notes that reassignment is a permitted managerial action (by a procedure claimed not to have been followed). So is the claim of failure to assign the plaintiff to his former position a matter of non-compliance with the grievance decision, or is it a potentially-grievable failure to comply with the collective bargaining provisions relating to the manner in which assignments/reassignments are to be undertaken?
The plaintiff relies on the trial court decision in Independent Labor Union v. Town of Wallingford, No. J.D. New Haven, CV000441784S, 2001 WL 686862 (May 23, 2001), but the court finds it to be unpersuasive. Of primary concern is that in the cited case, the issue of mandatory resort to the State Labor Board--the issue raised here--does not appear to have been raised.
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